combat operations after-action report information
for 2 BDE 25 INF
196 LIB

From date 670108 to 670126


2 BDE 25 INF was a US Army unit
196 LIB was a US Army unit
Primary service involved, US Army
Operation CEDAR FALLS
Binh Duong Province, III Corps, South Vietnam
Location, Ho Bo Woods
Description: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. 20310 AGAM-P (M) (20 Apr 67) 26 April 1967 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Operation CEDAR FALLS, 25TH Infantry Division (U) TO: SEE DISTRIBAUTION 1. Forwarded as enclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Cedar Falls., conducted by the 25th Infantry Division during the period 8 - 26 January 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. Kenneth G. Wickham, Major General, USA, The Adjutant General DISTRIBUTION: Commanding General US Army Combat Development Command Commandants US Army Command and General Staff College US Army War College US Army Air Defense School US Army Artillery and Missile School US Army Armor School US Army Chemical Corps School US Army Engineer School US Army Military Police School US Army Intelligence School US Army Infantry School US Army Medical Field Service School US Army Ordnance School US Army Quartermaster School US Army Security Agency School US Army Transportation School US Army Signal School US Army Special Warfare School US Army Civil Affairs School Copies furnished to: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Research Analysis Corporation (Library) Security Officer, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory South East Asia Forces, OSD (SA) Office of the Director of Defense Research & Engineering, ODD (SEAM) ODDR&E DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS 25th INFANTRY DIVISION APO San Francisco 97225 COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATIONS CEDAR FALLS 1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a search and destroy and blocking operation along the SAIGON River to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas, denying the use of the SAIGON River in the sector to VC/NVA forces. This operation was conducted in two phases. Phase I: (D Day) 25th Inf Div under the guise of normal operations deploys the 196th Bde (reinf) by air and ground means to seize the critical ground overlooking the SAIGON River in the HO BO Woods and destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector. Phase II: a. (D+1 to D+9) 2nd Bde deployed by ground means to blocking positions along the SAIGON River in sector. The 2nd and 196th Bdes prevented VC/NVA exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE area, and controlled the SAIGON River in their sectors to deny its use by VC/NVA forces. b. Brigade blocking forces conducted detailed search of their sectors and destroyed VC/NVA forces and installations. 2. DATE OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 - 26 January 1967. 3. LOCATION Along the SAIGON River from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG. 4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV 5. REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Frederick C. Weyand, 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67 6. TASK ORGANIZATION: 25th Inf Div: 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div: 1st Bn, 27th Inf 2nd Bn, 27th Inf. 2nd Bn, 34th Armor 1st Bn, 8th Arty (DS) 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (-) (GS) B Co, 65th Engr Bn (-) 196th Inf Bde (LT) (SEP) 2nd Bn, 1st Inf F Trp, 17th Cav 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty 2nd Bn, (M), 22nd Inf A Btry, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty 3rd Bn, 21st Inf 175th Engr Co. B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav 7. SUPPORTING FORCES: a. Air Support During Phases I and II air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers. A total of 409 sorties were flown in the area of the operations from 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67. B-52 strikes were flown in the AO during the period in support of the operations. They are as follows: DATE / TIME STRUCK AREA COVERED 060200 Jan 67: XT626303 - XT634314, XT648282 - XT656296 070240 Jan 67: XT582312 - XT586303, XT612322 - XT616312 070200 Jan 67: XT649290 - XT660293, XT653270 - XT669274 061600 Jan 67: XT654248 - XT665270, XT660242 - XT672246 190400 Jan 67: XT570352 - XT601359, XT574340 - XT604347 b. Artillery Support: (1) 5 January: A command and control element from HQ Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty and A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty displaced from CU CHI Base Camp to vicinity TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center. A Btry, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty (8" - 175mm) moved from CU CHI to TRUNG LAP and was GSR to the 25th Inf Div. A platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty (AWSP) were attached to 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (-) to provide security for the fire support base,. The MPQ-4 Radar Section from 7th Bn, 11th Arty was attached to the 3rd Bn, 13th Arty at TRUNG LAP. (2) 6 - 7 January: No change in status or location of units. (3) 8 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS commenced with the 1st Bn, 8th Arty, located in CU CHI Base Camp providing direct support to the 2nd Bde, A Btry, 3rd Bn. 13th Arty was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty from its fire support base at TRUNG LAP. D Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty was in general support of the 25th Division from its location in CU CHI Base Camp. (p2) (4) 9 - 12 January: No change in status or location of units. (5) 13 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from base camp at vic XT74701464 to better support the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The 8" platoon of A Btry, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty displaced from TRUNG LAP to vic TON SON NHUT, and a platoon of D Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty moved from CU CHI to the TRUNG LAP fire support base, and was attached to A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty. (6) 14 January: No change in status or location of units. (7) 15 January: 8" platoon from A Btry, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty returned to TRUNG LAP, and the 8" platoon from D Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty was detached from A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty and returned to CU CHI Base Camp. (8) 16 - 20 January: No change in status or location of units. (9) 21 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from XT74701464 to CU CHI Base Camp. (10) 22 - 24 January: No change in status or location of units. (11) 26 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated HQ Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (-); A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty; A Btry, 2nd Bn,. 32nd Arty and the platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty displaced by convoy from TRUNG LAP to CU CHI Base Camp. . (12) Special Equipment and Techniques: During the operation, Armor Infantry units established multiple base camps and forward positions in the FILHOL Plantation and HO BO and BOI LOI Woods. Up to this time there had been little or no target area survey because of the lack of high ground for a target area base and because of the requirement for an inordinate amount of security for isolated survey parties. Taking advantage of the security offered by the forward bases and by using DME's with NUI BA DEN as a control base, the survey parties were able to establish control in areas that are frequently target areas. (13) Commanders Analysis: With the artillery fire support originating from CU CHI Base Camp and TRUNG LAP, administrative and supply matters were greatly simplified. Supporting from the base camp enabled the firing batteries to improve defenses and living conditions. (14) Total missions and rounds fired: (a) Missions: Support 515, H&I 2,276. (b) Ammunition expended: HE 14,644, WP 868, ILL 386 (c ) Results: 12 VC KIA 9 (BC), 40 VC KIA (poss), 6 Bunkers, 25 sampans, 23 buildings destroyed and 27 buildings damaged. (p3) 8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: a. General: The area of operation for the 25th Inf Div during Operations CEDAR FALLS encompassed the area from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG. The division positions were located along the SAIGON River in former VC safe havens in both the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. Enemy units operating in and around the AO included the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 8th Bns of the 165th A Regt, elements of the D 14 Local Forces Bn, elements of MR 4, and local guerrillas. The area contained many foxholes, trenches, tunnels, bunkers and underground fortifications. The VC utilized the SAIGON River to a great extent in moving supplies and equipment. b. Terrain: The terrain in the area of operation varied from broad, flat plains of wet rice land to scrub brush and forested areas with heavy canopy. Cover in the rice paddies, marshes, and swamps was limited to road embankments and dikes. Concealment in the rice land was poor, with fair to good concealment in the forests and high marsh grass area. Fields of fire were poor in the forest to generally good in the rice lands and marshes. However, fields of fire were limited by stream banks and vegetation. Obstacles to overland movement were the interconnecting streams, ditches, and dikes in the rice land marshes. c. Weather: The weather during the operation was generally clear to partly cloudy with good visibility and light winds. The maximum temperature was 93 degrees and the minimum was 63 degrees with an average high of 86 degrees and low of 68 degrees. Total rainfall for the period was .2 inches. d. Operations: Light enemy contact was made initially as friendly units moved to the occupied blocking positions in the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. In the extreme eastern portion of the division sector, heavy contact was made with forces of the 2nd Bn, 165 A Regt on 8 January 1967 by elements of the 1st Bn, 27th inf. The enemy encountered by 1st Bn, 27th Inf withdrew under cover of darkness on the night of 8 - 9 January. Throughout the remainder of the operation no other heavy contact was made with the enemy forces, and most of the body count resulted from contacts with small groups of VC. During hours of darkness, maximum use was made of ambushes along the SAIGON River, and several VC were killed by ambush patrols as they sought to escape from the CEDAR FALLS Operational Area. Search and Destroy Operations accounted for most of the daylight activity of friendly forces. Through these S&D operations, several VC base camps along with large amounts of rice, equipment, ammunition and weapons were located. A large tunnel complex was discovered by the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf in the HO BO Woods on 21 Jan at coordinates XT650235, The tunnel is believe to have been the location of a VC headquarters unit. It was destroyed after it had been fully searched. 9. MISSION: To conduct S&D and blocking operations south and west along the SAIGON River, to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas, and to destroy VC base areas. (P4) 10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 2nd Bde: Attached: 2nd Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1 B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H, D Day B Co, 65th Engr Bn, effective 1900H, D Day MID element, effective 1900H, D Day Attached: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf to 196th Bde, effective 1900H, D-1 (1) Establish blocking positions in sector along SAIGON River early on D+1 to prevent VC/NVA exfiltration from the IRON TRIANGLE area. (2) Maintain control of the SAIGON River to prevent its use by VC/NVA forces. (3) Destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in sector. (4) Conduct BUDDY Operations in conjunction with 2nd Bn, 7th ARVN Regt to destroy VC/NVA infrastructure in PHU HOA DONG and expand government control over that village. (5) Continue reorganization of 4th Bn, 23rd Inf in base camp. (6) Be prepared to release 4th Bn, 23rd Inf to 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCE V reserve is committed. b. 196th Inf Bde: Attached: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, effective 1900H D-1 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, effective 0600H D-1 B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D-1 (1) Conduct airmobile operations on D Day to destroy VC/RVN forces in sector with priority of effort in objective A. (2) On D+1 secure high ground overlooking SAIGON River in sector and establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE. (3) Maintain control of SAIGON River in sector to deny its use to VC/RVN forces. (4) Conduct detailed search of sector to destroy VC/RVN forces and; installations. (5) Upon shift of left limiting point from vic XT571349 to a point east of BEN SUC, be prepared to release control of B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav to parent unit. (6) Maintain security of base camp and retain responsibility of securing Route 26 in p blue. (p6) (7) Be prepared to release one battalion to the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCEV reserve is committed. If this is released, 196th Bde is relieved from responsibility for securing Route 26. 11 EXECUTION: a. General: On D-2 (6 Jan 67) the Div, under the guise of normal operations, deployed the 196th Inf Bde reinforced. The 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf DAU TIENG along the southern edge of the BOI LOI Woods to an overnight position. At the same time the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf with Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, attached moved into the area north of the TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center to partially open a route and secure artillery fire support bases. The 3rd Bn, supporting artillery consisting of the 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty and A Btry, 77th Arty was lifted into these bases. The 196th Inf Bde CP and elements of the 3rd Bn 13th Arty and 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty moved by convoy to TRUNG LAP. The 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf secured a LZ for the 2nd Bn, 1st Inf. All elements less the fire support base security forces moved to blocking positions along the SAIGON River at the same time the 2nd Brigade moved to blocking position along the SAIGON River north of the FILHOL Plantation and NHA VIEC. Btry deployed with TF 2nd Bn, 34th Armor in the north, TF 2nd Bn, 27th Inf in the center, along with 2nd Bn, 7th ARVN Regt and 1st Bn, 27th Inf in the south. During the nights, a maximum amount of ambushes were emplaced along the river. During daylight hours minimum forces secured the river allowing extensive S&D operations in the VC base areas. Control of traffic on the SAIGON River was the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div while the 1st Inf Div was responsible for the control at the junction of the SAIGON - THI TINH Rivers. The 1st Inf Div with the and 11th Armd Cav Regt blocked enemy escape routes east of the THI TINH River, executed an air-mobile assault north of the IRON TRIANGLE, and then executed S&D operations south through the area. Highlights of the operations were: (1) B-52 strikes exploited by ground follow-up and occupation. (2) The effective denial of VC escape routes and use of the SAIGON River as evidenced by the high casualty toll suffered by the VC throughout the operation. (3) The discovery of a major VC HQ's tunnel complex by the 1/5 (M) Inf in the HOBO/BOI LOI Woods complex from which exploitation resulted in the recovery of important land timely intelligence (4) The US and ARVN cooperation in the evacuation and relocation of personnel and live stock from the village of BEN SUC to a New Life Hamlet. (5) The use of a 3rd Riverline RAG Task Force enabling the 196th Inf Bde to search thoroughly along and beneath both sides of the SAIGON River resulting in the exploitation of several VC safe havens. (6) The destruction of numerous VC fortifications and structures along with the discovery of many VC cache sites. (7) The effective fire support provided by the supporting artillery from the forward fire support bases and CU CHI plus the integration by tactical air support greatly aided the success of the operation. (8) The utilization of bulldozers and engineer equipment on the out-skirts of PHU HOA DONG to isolate that village from the VC in the FILHOL Plantation. b. Significant Actions: (p5) (1) On 8 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, located 10 tons of rice, 1500 gals of fish sauce, 2 boats (one with motor), 12 CBU's and 3 bicycles vic XT566323. All were destroyed except the rice and motor which were evacuated. (2) On 8 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf Ambush Patrol engaged an unknown number of VC with SA and AW fire vic XT733297. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification). One US carbine and one Russian rifle were captured and evacuated. (3) On 9 January, C Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, destroyed 2 underground fortifications vic XT597324. In the same area 35.65 tons of rice were destroyed. (4) On 9 January, B Co, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor engaged 15 VC on a raft with 90mm fire vic XT688222. Results: 15 VCKIA (BC) (no unit identification). (5) On 10 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, destroyed 5 VC structures vic XT563313. In the same area 100 tons of rice and 100 gals of tar were located and evacuated. (6) On 10 January, C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 30 underground fortifications vic XT744155 and 30 underground fortifications vic XT734184. (7) On 11 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 1 sampan, 1100 lbs of rice, 9 underground fortifications and 20 VC structures. B Co destroyed 61 underground fortifications and 1 sampan vic XT7319. (8) On 12 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, conducted an airmobile operation from the SAIGON River to vic XT747142 and conducted S&D operations resulting in the capture of 4 tons of rice, 2000 rds of SA, 2 sampans, 1 underground fortification, 1 VC structure and 5500 lbs of rice destroyed. (9) On 12 January, between 2000 and 2130, A Co, 2lnd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 13 VC in sampans vic XT715214 to XT716210. Results: 13 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 2 sampans destroyed. (10) On 13 January, C Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf engaged 4 VC in a sampan vic XT673255. Results: 4 VCKIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 1 sampan destroyed. (11) On 13 January, B Trp, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT569305 with SA and AW fire. Results: 6 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification). (12) On 15 January, B Trp, 2nd Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 1 underground fortification, 4 tunnels, 60 50mm rds, and 5 grenades vic XT592288. (13) On 16 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf engaged 13 VC in a sampan attempting to cross river vic XT673287. Results: 10 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (poss) and 1 sampan destroyed. Miscellaneous documents were captured and evacuated from the same area. (14) On 16 January, 8 Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 2 underground fortifications and 1 tunnel vic XT615303. One shotgun, 1 cal .45 SMG, 2 Chicom rifles, 1 pellet gun, 1 cal .25 rifle were captured and evacuated. (15) On 17 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, located 14 tons of polished rice vic XT590306 which was evacuated. In the same location 12.5 tons of rice were destroyed. (p7) (16) On 19 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf located 9 VC KIA (BC) vic XT664274 that were a result of operations conducted by the unit in the area. Five tons of rice were located and evacuated. (17) On 20 January, Co C, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 6 VC in a sampan vic XT718213. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification), 1 VC PW and 1 cal .45 pistol captured and evacuated. (18) On 20 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, with the assistance of a HOI CHANH located the following: 2 Springfield Rifles, 2 US SMG, 1 French Rifle, 1 Mauser Rifle, 6 CHICOM Carbines, one Shotgun, and 700 rds SA ammo vic XT661281. (19) On 21 January, A co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, located a tunnel complex consisting of a main tunnel 600 meters long and 10 branch tunnels vic XT650235. Sixty pounds of documents were evacuated. (20) On 22 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, apprehended 3 VC PW's vic XT704210. VC PW's led the unit to XT704216 where the following items were destroyed: 3 hand grenades, 10 AT mines, 4 homemade bangalore torpedoes, and two 155mm rds. Located and evacuated were: 2 commercial radios, miscellaneous web equipment, 1300 rds SA ammo, 4 Chicom carbines, 1 Russian rifle and 1 Mauser rifle. c. Revolutionary Development Activities: MEDCAP Teams were used and held. Hand items distributed in PHU HOA DONG. Mass evacuation and relocation of the villagers and livestock of BEN SUC to a New Life Hamlet was completed d. ARVN participation: The 2nd Bn, 7th ARVN Regt, conducted successful seal and search operations in PHU HOA DONG in coordination and conjunction with the 2nd Bde. The 30th RAG of the 3rd Riverine Zone provided boats to allow the banks of the SAIGON River to be checked for VC caches and sampans 12. RESULTS: a. US Losses: (1) Personnel: 40 KIA, 156 WIA (2) Equipment: 3 APC destroyed, 3 APC damaged (moderate), 2 APC's damaged (heavy), 1 tank-dozer damaged (heavy), 1 tank destroyed, one ¼ ton truck damaged (heavy) b. Enemy Losses: (1) Total Personnel Losses: VC KIA (BC) 331 VC KIA (POSS) 155 VC POW's 39 HOI CHANHS 147 Detainees 147 (2) Total Material Captured: (p8) Small Arms Weapons: TYPE QUANTITY Rifle, Cal 30, M-1 Us 7 Rifle, 7.92mm, Mauser 7 Rifle, AK-47, Soviet Assault 6 Rifle, U/I 5 Rifle, U/I, Soviet 2 Rifle, MAS-36, French 3 Rifle, Type 56, CHICOM 7 Rifle, Cal .25 1 Rifle, Enfield 1 Rifle, Springfield, (US) 2 Rifle, 7.62mm, M-14 (US) 1 Carbine, Cal .30 (US) 12 Carbine, Type 53 CHICOM 35 Carbine, 7.62mm, Soviet 3 SMG, Cal .45 (US) 4 SMG, 7.92mm 2 SMG, CHICOM 1 Pistol, Cal. 45, (US) 6 Pistol, Homemade 8 Pistol, 9mm, P-38 4 Shotgun, U/I 2 Gun, Pellet 3 (b) Crew Served Weapons: TYPE QUANTITY Launcher, RPG-2 Rocket 3 BAR, Cal .30, (US) 2 Rockets, U/I 3 (c ) HE Rounds 82mm Mortar 2 rds (d) SA ammo 7717 rds (e) Rice 253.85 tons (f) Miscellaneous: NONE (3) Total Material Destroyed: (a) HE Rounds TYPE QUANTITY 155mm 10 rds 105mm 18 rds 90mm 1 rd 81mm 23 rds 60mm 117 rds (p9) Bombs 15 4.2 inch 2 rds 82mm 1 rd 57mm 26 rds 57mm 26 rds RPG-2 2 rds 8 inch 3 rds 75mm 3 rds 2.75 6 rockets 175mm 1 rd (b) Mines and Grenades: TYPE QUANTITY Bangalore Torpedoes 4 CBU 135 Grenades 451 Shape Charge 1 AT Mines 101 AP Mines 59 (c) SA Ammo. 3013 rds (d) Miscellaneous: ITEM QUANTITY TNT 4 lbs Salt 200 lbs Outboard motors 6 Bicycles 10 Sampans 11 Printers Ink 5 gals. Tar 5 gals Cement 600 lbs Documents 285 lbs Books Four 5 gal cans CHICOM flashlight Batteries 260 Roll of tin 1 roll (1000' X 3') Gasoline 10 gals Typewriters 2 Grenades 10 Medical Supplies 15 lbs Mask, gas (VC) 121 Mask, protective, (US) 4 Sewing Machine 1 Batteries 24 Misc. clothing & web equip. 0 Civilian Radios 1 Camera 1 Tape Recorders 2 (p10) Sound Tapes 74 Forging Kit 1 Rolls of Wire 2 Fish Sauce 1500 gals Outboard Motors 3 Boats 4 Trenches 14 Bicycles 9 Salt 1200 lbs Sampans 145 Claymore Mines 7 Foxholes 129 TNT 292 lbs Printing Press 1 Bridges 6 Kerosene 5 gals Punji Pits 26 Tunnels 521 VC Structures 340 Rice 100.4 tons 13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: a. Logistics: For a listing of logistic problems encountered, see the After Action Report of the 25th Inf Div SUPCOM (App 1). b. Signal. The circuits established to support this operation are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report (App 1)/ c. Aviation. For Aviation Operations, see 25th Aviation Bn After Action Report (App 1). 14. CIVIC ACTION: a. 196th Bde: (1) Conducted a total of 3 MEDCAPS at TRUNG LAP treating 301 patients. (2) Provided 2,500 lbs of captured rice to ARVN dependents at TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center. (3) Constructed 5000 meters of road vicinity TRUNG LAP. b. 2nd Bde: (1) Conducted a total of 10 MEDCAPS vicinity of PHU HOA DONG, treating 473 patients/ (2) Distributed clothing to approximately 1000 people at PHU HOA DONG (P11) (3)Constructed a swing for school at PHU HOA DONG. (4) Constructed playground at PHU HOA DONG. (5) Delivered 4000 lbs of captured rice (sour) to PF Compound at TAN PHU TRUNG to be used as hog feed. c. Division: (1) Provided clothing and commodities to 83 people evacuated from operational area. (2) Provided 4000 lbs of captured rice to HAU NGHIA Province Chief. d. Civic Action by Divisional units was confined generally in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP (XT7119) villages. The proximity of US forces has enable units to increase civic action projects in those villages. The security provided by 2nd Bde has enabled the district chief of PHU HOA DONG to reestablish the district office at PHU HOA DONG from PARIS TAN QUI. Evacuation of non-combatants was primarily handled by 1st Div units. 25th Div was involved in the evacuation of 83 non-combatants who were subsequently returned to GVN control at TRUNG LAP New Life Hamlet. e. Psychological Operations: (1) The task organization of the division had a HB, light Mobile (Loudspeaker Team) attached to 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div and an ARVN PSYOPS team attached to the 196th Lt Inf Bde. The 246th PSYOP Company was in general support of the 25th Inf Div PSYOP program. (2) The general attitude of the population toward the US forces was one of mistrust and concern. In the area in and around the village of PHU HOA DONG (XT7121), the population was extremely hostile as this had been a Viet Cong stronghold for many years. (3) Psychological Operations were directed against enemy targets, emphasizing Allied Might and Introductory Themes. As the operation continued, emphasis was placed on themes to convince the VC that their situation had deteriorated in order to induce them to rally. For this purpose, CHIEU HOI and inevitable victory themes were used. Target areas were systematically covered to reach all intended target audiences. On D+1 the 146tih PSYOP Company and brigades commenced leaflet and loudspeaker operations in the AO. Pre-planned operations to D+5 were executed and then conducted as the tactical situation presented itself. Ground mounted loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted on a nightly basis at (XT7121) across the SAIGON River. There were 3 HOI CHANHS exploited with personalized leaflets and 4 with loudspeaker tapes. Altogether there were 976,265 leaflets dropped and 29 loudspeaker sorties flown in support of the operation,. Total aerial broadcast time was 10 hours and 40 minutes. Total ground broadcast time was 17 hours and 20 minutes. Approximately 70% of all loudspeaker operations were conducted at night. (4) The operation resulted in 37 HOI CHANHS who returned, 11 of them to US units. Those who were interviewed acknowledged seeing leaflets and hearing loudspeaker Broadcasts, and admitted that they were to some extent influenced by the propaganda. FOR THE COMMANDER: JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN, Cpt. AGC. Asst AG

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