Logistical Support of Airmobile Operations information
for USAASC
18 AVN CO
57 TC CO
For date 620126
USAASC was a US Army unit
18 AVN CO was a US Army unit
57 TC CO was a US Army unit
Primary service involved, US Army
Khanh Hoa Province, II Corps, South Vietnam
Location, Nha Trang
Description: The following is the sixth installment (an extract) from the US Army Aviation System Command, March 1971 publication titled: "Logistical Support of Airmobile Operations, Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1971"
Things Stiffen Up
At this early date in 1962, there were still no effective logistics web of Army air capability netting the entire area of operations. Helicopter companies functioned within their own assigned areas and were only occasionally employed together in complex operations because of their range limitations. To some extent, the logistics gap was bridged upon arrival from Fort Riley, Kansas, in January 1962 of the 18th Aviation Company (U-1A Otter). To provide a utility air-net capability throughout the country, their aircraft were deployed at Tan Son Nhut to service the IV Corp area, at Nha Trang to serve the III Corp area, and at Qui Nhon to accommodate requirements in the I and II Corps areas in the northern part of the country.
The delivery of aircraft parts and supplies to aviation units widely separated from their support elements was a notable accomplishment of the "stiff-wings", and they unquestionably enhanced the ability of these aviation units to maintain their aircraft and perform their assigned missions.(7)
Aviation Logistics Support Posture (1961-1962)(10)
Although elements in Okinawa were originally responsible for logistics support of the developing situation in RVN, the 9th Logistical Command in Okinawa was later bypassed in favor of developing a TD (Table of Distribution) unit tailored to meet the peculiar requirements of the Vietnam operation. This placed the TD activity in the position of needing to be fully operation at the same time it was trying to formulate, activate and organize. This initial logistics impact and the requirement to accommodate rapidly expanding requirements created a difficult situation, the effects of which were felt for some time.
Various pressures were also experienced because RVN requirements had not been programmed and funded for in the initial phases of the commitment. This initial supply posture of minimum response capability was a result of several previous years of austere programming and funding, necessitating severe limitations on inventories. The initial actions taken in satisfying RVN requirements created a critically depleted stockage situation for certain items. Although additional money was authorized in February 1962, it was not made available immediately and procurement could not be initiated until late May and June of 1962. The long lead-time required for procurement of some aircraft items further complicated the situation that existed during the first year in RVN. Table 1 reflects the supply posture pertaining to H-21 helicopters in the early years.
FY 62 FY 63
CONUS Depots 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr
(Millions of Dollars)
Stock on Hand 27.8 23.7 17.5 14.8 14.6
Stock Due In 16.2 18.0 24.6 24.2 28.4
Stock Due Out 2.3 5.2 7.5 5.3 7.0
Issues 4.2 5.8 6.1 9.8 6.2
Table 1. CONUS Supply Posture, CH-21 Repair Parts (1961-1962)
Examination of Table 1 reveals the following:
a. A continuing drain of depot inventories and a downward tread in depot stocks (a situation which had not reversed by the fall of 1962).
b. An improved procurement due-in position (causing a reversal in the depletion aspect in the 4th Qtr FY 63).
c. An increasing demand rate (issues and due-outs), reflecting unprogrammed deployment of aircraft to RVN during 1962.
In addition to increased logistics requirements to accommodate the increased flying hour program, extremely high support requirements attributable to the environmental and tactical situation were generated. For example, approximately 60 rotor blade sets per month were needed during the monsoon season to support the fleet of approximately 100 H-21s. (This is in addition to the many blade repairs accomplished by the supporting field maintenance detachments.) Also, the 57th Transportation Company required over 50 engine replacements in their first full year of operations. The engine overhaul contract in CONUS was terminated and the function assumed by the Army Aeronautical Depot Maintenance Center (ARADMAC), Corpus Christi, Texas. Army aviation's in-house depot facility, in a continuing effort to improve engine reliability. The primary problem in this regard, however, was the unsuitability of the engine for the H-21 helicopter.
Carrying the Ball
During these early days of US Army aviation in RVN before an adequate supply system and maintenance support system were available, the aviation units existed and accomplished their missions principally by the application of highly innovative and sometime ingenious techniques by the extremely well-trained and highly experienced maintenance personnel and commanders. As described earlier, military technicians, in some instances, trained civilian contractors (such as Air America) who thereafter expanded to provide a wider scope of support. Crash-and battle-damaged aircraft in the "boneyards" were cannibalized for every usable part and component. The highly experienced and dedicated H-21 pilots performed feats with their aircraft which - with lesser experienced pilots - would have dictated mission aborts to prevent possible damage to aircraft or loss of life; the maintenance personnel and crew chiefs worked long hours, day and night, to keep their aircraft flyable. Dedicated crew chiefs, on many occasions, literally taped and wired and held their aircraft together, permitting them to be flown back to home base rather than have them face possible destruction in hostile areas.
As an example of aircraft utilization in these first helicopter companies, the 57th (later designated the 120th Aviation Company) logged over 17,000 flying hours, over 15,000 ton-miles, over one million passenger-miles, and over 20,000 combat support sorties during the period December 1961 to January 1964.(11)
Vietnam Advisory Campaign (15 March 1962 - 7 March 1965)
Tactical Situation (12)
North Vietnam planned in 1960 to infiltrate large numbers of reinforcements to the underground Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam; this was accomplished during the rainy season in 1961. Thereafter, Viet Cong attacks occurred throughout South Vietnam. At this time, and up until early 1965, the primary mission of US military forces was to advise and assist GVN forces in building its military structure - to fulfill the needs of its national security. Because of the increasing scope and intensity of VC operations, this advisory task expanded very rapidly during this period. For example: VC regular forces grew steadily from two to five regimental headquarters, VC battalions doubled in the same period; quality and quantity of weapons and equipment improved considerably. This buildup of VC forces necessitated the deployment of additional US aviation units for counteraction; the deployment of additional aviation units required rapid growth, modernization and technical improvements in logistical support operations. From a single transportation battalion with three helicopter companies in early 1962, an enormous operational and logistical support complex was developed consisting of many battalions with many helicopter companies, fixed-wing units, maintenance units and other special purpose organizations.
The source for this information was 34 GS Grp CD prepared by George G. Reese Jr. contains scan copies of the manual
Additional information is available on CD-ROM.
Please send additions or corrections to: Gary Roush Email address: webmaster@vhpa.org
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Last updated
07/15/2002
Date posted on this site:
05/13/2023