combat operations after-action report information
for 2 BDE 25 INF
11 CAB
From date 660314 to 660319
2 BDE 25 INF was a US Army unit
11 CAB was a US Army unit
Primary service involved, US Army
Operation HONOLULU
Hau Nghia Province, III Corps, South Vietnam
Description: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225
AVTLBDB-T 8 April 1966
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96225
1. OPORD 17-66 (Operation HONOLULU)
2. 140630 March 1966 - 192025 March 1966.
3. 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division conducted search and destroy operation in HAU NGHIA Province in TAOR PINAPPLE coordinates (XS5188, XT3720, XT5416, XT6705). OPORD 17-6 was issued 101200 March 1966. Initially the operation was two-battalion sized with a forward Brigade Command Post. One battalion conducted an airmobile assault into a landing zone east of the Oriental /River, the other an overland move to a forward assembly area. On order search and destroy operation were to be conducted in assigned battalion TAORS. Colonel L. M. Johnson, Jr. is the reporting officer. Task organization and commanders were as follows:
1/5 Inf (Lt Col Greer Cmdg) Rear Det (Lt Col Cawthra Cmdg)
Sqd B/65 Engr 1/27 Inf
FAC 1/69 Armor (-)
OH23 2/32 Arty (-) GSR
Btry A 1/8 Arty
2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cmdg) Elms, HHC, 2Bde
Sqd B/65 Engr 2d Spt Bn (-)
FAC Co C, 65th Engr
OH23
Bde Control
1/8 Arty (-) (Lt Col Walker Cmdg)
Btry C 2/32 Arty GSR
HHC, 2d Bde (-)
A 3/4 Cav
Co B/65 Engr (-)
Elms 2d Spt Bn
4. Intelligence.
a. Analysis of terrain:
Terrain in the area of operations was generally low and flat XT4912, XT5512, XT6006, XT4906, XT4117 is trafficable most of the year for tracked vehicles. The terrain within 1200 meters along the Oriental River was considered unsuitable for tracked vehicles since many streams and swamps are prevalent. Hamlets and populated areas were located throughout the area. Ground observation was poor in the cultivated, full growth sugar cane area, which also canalized friendly movements to existing trails and open areas. The area south, east, and north of BAO TRAI was interlaced with small forest patches, affording concealment and partial cover to enemy forces. Fields of fire and air observation were generally excellent, except in the sugar cane fields and dense woods.
b. Intelligence prior to operations.
The area was believed to be completely controlled and dominated by the VC. A study of the troop dispositions, installations, bunkers, base areas and trench systems indicated that the area southwest of BAO TRAI was extensively used by the VC. The Oriental River and trails along the river had been used as a major logistical route. Two main force battalions and one separate company were reported operating in the area.
c. Enemy situation during operation.
As the Brigade Task Force moved into the area, the VC units went into hiding and infiltrated across the Oriental River to the West. The VC made maximum use of snipers, booby traps, and mines to inflict casualties on friendly forces. Enemy activity was heaviest on the first day with a definite decrease on the following days as the VC had a chance to slip out of the area.
5. Mission: 2d Bde Task Force was to conduct operations in TAOR PINEAPPLE to locate and destroy VC forces, base camps and disrupt VC infiltration routes along the Oriental River commencing 14 March 1966.
6. Concept of the Operation: The operation was conducted in eight phases.
Phase I: A 3/4 Cav secured route Blue from vic CU CHI to vicinity BAO TRAI XT526045 in coordination with ARVN Ranger Battalion.
Phase II: Task Force 1/8 Artillery moved by road to Position ACE for support of operations.
Phase III: 1/5 Infantry (Mech) moved over route Blue to forward assembly area.
Phase IV: 2/27 Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into LZ QUEEN with the 1/5 Infantry (Mech) simultaneously moving from assembly area to area of operations.
Phase V: 1/5 Infantry (Mech) and 2/27 Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in respective TAORS, to include disrupting VC infiltration route along the Oriental River. Inclosure 1.
Phase VI: 2d Bde Forces redeployed to Northeast portion of TAOR PINEAPPLE and continued search and destroy operations. Inclosure 2.
Phase VII: 2d Bde Forces continued search and destroy operations in TAOR PINEAPPLE to include airmobile assault of 1/27 Infantry Task Force to LZ's vic XT515156 and XT537157. Inclosure 3.
Phase VIII: Bde Task Force units returned to Base Camp on order.
7. Execution: D-Day (14 March 1966).
Phase I: A 3/4 Cav conducted a route clearing operation and secured route Blue commencing 140630 March 66, and in conjunction with ARVN Ranger Battalion positioned forces along the road between BAO TRAI and CU CHI. During clearance of Brigade Forward CP, four anti-personnel mines were detonated and one AT mine detonated throwing a tank track vic XT532035. There were no VC contacts during occupation of the Brigade Forward CP.
Phase II: At 140730 March 66, 1/8 Artillery Task Force with Brigade HHC elements moved to vicinity of BAO TRAI (XT531035). Upon arrival in forward area a 15 minute preparation was fired on LZ QUEEN using VT fuze. A total of 190 105 and 27 8" rounds were fired.
Phase III: 1/5 Infantry (Mech) moved along route Blue commencing 140715 March 66 to the attack position vic XT510034 without opposition. Upon arrival in the attack position, Recon Platoon located several bunkers and two sampans vic XT543022. All were destroyed. By 0931 hours, all elements were in the attack position.
Phase IV: By 140845 2/27 Infantry formed at the loading zone. At 0937 fifty helicopters arrived. By 1025 all units had landed on LZ. Light small arms fire was received on one LZ. There were no friendly casualties during the landing. At 1000 1/5 Mech initiated their search and destroy operations.
Phase V:
1/5 Infantry (Mech)
By 1130 hours 1/5 Mech units were unable to continue their mounted attack, due to swampy conditions in their TAOR. Two companies moved abreast while on company trailed. While attempting to extract several mined tracks, Co B was brought under enemy SA fire by VC squad vic XT485017. Fire was immediately returned; the VC were routed leaving behind packs, clothing, equipment, ammunition, grenades, and documents. At 1300 Co B again made contact vic XT483006 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (Poss). Co B captured a VC in hole vic XT485017. The company suffered 2 WIA's from sniper fire at 1530. By 1700 all units coiled for the night.
2/27 Infantry
Objective KING was secured by 1250, with only light resistance being encountered. The Battalion was airlifted to the objective area. Light small arms fire was received from West of the Oriental River. Upon seizure and control of objective, companies initiated search and destroy operations in their zones. During these operations, three VC were captured and evacuated. A French carbine and an M-1 were captured. Seven refugees were evacuated. The battalion received light harassing fire and two incoming mortar rounds during the night.
D + 1 (15 March 1966)
1/5 Infantry (Mech) - The Battalion continued search and destroy operations in southeastern portion of TAOR PINEAPPLE. At 1100 Co C discovered three rocket launcher rounds and numerous CHICOM grenades in a hut vic XT 485018. Another weapons cache vic XT 498005 was found to contain ammunition, weapons parts, combat packs and equipment. The battalion was harassed by sporadic small arms fire and booby traps throughout the day. VC fired on medical evacuation ships during extraction of wounded. There were five friendly WIA's and one KIA during the day. By 1750 all units were in position for the night.
2/27 Infantry - One VC was killed at 0230 when attempting to penetrate A Co's line. The Battalion encountered only light resistance during the day. The VC used evasive tactics during all contacts. By 1930 all units had returned to the battalion base and established defensive positions. At 1500 Co B was alerted for an Eagle flight to vic XT482085 where seventy VC were reportedly assembling. Co B departed at 1630 when the aircraft became available and joined a platoon from 3/4 Cav in the vicinity of the objective. There was no contact as a result of the action and Co B returned by 1900. Two ambush patrols were dispatched at darkness. Again, the battalion perimeter was lightly probed during the night.
At 150800 Frag ORD 1 to OPORD 17-66 (Operation HONOLULU) was issued. This Frag ORD outlined the shifting of Brigade Task Force forces on 17 March to northwest portion of TAOR PINEAPPLE for continuance of search and destroy operations.
D + 2 (16 March 1966)
1/5 Infantry (Mech) - Battalion units finalized clearance of the southeastern portion of TAOR PINEAPPLE. Several marked mine fields were found throughout the area. All mine field signs were booby trapped. At 1522 Co C engaged an estimated two squads of VC using small arms and automatic weapons vic XT506978. The company used fire and maneuver in conjunction with mortars and artillery against VC. There were an estimated 10 VC KIA. All units had closed the battalion base area by 2045. Four ambushes were established, one sprung vic XT522013 resulting in one VC KIA (BC). A VC, believed to have been wounded in the ambush, was captured the next morning on the battalion perimeter.
2/27 Infantry - Co C conducted an Eagle Flight to vic XT584017 at 1030. The company landed and began search and destroy operations with a platoon from A 3/4 Cav acting as a blocking force. There was no organized VC resistance, but numerous mine fields were encountered. Sixteen VC suspects were evacuated. Each house in the area had a bunker adjacent to it. Booby trapped grenades on bamboo sticks with trip wires caused seven friendly WIA's. At 1045 the Battalion began its move to new area in accordance with Frag ORD 1. Companies A and B conducted foot marches to the new area. Co C, after completing their operation moved to the new area vic XT537061.
Phase VI:
D + 3 (17 March 1966)
1/8 Artillery - The battalion conducted a motor march to new fire support base vic XT487103 commencing 0700. There were only 102 -155mm rounds and 16 - 8" rounds fired in support of the day's operations. The Brigade Command Post with A Troop 3/4 Cav (-) remained in Position ACE.
1/5 Infantry (Mech) - The Battalion conducted a three-pronged advance to the northwestern portion of TAOR PINEAPPLE. Co A on the left, Co C in the center and the Reconnaissance Platoon on the right flank. Co B trailed the lead elements, conducting detailed search and destroy operations to the rear of the main elements. The Reconnaissance Platoon located a classroom with trenches and tunnels leading out of the area vic XT448159. The classroom had a seating capacity of 25. Four feet of the classroom were below ground level.
By 1230 hours all units had reached their main objective areas just east of the Oriental River. The Reconnaissance Platoon detained 56 civilians, one of whom was identified by National Police as a VC. At 1800 Co C vicinity XT401178 engaged five VC's resulting in estimated 3 VC KIA.
2/27 Infantry - The Battalion executed an airmobile move from landing zone vic XT530057 to LZ vic XT436122 in Northwest portion of TAOR. The battalion attacked northwest on two aces attempting to drive the enemy against the Oriental River as the 1/5 Mech attacked to the north. Companies A and B moved abreast to seize objectives vic XT420128 and XT438135. The entire area was heavily booby trapped. Only light small arms fire was encountered. During airlift of the battalion (-) to the forward Command Post, the security platoon at the loading zone was brought under heavy small arms fire by VC squad. There were no friendly casualties, however, and the move was completed without further incident.
D + 4 (18 March 1966)
1/5 Infantry (Mech) - The two forward companies continued search and destroy operations in positions adjacent to the eastern bank of the Oriental /River. B Co search the area to their rear. The Reconnaissance Platoon discovered a 24 ton rice cache vic XT467156. A considerable portion of the rice was evacuated from the area. By 1930 all units were in the assembly area and preparing for night operations.
2/27 Infantry - Commencing 0900 Company A conducted an airmobile assault west of the Oriental River to the vic XT398152 in accordance with Frag ORD 2 issued 162000 March 66. There were no VC contacts and extraction was completed by 1300. During clearance operations in the Battalion area, one VC KIA (BC) six VC were captured and 2 VC suspects were evacuated. At 0800 A Troop 3/4 Cav and a platoon from B Co 65th Engineers conducted a daylight sweep vic XT540110. The Task Force failed to make a significant contact, but did retrieve a Vietnamese Ranger who reported he had been kidnapped by VC. At the same time, he indicated approximately 100 VC were located vic XT529113.
Phase VII and VIII
D + 5 (19 March 1966)
1/5 Infantry (Mech) - Based upon information provided by the Vietnamese Ranger and other reports, Company C departed the assembly area at 0025. The Co reported to be in position by 0545. Upon search of objective area vic XT525106 no VC were found. By 0700 the Battalion (-) moved east searching central portion of TAOR PINEAPPLE. An estimated 10 VC were killed vic XT565094 in brief encounter with Co A. At 1635 units began movement to Base Camp. All elements had closed by 1930.
2/27 Infantry - The Battalion conducted local search operations in their assigned area. The Battalion conducted an airmobile extraction to Base Camp which was completed by 1950.
1/27 Infantry (+) - In accordance with Frag ORD 3 to OPORD 17-66, 1/27 Infantry conducted airmobile assault to link up with a combined ?arms land element to conduct search and destroy operations vic XT500157, XT553155, XT560140, XT507140. The mounted force consisting of A 1/69 Armor (-), one platoon from C 1/27 Infantry, and the Battalion reconnaissance platoon which moved overland to blocking positions on the eastern edge of the objective area. Companies A and C with one tank platoon attached to each, swept their respective areas from North to South. Numerous tunnels and trenches in the objective were destroyed. The battalion had no significant contact during their sweep. The battalion conducted a combined foot and motor march, closing base camp by 2025.
7. Results:
Friendly Losses Enemy Losses:
KIA: 2 KIA: 45 (BC) 112 (POSS)
WIA: 56 VCC: 18
NON BATTLE LOSS: 1 VCS: 51
52,700 lbs rice captured
24 Sampans destroyed
152 structures destroyed
Numerous tunnels and bunkers
destroyed
8. Supporting Forces.
a. Artillery Support
(1) Organization for combat:
(a) 1/8 Arty (-) Reinf, GS 2d Bde
(b) 2/32 Arty (-), GSR 1/8 Arty
(c) A 1/8 Arty attached 2/32 Arty (-) effective 140700
March 66
(2) How and when artillery employed:
(a) 1/8 Artillery conducted 15 minute preparation on
LZ for 2/27 Infantry on D Day.
(b) The Battalion displaced on 17 March to vicinity
XT487103 to support operations in northwestern
portion of TAOR PINEAPPLE.
(c) On 18 March the battalion fired 314 rds at
coordinates XT529113 where VC battalion was
reported, resulting in estimated 38 VC KIA.
(d) H and I fires were conducted during the hours
of darkness throughout the operation.
(e) On call fires were provided quickly and accurately
as required.
(3) Results of artillery: The artillery proved effective in clearing landing zones and provided fire power when and where needed through the operation.
b. US Air Force.
(1) An initial air strike was utilized to prepare landing zone QUEEN for 2/27 Infantry on first day of the operation.
(2) During the remainder of the operation close air support was available by utilizing ground alert aircraft or diverting airborne fighters from lower priority targets.
(3) Nineteen missions were flown during the operation resulting in fifty-one structures destroyed, 26 damaged, 11 sampans destroyed, 2 secondary explosions, and 13 KBA (BC) 33 KBA (POSS).
c. Army Aviation.
(1) 11th Aviation Battalion provided the following support:
(a) 50 UH1D helicopters and escorts for airlift of 2/27 Infantry from base camp to LZ QUEEN.
(b) 3 Command and control aircraft; one for each CO, 2d Brigade, CO 1/5 Infantry (Mech), CO, 2/27 Infantry.
(c) Four UH1D were utilized by Brigade S-4 for resupply missions.
(d) One light fire team was maintained on continuous ground alert at the Brigade Forward Command Post.
(2) The 2d Brigade Aviation section provided continuous OH-23 support.
(3) The two battalion-sized assaults and the battalion-sized extraction were conducted smoothly and efficiently.
(4) Three Eagle flights were conducted. Army Air Support responded quickly and contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the operations.
9. Administration and Logistics:
a. Supply
(1) Four UH1D's were requested and utilized for each day of the operation. Resupply of the maneuver battalions was effected by these helicopters.
(2) The use of 2d Bde form, Request for Resupply, facilitated the gathering of logistical data and aided the pilots since coordinates, frequencies and tonnages are included in the form.
(3) Brigade S-4 controlled all resupply helicopters. Units submitted requests and placed loads in vicinity of helipads. The helicopters were then allocated according to the activities of the units and the priorities established.
b. In most cases, casualty reporting was accomplished through written messages delivered to base camp by resupply helicopter.
c. Signal
(1) Difficulty was experienced in establishing initial VHF contact with higher headquarters.
(2) Long distance wire communications were extremely difficult to maintain.
(3) There was insufficient power to drive two VHF systems from MRC-69.
(4) A radio relay team was employed during late stages of the operation to facilitate communications with the maneuver battalions.
10. Special Equipment and Techniques: Aluminum balk for engineer bridges used as footing proved very helpful in recovery operations of track vehicles. 100 ft. cables are also a necessity in recovery operations.
11. Commander's Analysis:
a. The operation proved the ability of the Brigade Task Force to operate effectively in an extended operation away from base camp.
b. Valuable experience was gained in the employment of mechanized and armored units. Both proved to be effective in combating the VC in the terrain traversed during this operation and under the weather conditions which prevailed.
c. The Brigade Task Force demonstrated its ability to conduct effective airmobile operations and Eagle Flights.
d. Bunching continued to be a problem. Commanders at all echelons must emphasize dispersion and continuous alertness.
e. Too much reliance was placed on aerial photos. All coordinates and overlays must be reported on the 1:50,000 map.
f. Additional emphasis must be placed on rapid reaction by artillery. This can only be accomplished by more rapid and accurate reporting of friendly unit locations.
g. Speed and thoroughness must be emphasized in village searches. Units must search all areas during sweep operations. Tracks can be used to clear densely vegetated areas and destroy booby traps.
h. Radio security required more emphasis. All units must be security conscious. Also units must carefully tune their sets to the Brigade NCS.
i. Night ambushes are more effective the first night during an operation than the second or third night.
j. Maximum utilization of aircraft is a must. Supply ships should retrieve POW's and slightly injured personnel whenever possible. OH23's must be used sparingly and only for specific missions. Supplies should be brought in prior to 1700 hrs. Continuous on-station surveillance is unnecessary and costly in terms of aircraft maintenance.
k. Gunships were not used properly at all times. Units must be prepared to move and report their location at all times so gunships can be allowed to engage VC targets close in.
l. Squad leaders thru company commandeers must utilize the compass more often for navigation in their terrain.
m. Units must always be prepared to react rapidly and aggressively in order to take advantage of enemy information.
n. Crossing rivers or streams must be closely supervised and well controlled.
o. Civil Affairs:
(1) Numerous loud speaker and leaflet drop missions were flown during the operation.
(2) Medcap II was held in the villages of Duc Lap (XT5505) and So Do (XT5106). 340 civilians were treated.
p. Use and Effectiveness if IPW team.
(1) IPW teams were located and controlled at the Brigade Command Post.
(2) The US IPW Teams, even with ARVN interpreters, are greatly restricted by the language barrier.
12. Conclusions and Lessons Learned:
a. Definite convoy procedures must be established. Drivers must be thoroughly oriented on these procedures.
b. FM retransmission should be planned for any exercise when the Brigade CP is to be more than 5 kilometers from the Battalion CP's.
c. A water resupply capability must exist at the supply helipad area to facilitate rapid filling of water cans.
d. A Battalion officer must be present at the helipad to insure proper resupply is effected to his battalion.
e. Ground to air communications must be established and resupply effected SASP. When using smoke, units must wait for pilot to identify smoke. Units must not identify smoke for pilot.
f. Unit OIC's of resupply should accompany day's first resupply lift. Unit locations are verified and supply requirements confirmed.
g. All leaders must be qualified to call artillery fire, since the FO's are most often with the company commander.
h. An "overnight box", with such items as trip flares, claymores, starlight devices and sniper scopes, can be dropped off to companies in the evening and picked up in the morning.
i. Mounted sweeps alone will not produce results. Detailed foot-mobile searches must be conducted. Armored vehicles are best utilized to move forward and destroy booby traps in order to reduce casualties to infantrymen.
j. Radio operators must be rotated. Fresh and alert operators will contribute to better communications.
k. Troops must dig in even in marshy areas. Prone shelters in marshy areas will save lives in the event of mortar attack.
l. Extraction procedures in an airmobile operation are critical. A security element must be deployed so as to block all approaches to the loading zone. Withdrawal of the security force outpost and finally the security force itself to the loading zone should be accomplished with speed and efficiency. A small command post element should remain and extract with the last lift. Use of gunships and planned artillery fire is mandatory.
m. Platoons should have at least two protective masks in each platoon for use in tunnels that have had CS and CW used in them.
n. The attachment of additional National Police and ARVN interpreters to units would facilitate operations in built up areas. This would alleviate the problem of moving interpreters from one flank to another as needed.
The source for this information was Vietnam Source document prepared by Ron Leonard
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