Information on U.S. Army helicopter UH-1H tail number 68-16262
The Army purchased this helicopter 0969
Total flight hours at this point: 00000391
Date: 03/17/1970
Incident number: 700317161ACD Accident case number: 700317161 Total loss or fatality Accident
Unit: A/123 AVN 23 INF
The station for this helicopter was Chu Lai in South Vietnam
UTM grid coordinates: BT428015 (To see this location on a map, go to https://legallandconverter.com/p50.html and search on Grid Reference 49PBT428015)
Number killed in accident = 2 . . Injured = 6 . . Passengers = 4
costing 334345
Original source(s) and document(s) from which the incident was created or updated: Defense Intelligence Agency Helicopter Loss database. Army Aviation Safety Center database. Also: OPERA (Operations Report. )
Loss to Inventory
Crew Members:
AC W2 SC PIKE
P W1 RD FRANSON
CE SP4 MURPHY RAY KIA
G E4 ML REED
Passengers and/or other participants:
O3 TJ RUFFING, PAX, D
O3 JP TUCKER, PAX, D
O8 LB RAMSEY, PAX, D
LTC THOMAS ROBERT JOSEPH, AR, PX, KIA
Accident Summary:
CW-2 STEPHEN C. PIKE, AIRCRAFT COMMANDER, AND WO-1 RONALD D. FRANSON, PILOT, DEPARTED LZ CENTER, COORDINATES BT 052250, VIETNAM ON OR ABOUT 1530 HOURS, 17 MARCH 1970, IN UH-1H SN 68-16262, ENROUTE TO CHU LAI, VIETNAM. DUE TO THE BROKEN CLOUD LAYER AT 2000 FEET INDICATED ALTITUDE, THE AC CHOSE TO CLIMB THROUGH A HOLE IN THE CLOUDS AND FLY VFR ON TOP. SKATER 62 CONTACTED CHU LAI APPROACH CONTROL AT 1555 HOURS FOR RADAR ASSISTANCE. AFTER DIFFICULTY ESTABLISHING RADIO CONTACT, RADAR CONTACT WAS CONFIRMED AT 8 MILES NORTH NORTH-WEST OF CHU LAI WEST AIRFIELD AT 1600 HOURS. THE RADAR CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED BY OBSERVING A TARGET CORRECTLY RESPOND TO INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN MORE THAN 30 DEGREES. AFTER CW-2 PIKE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO TEST HIS TRANSPONDER IN THE EMERGENCY CODE, A DIFFERENT TARGET WAS LOCATED 11 NM NORTH-EAST AT 1601 BY OVSERVING A TARGET RESPOND TO 2 TRANSPONDER SQUAWKS. ASSUMING THAT HE HAD MADE A MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION THE FIRST TIME, THE CONTROLLER ISSUED DIRECTION AND INSTRUCTION TO THE TRANSPONDER TARGET. ONLY ONE ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CHECK THE POSITION OF THE FIRST TARGET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. SKATER 62 REQUESTED A RADAR MONITORED LET DOWN TO VFR CONDITIONS UNDERNEATH THE OVERCAST. CHU LAI WAS REPORTING A CEILING OF 2000 SCATTERED. SKATER 62 WAS TOLD TO TURN TO A HEADING OF 180 AND DESCEND TO 1700 FEET, MINIMUM VACTORING ALTITUDE FOR THE ALTITUDE FOR THE AREA EAST OF CHU LAI. POOR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EXISTED BETWEEN APPROACH CONTROL AND THE AIRCRAFT. RADAR CONTACT WAS LOST AT 1603 DUE TO THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF A TRANSPONDER SQUAWKING NORMAL WITHIN 5 TO 7 MILES OF THE RADAR SET. SKATER 62 WAS TOLD TO TURN LEFT TO A HEADING 140 DEGREES AND REPORT VFR CONDITIONS. AT 1605 HOURS AND 30 SECONDS, SKATER 62 REPORTED LEVEL 1700 AND IFR. HE REQUESTED A GCA AND STATED MINIMUM FUEL. RADAR CONTACT WAS NEVER REGAINED. RADIO CONTACT WAS LOST AT 1607 HOURS AND 30 SECONDS. SKATER 62 ON GUARD AND IN THE BLIND. AT ABOUT 1615 AFTER A RAMP CHECK AT CHU LAI EAST AND WEST SHOWED THAT SKATER 62 HAD NOT LANDED, AIR-SEA RESCUE WAS LAUNCHED AND DIRECTED TO SEARCH 5 MILES SOUTHEAST OF CHU LAI. AT APPROXIMATELY 1630, TACP TAM KY, VIETNAM, MONITORED A DISTRESS CALL: "SKATER 62 APPROXIMATELY 5 MILES NORTHEAST OF LZ PINEAPPLE/IFR AND COME UP TO SOME MOUNTAIN." SKATER 62 USED SEVERAL CALL SIGNS AFTER THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED. THERE WERE NO WITNESSES OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASH DUE TO THE IFR CONDITIONS. RESCUE OPERATIONS WERE HINDERED UNTIL THE FOLLOWING MORNING DUE TO POOR VISIBILITY.\\
War Story:
Contributed by Colonel Wayne Johnston.
former 1st/6th Infantryman.
Notes: from Colonel Johnston
1. For your information, I talked night before last with the NCO who was in charge of the relief effort on the
ground from C25/1-6th Inf to get to the crash site. He was a platoon sergeant at the time: SSG Alan McPherson
(Phone & Address provided). He told me that they had to fire in the air (arty) to be guided in to the crash site, and that he still has the tools and survival knife off the helicopter. They went all night without a
break to get to the crash site. They apparently had to hack their way in and out. He got an impact award for their efforts.
Notes: From Don Bullard. Don was the pilot who was normally scheduled to fly the mission. He was pulled off the mission because the cumulative hours for the past 30 days exceeded regulations. He stayed up all night with others from the company listening to the radio traffic as they tried to locate the missing helicopter.
Notes: From Mickie Reed. Mickie Reed was injured in the accident and Ray Murphy was killed in the accident. Mickie Reed and Ray had been friends from Connersville, Indiana. Mickie had worked to get Ray out of the field from infantry to the nice job on the VIP helicopter mission. Mickie had thought he had been thrown from the helicopter.
Notes: From Les Hines ADVA historian. I had three instances where pilots had requested ground control assistance when I was 'crewing' a mission (crew-chief from June 68-July69). Each time we were fortunate to break out of instrument flight conditions and regain visual flight conditions. Each time the assistance information was wrong and we were being guided in harm's way. Based on other conversations with crews from A/123rd this seems to be a common experience.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EXHIBITS
TAB 1 - Copy of Crash Facts message
TAB 2 - Copy of Orders Appointing Investigation Board
TAB 3 - Weather Report
TAB 4 - Certificate of Damage
TAB 5 - Copy of Equipment Improvement Record
TAB 6 - Special Technical Reports and Laboratory Analysis
TAB 7 - Weight & Balance
TAB 8 - Diagrams and Photographs
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
page
1 of 2 190914Z MAR70
FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIV, CHL, RVN
TO: AIG 23-013, DELETE: ACSFOR, DA
INFO: CO, 123RD AVN BN (CB), CHUL, RVN (COURIER)
UNCLAS F O U O
ADVF-ABFS
SUBJ: Army Aircraft accident, Crash Facts Message Report, RCS
CSGPA-459
1. 171615H March 1970, day.
2. 4 1/2 km's SW Hill 76, BS 429994.
3. UH-1H, 68-16262.
4. Co A, 123d Avn Bn, 96374
5. Major accident, total loss.
6. AC: Pike, Stephen C., xxx-xx-xxxx, CW2, Co A, 123d Avn Bn,
96374, sprained neck and shoulder bruises.
7. Pilot: Franson, Ronald D., xxx-xx-xxxx, WO1, Co A, 123d
Avn Bn, 96374, concussion and back strain; CE: Murphy, Ray,
307-54-3925, SP4, Co A, 123d Avn Bn, 96374, fatal; G: Reed,
Mickie L., xxx-xx-xxxx, SP4, Co A, 123d Avn Bn, 96374,
fractured left cheek bone.
DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICER SYMBOL AND PHONE
EDWARD L. CONNER, AVDF-ABFS, DASO, 4398
G.M. KAY, Asst AG, AVDF-AGA, 2081
(Protective marking cancelled 21 MAR 70
DD Form 173
page
2 of 2 190914Z MAR70
8. Ramsey, Lloyd B., xxx-xx-xxxx, MG, Hq Americal Div, 96374,
fractured left arm; Thomas, Robert J., 517-24-3130, LTC, Hq Americal
Div fatal; Tucker, John P., xxx-xx-xxxx, CPT, Hq Americal Div,
96374, none; Ruffing, Thomas J., xxx-xx-xxxx, CPT, Hq Americal Div,
96374, fractured ribs and internal injuries.
9. OCS, VFR, Chu Lai
10. Straight and level flight.
11. Acft crashed on a mountainside, cause unknown as of this date.
12. Unknown
13. Unknown
14. Unknown
15. Unknown
16. a. No b. No C. No d. Supplement will follow
17. 1LT McGee, 123d Avn Bn, 96374, 4387
18. Protective marking cancelled on 21 march 1970.
SIGNATURE Protective marking cancelled
K?? Clearing officer
CPT CONNER cancelled 21 Mar 70
page
1 of 1 220301Z MAR70
FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIV, CHL, RVN
TO: AIG 23-013, DELETE: ACSFOR, DA
INFO: CO, 123RD AVN BN (CB), CHUL, RVN (COURIER)
UNCLAS
AVDF=ABFS
SUBJECT: Supplement Army Aircraft Accident, Crash Facts Message
Report, CSGPA-459
1. UH-1H, 68-16262
2. Accident, Major, occurring 171615H March 1970.
3. AC: Pike, Stephen C. xxx-xx-7014, CW2, Co A, 123d Avn Bn.
96374.
4 Para 11 should read: Acft impact on mountain side while
in a radar invironment [sic] after entering IFR condition, possible
identification error., Para 12 should read: No., Para 13 should
read: None., Para 14 should read: No., Para 15 should read:
Chu Lai radar approach control, none
DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICIAL SYMBOL AND PHONE
EDWARD L. CONNER, DASO, AVDF-ABFS, 4398
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE
G.M. KAY, Asst AG, AVDF-AGA, 2081 CLEARING OFFICER
SIGNATURE EC
CPT CONNER
UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374
map
SPECIAL ORDERS 22 March 1970
NUMBER 81
EXTRACT
89 TC 456. Following BOARD/COMMITTEE appointed subject to call of the PRESIDENT/
CHAIRMAN thereof, and will consist of members as follows in positions indicated.
Authority: AR 385-40
Name of Board: Investigation Board.
Members: SMITH, RICHARD H. 484-36-XXXX Maj 1981 HHC 123rd Avn Bn TC, Member
HITE, OLIVER 230-36-XXXX Maj 1981 14TH AVN Bn (Cbt) XO, IN, President
SCHNEIDER, HENRY 209-32-XXXX CPT D3160 HHC 123rd Avn Bn MC, Member
EDWARDS, WILLIAM J. 304-36-XXXX CPT 1981 HHC 16th Avn Gp (Cbt) IN, Member
YOUNG, WHITNEY L. 242-62-XXXX CPT 1981 71st Avn Co 14th Avn Bn (Cbt) FA,
Member
Period: Indef:
Purpose: To Investigate the facts and circumstances of Army Aircraft Accident, UH-1H, 123rd Avn Co., APO 96374, that occurred on 171615H March 1970.
Effective Date: 17 March 1970.
Special Instructions: Investigation will be guided by AR 95-5 and 385-40, USARV Reg 385-10, 385-40 and 385-51 , and Americal Reg 385-10. Report will be submitted in triplicate to their HQ's ATTN: AVDF-ABFS,
no later than 11 April 1970. Commanders will insure that members of the investigation board are provided with ample time to conduct the investigation.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
OFFICIAL T. H. TACKABERRY
ROMAN J. BAKUMENKO
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
DISTRIBUTION:
25-5 Ea Indiv Conc
30-AVDF-AGPS
2 -AVDF-AGPO
10-AVDF-AGPR (MR)
15-AVDF-FC
4-AVDF-AGPM
15-AVDF-ADFS
5-HHC 123rd Avn Bn
5-14th Avn Bn (Cbt)
5-HHC 16th Avn Gp (Cbt)
5-71st Avn Co 14th Avn Bn (Cbt)
1-123rd Avn Bn ATTN: S-1
1-14th Avn Bn (Cbt) ATTN: S-1
1-16th Avn Gp (Cbt) ATTN: S-1
EXTRACTS FROM OPNAV FORM 3140-6 (Rev 8-61)
Report of weather conditions and winds aloft at Chu Lai Airbase during
hours of 1500H-1700, 17 March 1970.
WEATHER
1500H: Scattered Stratocumulus at 2000' Visibility 5 miles with haze,
Temp. 79 Dew Pt. 70 Wind 020/10 Altimeter 29.78
Remarks: Haze aloft
1600H: Broken Stratocumulus at an estimated 2000', Visibility 5 miles
in haze, Temp: 77 Dew Pt: 69 Wing 350/08 Altimeter 29.77
Remarks: Haze aloft, Visibility lower Southwest through Northwest
1615H: Broken Stratocumulus at 1500' 5 miles in haze
1700H: Scattered Stratocumulus at 1500' Visibility 5 miles in haze
Temp: 76 Dew Pt: 70 Wind 360/07 Altimeter 29.77
Remarks: Haze aloft, visibility lower west.
Winds aloft from sounding taken at 1400H by Americal Swatter Metro
1000: 090/07
2000: 140/10
3000: 140/10
4000: 180/12
/s/ J.H. WOLFE
Capt USMC
Weather Officer
CO E 723RD MAINTENANCE BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96374
24 MARCH 1970
SUBJECT: ESTIMATED COST OF DAMAGE FOR HELICOPTER UH-1H, 68-16262
TO:
COMMANDING OFFICER
123RD AVIATION BN.
APO 96374
FSN NOMENCLATURE U/I ACTUAL COST
1615-919-1351 TRANSMISSION, MAIN 1 EA. $11,620.00
1560-073-8203 MAST ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 954.00
1615-957-7316 SCISSORS & SLEEVE ASSY. 1 EA. 676.00
1560-624-2721 SWASHPLATE AND SUPPORT 1 EA. 2,755.00
1615-472-7308 BLADES, TAIL ROTOR 2 EA. 579.00
2840-911-7685 ENGINE, AIR 1 EA. 63,800.00
1615-072-5799 BLADE, MAIN ROTOR 2 EA. 6,036.00
1615-918-2676 GEAR BOX 42 DEGREE 1 EA. 1,144.00
1615-919-2677 GEAR BOX 90 DEGREE 1 EA. 1,538.00
1615-833-1556 HUB ASSY. MAIN ROTOR 1 EA. 3,237.00
1615-933-6825 HUB ASSY. TAIL ROTOR 1 EA. 535.00
1560-996-3905 ELEVATOR, RIGHT HAND 1 EA. 177.00
1560-996-3906 ELEVATOR, LEFT HAND 1 EA. 177.00
1560-830-9754 COLLECTIVE LEVER 2 EA. 77.70
1615-866-6015 STABILIZER BAR ASSY. 1 EA. 1,005.00
1680-633-0811 SERVO CYLINDER 3 EA. 1,257.00
1615-832-8951 HANGER ASSEMBLY 4 EA. 752.00
1560-739-2554 HORN ELEVATOR 1 EA. 93.66
2925-878-1136 STARTER GENERATOR 1 EA. 492.00
1680-871-8736 QUILL ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 1,000.00
1560-863-3819 SHAFT ASSEMBLY, MAIN 1 EA. 1,459.00
1560-649-8266 TUBE ASSY. TAIL BOOM 1 EA. 40.70
1560-967-7624 TUBE ASSY. CROSS 1 EA. 220.00
1620-076-9036 TUBE ASSY. CROSS 1 EA. 178.00
1620-759-4838 SKID TUBE ASSY. R/H 1 EA. 239.00
1620-795-0678 SKID TUBE ASSY. L/H 1 EA. 307.00
1560-995-6503 BAFFLE ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 94.62
1660-992-6504 BAFFLE ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 46.43
1560-014-1448 PAN ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 25.34
1560-967-1751 TRI-POD ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 48.97
1560-078-8698 CONNECTING LINK RIGID 1 EA. 21.58
1560-967-1952 BI-POD ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 32.02
2945-027-3022 FILTER ASSEMBLY R/H 1 EA. 113.00
2945-027-3025 FILTER ASSEMBLY L/H 1 EA. 154.00
2945-027-3016 FILTER ASSEMBLY TOP 1 EA. 219.00
1560-923-2879 FAIRING ASSY. TRANSMISSION 1 EA. 303.00
1560-079-8944 LINK ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 25.73
1560-879-0851 TAIL BOOM 1 EA. 4,538.00
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (CON'T)
SUBJECT: ESTIMATED COST OF DAMAGES TO HELICOPTER UH-1H, 68-16262
FSN NOMENCLATURE U/I ACTUAL COST
1560-674-4185 FITTING, TAIL BOOM 1 EA. 33.87
1560-739-4568 PYLON MOUNT 4 EA. 118.00
1560-963-1018 MOUNT ASSEMBLY 1 EA. 100.00
1560-739-4569 PYLON MOUNT 1 EA. 29.68
TOTAL COST FOR PARTS $186,630.30
ESTIMATED 2200 MAN HOURS @ $5.00 PER HOUR 11,000.00
TOTAL COST OF REPAIR $197,630.30
MELVIN D. RADFORD
SP/6 AVN
QUALITY CONTROL
MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT 67
Marine Air Base Squadron 13
Marine Aircraft Group 13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602
TJS: dgc
3759
20 Mar 70
STATEMENT OF: Capt T. J. STANFORD 089301/7582/6720 USMC
I Certify that following is a true statement of events concerning the
aircraft incident involving SKATER 62 (UH-1) on 17 March 1970.
In order to understand the qualification of an ATC Controller and to
appreciate the burden of responsibilities of these men we must consider
his training. Prior to reporting to a MATCU Unit a controller must have
completed the Class "A" School and in some case GCA School. In the course
of instruction the student controller is instructed on FAA Procedures,
OpNav Instructions, Meteorology, Navigation and Equipment. During training
he is examined by the FAA in a seven (7) part comprehensive Exam which when
satisfactorily completed qualifies the controller for his Control Tower
Operators License. Upon reporting for duty to a MATCU, specifically MATCU 67,
the controller is interviewed by the Officer in Charge to determine the
mans qualifications and further assignment. The man's qualifications, the
needs of the Unit and the individual's desires are all considered in assigning
this controller to either the Tower, GCA, or Approach Control for duty.
Following assignment the controller is sent to a local ground school
where FAA Procedures, FAA Regulations, and OpNav Instructions are reviewed.
Local training also consists of local procedures, local area knowledge,
coordinating instructions, letters of agreement, and the specific duties of
that position which the controller will work.
Then the controller is assigned a position. This position and the
controllers performance is constantly monitored by a qualified controller
at that position. The time required to qualify the student controller very
greatly, depending upon, knowledge, prior experience, mental alertness, and
the individual's motivation. Each controller progresses at his own speed,
though monitored at all times. When the monitoring controller and/or the
Crew Chief feel the man is qualified at that position a written examination
is administered on every facet of that position. A controller must achieve
a passing score of 80% or higher to pass. After passing the written exam,
the controller must then pass, to the satisfaction of his Crew Chief, Training
Chief, Radar/Tower Officer, and Watch Officer, a flight check. This a
performance evaluation. The controller's decisiveness, knowledge, tact,
ability, judgement, alertness, and mental attitude determine his qualification
recommendation. The Officer in Charge makes the final decision to qualify
a controller.
On the afternoon in question, 17 March 1970 SSgt. R. M. SZUBA was
manning the Approach Control position.
SSgt SZUBA has attended the ATC class "A" school and the GCA "C" school.
He has been previously qualified in radar at every station to which he
was assigned, including qualification as an Approach Controller here at
Chu Lai in 1966. He brings seven (7) years of experience to this unit.
Since arriving here on 13 January 1970 he has completed his GCA written
exam and is awaiting a flight check. His training, however, has been con-
centrated on Radar Approach Control with well over 250 hours of super-
vised on the job training to qualify. At the present time SSgt SZUBA is
not qualified in accordance with local qualif[y]ing procedures.
Due to the foregoing GySgt J. J. CARR was monitoring SSgt SZUBA's
performance. GySgt CARR has been in the ATC field for nine (9) years
and has been qualified at every station assigned. At one station or an-
other he has been qualified at every position in the unit, to include
Tower, GCA, Manual and Radar Approach Control His knowledge, ability,
and motivation allowed him to qualify as an Approach Controller in a period
of 25 days on 20 January 1970.
A controller's proficiency is measured by present and past performances.
These the controllers, with 16 years total experience, possess a level of
proficiency which I feel is unquestionable.
The equipment utilized in the control of SKATER 62 on 17 March 1970
was AN/UPS-1C (Serial # A-83) surveillance radar. This equipment was flight
checked by the U.S. Air Force Flight Check service on 11 March 1970 and
found to be satisfactory, with minor discrepancies. The formal report of
that check has not as yet reached this Unit. At 1534H on 17 March 1970,
UPS-1C (Serial # A-83) was placed back in service after a P.M. check, generator
change, and complete alignment and adjustment. This radar set, in my opinion,
was adjusted and operating properly at this time.
Several questions were presented during the course of the investigation.
The following is submitted for consideration:
RADAR IDENTIFICATION: A radar target can be identified by one (1) I.D. turn
of 30' or greater only if his position can be fixed in relation to the radar
site and only if no other aircraft is observed to take the I.D. turn. The
most widely accepted procedure is through the use of IFF/SIF Transponder
changes, that is an Ident squawk, followed by Standby, then followed by a
coded squawk. TATC 7110, 8A Para 601, 602, 603
LOST COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE: When weather reports indicate that an air-
craft is likely to encounter IFR weather conditions during an approach, a
Lost Communications Procedure shall be given after establishing radar con-
tact, however* if the pilot states he cannot accept this procedure dure to
weather or other reasons, request pilots intentions.
* TATC 7110. 8A para 702
RADAR ASSISTANCE TO VFR A/C IN WEATHER DIFFICULTY: FAA regulations do not
require ATC to provide radar services to an aircraft in VFR conditions unless
an emergency is declared*. An emergency may be declared by the controller for the pilot if in the controller's judgment an emergency exists
or is imminent.**
* TATC 7110. 8A para 855
** TATC 7110. 8A para 835
CO
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE: Appropriate action in the event of a lost two-way
communication. Broadcast by any available means. At[t]empt contact by
having the aircraft use transponder or turns to acknowledge receipt of
transmissions. Use Ident feature or squawk changes if necessary.
TATC 7110. 8A para 868
It is my opinion that the judgement and procedures used by Chu Lai Approach
Control in controlling SKATER 62, on 17 March 1970, were sound, appropriate
and in accordance with established doctrine.
T.J. STANFORD
CAPT, USMC
Officer in Charge
CONTROLLER QUALIFICATIONS
GySgt JOHN J. CARR 1572509/6724 attended Air Traffic Control School
Class in 1961 and GCA Controller School Class C in 1968. He has
worked in the ATC field for the last nine (9) years and has held the
following qualifications:
CTO CERTIFICATE
Junior Controller MCAS Yuma
Approach Controller (Manual) Iwakuni
IFR/PAR Controller (H) NEW RIVER
Approach Controller (Radar) MCAS Cherry Point
Air Traffic Control Specialist MCAS Cherry Point
Approach Controller (Radar) MCAS Chu Lai
GySgt CARR joined MATCU-67 26 December 1969 and qualified as an Approach
Controller by 20 January 1970
SSgt RICHARD M. SZUBA 1481375/6724 attended both Air Traffic Control
A School and GCA C School in 1963. He has worked in the ATC Field for
the last seven years and has held the following qualifications:
STO CERTIFICATE
ASR/PAR IFR Controller MCAS Cherry Point
IFR/PAR Controller MCAS Chu Lai
Approach Controller (Radar) Chu Lai
IFR/PAR Controller NAS Willow Grove
IFR/GCA Watch Officer NAS Willow Grove
SSgt SZUBA joined MATCU-67 13 January 1970 and has passed his PAR written
exam on 09 March 1970. His training has been concentrated on Radar Approach
Control with well over 250 hours of supervised on the job training since
arrival.
AFCS FORM 44 SURVEILLANCE RADAR INSPECTION REPORT.
OPERATING AGENCY AND ADDRESS [MATCU 67 MAG 12]
Periodic inspection was performed 11 Mar 1970. Next expectation due 9 Jul 1970.
Type Equipment: AN/UPS-1 #A-83
ANTENNA TILT [3.0]
STANDBY POWER [N/A]
FACILITY LOCATION [Chu Lai, RVN]
CIRCULAR POLARIZATION [UNSAT]
APPROACHES [N/A]
HORIZONTAL ORBIT [N/A]
INNER FRINGE OUTER FRINGE
VERTICAL COVERAGE: 1000 FT. BEARING 030 [ .75 miles 18 miles ]
3000 FT. " [ - 35 miles ]
5000 FT. " [ - 50 miles ]
10000 FT. " [ 4.5 miles 50 miles ]
Some standby communications frequencies were marked as unsatisfactory, but primary communications were all marked as satisfactory.
REMARKS:
1. C-140, 95958.
2. Secondary radar satisfactory. Restriction removed.
3. Vertical coverage less than 85% of commissioning for 1,000'.
4. Facility restricted for remark #3.
(Note: a summary of the document will be done here rather than trying to
replicate the form).
Equipment classification was Restricted.
Signed by Alexander R. Kobiec, Major.
Operating Agency Representative: T.J. Stanford, Captain.
RADIO LOG
RADIO CALLS 17 Mar 70 0745 Page 1 of 1
Tactical: N/A Preflite: N/A Over Field: N/A Squadron: 20 Tass
Flight No.: N/A Voice: N/A Taxi: N/A Land: N/A
A/C Number or Location: Tam Ky Collective: N/A Airborne: N/A
Equip off: N/A Pilot or OIC: MAJ Giblin
Special: Jake 20 Mission or Net: D.A.R.N.
1635 LE Note LOG Mont Mayday/Skater 62 app 5
miles NE of LZ Pineapple/IFR
and came up to some mountain/ PN
Extract of Jake 20 Log Page
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
O.R. HITE
MAJ IN
ACCIDENT BOARD PRESIDENT
Copy of "WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE" FORM DD 365F DATED 22 MAR 70
for UH-1H Serial no. 68-16262 Pilot listed as Pike from A Co 123rd .
Crew of four was listed.
(Note: Details are in document, but were not transcribed here)
Computed by Robert L. McG ----
Photos: (Note: the helicopter photos show are mainly pieces of the parts)
1) Photo Caption: Aircraft: UH=1H #68-16262
Date of Accident: 17 March 1970
Locations: Coordinates BS 429994
Main rotor hub assembly with pinched mast.
2) Photo Caption: Aircraft: UH-1H #68-16262
Date of Accident: 17 March 1970
location: Coordinates BS 429994
Instrument panel and fuel quantity gauge.
3) Photo Caption: Aircraft: UH-1H #68-16262
Date of Accident: 17 March 1970
location: Coordinates BS 429994
Tailboom, 42 degree gearbox
4) Photo Caption: Aircraft: UH-1H #68-16262
Date of Accident: 17 March 1970
location: Coordinates BS 429994
Collapsed right jump seat
4) Photo Caption: Aircraft: UH-1H #68-16262
Date of Accident: 17 March 1970
location: Coordinates BS 429994
90 degree gearbox and tail rotor
hub assembly
5) Photo Caption: Aircraft: UH-1H #68-16262
Date of Accident: 17 March 1970
location: Coordinates BS 429994
Main rotor blades
6) Photo Caption: Aircraft: UH-1H #68-16262
Date of Accident: 17 March 1970
location: Coordinates BS 429994
Upper portion of transmission housing
MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT 67
Marine Air Base Squadron 13
Marine Aircraft Group 13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602
QBQ:dgc
18 Mar 70
APPROACH CONTROL TRANSCRIPT: I certify that the following is a true
tape transcript of the aircraft incident
involving Skater 62 (UH-1) on 17 Mar 70.
DEFINITIONS OF ABBREVIATIONS: Apc Approach Control
62 Skater 62
S-I SSgt SZUBA-Intercom
C-I GySgt CARR-Intercom
FD-I Flight Date-Intercom
B5-I Cpl GINTER-Intercom
-2 LoveBug 156-2
Twr Tower
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0755Z 62 Chu Lai Approach Control, Skater 62.
Apc Skater 62, Chu Lai.
62 Chu Lai Approach, Skater 62
(TWO (2) KEYS NO TRANSMISSIONS)
62 Chu Lai Approach Control, Chu Lai Approach Control, Skater 62.
Apc ....(Cut out)....Go ahead (weak)
0755/COZ 62 This is 62, I'm not able to read you. I'm getting
background noise in your transmissions, do you have
another frequency I can use, over
Apc (Extremely weak) Roger, (very broken) contact
Approach Control on 3....point four, over.
C-I Let me try him once over here.
Apc Skater 62, how do you hear?
C-I What's 38.1 on, still on nine isn't it?
0756Z S-I Yeah
C-I No come up other freq?
S-I Na
Apc 156-2 you're loud and clear.
62 Chu Lai Approach Control, Chu Lai Approach Control
(Portion unreadable) on victor, how do you read me,
over.
S-I I don't hear him at all now, he said...(unreadable) ....
tried 329.4...(unreadable) .... very weak.
0756/30Z Apc Skater 62, this is Chu Lai Approach Control on 383.1
how do you hear now, over?
62 Are you on victor now?
Apc Skater 62, I hear you but very, very weak and unreadable.
C-I I can't hear him at all. What freq is he on? 329....
(Cut out) frequency?
0757Z -2 And Chu Lai Approach Love Bug 156-2 ah, we're going VFR
at this time, thank you and good-day.
Apc LB-156-2 roger and good-day to you.
FD-I All right, this guy coming from Phu Cat, estimating SK
at 0822, they don't know what type aircraft or where he's going...(fades out weak and unreadable)
0757/30Z 62 Chu Lai Approach, Chu Lai Approach, Skater 62 on victor.
Apc He's very weak...(fades out)
C-I Can you hear me?
S-I Yeah, I can hear you.
C-I I can hear you loud an clear.
S-I OK, I can hear you a little better, now...(weak & unreadable.)
C-I YEAH
0758Z S-I I can (weak and unreadable)...sounds like..(weak & unreadable)
C-I Want
C-I Want to try another headset?
S-I Unreadable
C-I Intercom is alright, but when you transmit....(unreadable)
0758/30 S-I I can hear the pilot...(unreadable)
62 Chu Lai Approach Control, Chu Lai Approach Control
Skater 62 on uniform, how do you read over?
Apc Skater 62 loud and clear, how me over?
62 Roger, I've got you loud and clear now my approximate
position is 15 miles to your northeast (West???) approx-
imately your 320 radial we have transponder equipment,
would like you to give me a pickup to a 4000 foot VFR
on top.
Apc Skater 62 squawk mode 3 code 7000.
0759Z 62 Understand mode 3 code 7000.
Apc That's affirmative.
62 Squawking now.
Apc Skater 62, say your position.
62 Roger, approximate position is a 12 miles to the north-
west.
C-I Ask him his heading.
Apc I'm not picking up your squawk yet....garbled...Skater
62 say your heading.
62 Roger, heading is 135 degrees.
0759Z/30Z S-I That might be him right there...garbled.
Apc Skater 62 turn left heading 090.
62 Roger, left to 090, Skater 62
S-I It's one of them. Looks like both of them.
0800Z Apc Targets (garbled) Skater 62 be advised I'm not picking
up your IFF squawk. Have you radar contact 8 miles north
north-west of the field maintain your present heading
090 present Chu Lai weather two thousand scattered,
visibility five miles with haze altimeter 2977, read back.
0800/30Z 62 Roger, Skater 62 maintaining 090.
Chu Lai this is 62 I would like to check out the
emergency.
Apc (Garbled) Skater 62 roger squawk emergency for five
seconds.
62 Roger, squawk emergency five seconds.
C-I (Garbled) Have him squawk standby one.
Apc Skater 62 squawk standby
0801Z 62 Roger squawking standby
Apc (On Intercom) That's him. (To 62) Skater 62 squawk
normal your radar position 11 miles north east.
62 Roger squawking normal.
Apc (On Intercom) I don't know if he wants a GCA.
(To 62) Skater 62 you requesting GCA. Skater 62
are you requesting GCA?
62 Roger 62, negative a (garbled) special VFR conditions
until we get passed this cloud bank.
0801/30Z Apc Roger Skater 62 turn right heading 180 descend and
maintain 2500 over.
62 Roger, turning right 180 descending to 2500.
0802Z C-I Might have to take him down to 1700. Yeah, 2000 layer
there.
Apc (Garbled) Skater 62 duty runway is 32 west the south
overrun is unusable.
62 This is 62, roger--ah, understand your reported ceiling
is 2500 feet.
Apc Estimated Negative Ceiling two thousand scattered, over.
0802/30Z 62 Roger, we would accept VFR--pause--a GCA vectors to
VFR conditions on the bottom now please.
Apc Roger, your present heading is 180; you're cleared
to descend to 1700, over.
62 62 Squawking normal this time.
Apc (KEY: NO TRANSMIT) roger 62 squawk low you're ringing
the station.
62 This is 62, you're coming in weak and unreadable, say
again please.
Apc Roger, Skater 62, squawk low, squawk low, over (garbled)
0803/30Z 62 62, Squawking low.
Apc Skater 62, say altitude passing now.
62 Roger 3500
Apc Roger, turn left heading 140'
62 Roger, left to 140
Apc Squawk normal
0804Z 62 Squawking normal
62 Steady 140'
Apc Ah, roger
Apc Ah, roger
Apc (On intercom) Squawk, Squawk low, he goes right off.
Yeah, (unreadable)
Apc Skater 6(Broken) we cut out Skater 62 report in VFR
0804/30Z conditions.
62 Roger, this (garbled)
C-I Come-ff, ah put 316.0 on ah receive only and 118.3
(garbled) yeah put it on receive come off (garbled)
0805Z Put VHF one on receive I don't know if that'll help
any it might.
S-I There were that way.
0805/30Z C-I Let me turn the gain down, see if you can......
62 Chu Lai Approach Skater 62
Apc Skater 62, Chu Lai go ahead
62 Roger, I'm on a heading of 150 seventeen, we'd like
a precision approach. We're not VFR at this time.
Apc Roger, Skater 62, standby
62 Roger, and we're down to almost minimum fuel
C-I Minimum fuel?? garbled background
Apc Skater 62 ah, this will be a radar vector and precision
0806Z approach runway 32, if no transmission received for one minute in
the pattern, fifteen seconds on base leg,
five seconds on final, proceed VFR, contact the tower
if possible continue tacan approach runway one (dash) 32,
over.
62 Roger
Apc And Skater 62 say position now.
62 Roger, we're not DME equipped
Apc Roger, disregard the Tacan lost comm (garbled with
beeper in background)
0806/30Z 62 Roger
C-I VFR lost comm
S-I Yeah (garbled) low fuel
C-I O.K. (GARBLED)
Apc (on intercom) You got him back there?
Apc And Skater 62 squawk standby
62 Roger, we're squawking standby.
0807Z B5-I Garbled and weak
C-I Tell him squawk normal
Apc Skater 62 squawk normal
62 Roger, squawking normal
0807/30Z Unk Loud garbled noise
Apc And Skater 62 contact Chu Lai Approach Control
this time frequency 329.4, over.
B5-I I got a possible, guns, on him, on 105' about
7 southeast bound.
Apc And Skater 62 squawk standby we don't have you in
0808Z radar at this time, over (garbled)
Apc Skater 62, Chu Lai
Unk Yeah
WEAK GARBLED BACKGROUND
C-I Okay tell him--fades out
Apc Skater 62, Chu Lai
Apc This is Chu Lai Approach on guard, Skater 62 if you
hear squawk standby over.
C-I Ah, turn him-in
0808/30Z Apc Skater 62 ah, take up a heading of 320' over.
C-I Tell him to squawk...That ain't...(garbled.)
S-I Na
Apc Skater 62, this is Chu Lai Approach control on guard
if you hear come up 383.1, over
B5-I Hey Guns
C-I Yeah
B5-I OK, give him a turn to 090. I think I got, this is
him right here.
C-I Well, he's low fuel, somewhere, we'll turn him base
OK 230 OK
B5-I I can't even
S-I I'm not even talking to him.
C-I Well, well, hit him on guard, if you hear turn
right heading 230
0809Z Apc Skater 62, if you hear on guard turn right zero
correction 230, 230 over
0809/30Z C-I Is it about 8 miles
Apc Turn, turn you son of a gun
Twr Towers up Bay 5
B5-I OK BOB, AH, They can't find this airplane, where
he's at, we can't get radar with him, tower, OK
Twr OK
S-I I've got three different targets right there.
Unk Unreadable
C-I Squawking 7000
UNREADABLE
0810Z Apc Skater 62, recycle squawk 7000 normal, over
C-I You talking to him?
S-I I'm trying on guard
C-I Tell him if you hear, squawk emergency
Apc Skater 62, This is Chu Lai Approach Control on guard..If you
hear squawk emergency, over.
0810/30 UNREADABLE
C-I Is tower talking to him? Unreadable
B5-I Hey tower
Twr We're not talking to him
B5-I They're not talking to him guns.
C-I Have the..How about East Field Tower, ask them to
check with them.
B5-I Talk with East Field Tower.
0811Z
U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y V I E T N A M
OFFICE OF THE AVIATION OFFICER
(MACV crest)
Suspense: 13 July
Date: 13 July 70
Safety
I haven't yet received the formal accident investigation on the aircraft accident that nearly killed Gen Ramsey, Americal Div.
?signed?(?George W. Putnam, Jr)
AVHAV-S (11 Apr 70) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Army Aircraft Accident UH-1H, SN 68-16262, 17 March 1970,
Aircraft Commander PIKE
Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375
TO: Director USABAAR, Fort Rucker, Alabama 36260
1. Forwarded is copy 1 of the report of the subject accident.
2. For statistical purposes this headquarters had coded the cause of
subject accident as OPERATION.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
[Signed] Al
1 Incl D.J. Winter
Cy 2 wd CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
MAJ Ammons/np/LBN 4887
AVHAV-S
SUBJECT: Army Aircraft Accident UH-1H, SN 68-16262, 17 March 1970,
Aircraft Commander PIKE
THRU: Commanding General, Americal Division, ATTN: Aviation Safety,
APO 96374
Commanding Officer, 16th Aviation Group, ATTN: Aviation Safety,
APO 96374
Commanding Officer, 123d Aviation Battalion, ATTN: Aviation
Safety, APO 96374
TO: Commanding Officer, Company A, 123d Aviation Battalion,
APO 96374
1. The report of the subject accident was forwarded to USABAAR with the
following comments in the approval block:
#1. The findings and recommendations of the accident investigating
board are approved.
#2. The estimated cost of repair is in excess of the limits estab-
lished by TB 750-99-15. The estimated cost of damage is amended to read
$244,345, the replacement cost of the UH-1H.
#3. Corrective actions are adequate."
2. Your interest in aircraft accident prevention, as evidenced by the
completeness of this investigation, is commendable.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
[Signed] Al
D.J. Winter
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
AVDF-ABFS (24 Apr 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Army Aircraft Accident, UH-1H, 68-16262, 17 March 1970,
AC: Pike
DA, Headquarters, Americal Division, APO 96374
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHAV-S
APO 96375
1. Concur with the findings and recommendations of the accident investigating board.
2. Actions taken to prevent recurrence as amended by the 2d indorsement are
considered to be appropriate and are being reemphasized within this Division.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
1 Incl A. G. HUME
wd cy #3 Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
1(b). Probable or Suspected Cause Factors - (con't)
(2) The air traffic controllers were late in detecting an emergency situation
developing and delayed 4 minutes and 45 seconds in notifying the pilots that
radar contact was lost.
(3) A ghost aircraft may have been responding to instructions given to the
aircraft in radio communications with ATC (Skater 62).
2. Recommendations (con't)
e. That a low frequency/medium frequency ADF beacon by installed at Chu Lai
and that a low altitude ADF approach be commissioned.
f. That Commanders at all levels should stress the importance of carrying
the UHF emergency radios on all missions. These radios should be frequently
checked to ensure that they are operational.
h. That Commanders at all levels should appraise pilots and controllers of
the inherent dangerous potentiality, however remote, of a ghost aircraft reacting
to instructions intended for other aircraft.
i. That emphasis be placed on the importance of ensuring that all occupants
are properly entered on passenger manifest (DA form 1080).
j. That commanders ensure all aviators perform a minimum of two hours hood
flying monthly, and a minimum of two practice GCA's every three months.
Statement of Reviewer of Concurrence/Non-Concurrence and Corrective Actions
Taken (con't)
6. All unit aviators have been advised of the possibility of a unidentifi-
cation on radar and the possibility of a "ghost" aircraft responding to instruc-
tions meant for them.
7. The passenger manifest (DA Form 1080) is being completed prior to every
flight.
8. A Collateral Investigation has been conducted.
John F. BROSNAN
LTC, ADA
Commanding
AVDF-ABFS (24 Apr 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Army Aircraft Accident, UH-1H, 68-16262, 17 March 1970,
AC: Pike
DA, Headquarters, 16th Aviation Group (Combat), APO 96374.
TO: Commanding General, Americal Division, APO 96374.
1. Concur with the findings and recommendations of the investigation board.
2. The actions taken to prevent recurrence are amended to include:
a. Aviation commanders have been instructed to ensure that all crew
members wear the Nomex flight gear on all flights.
b. Continual liaison is accomplished with terminal facility personnel
to ensure dissemination of standard IFR procedures to army aviators within
the Americal Division.
c. Discussions have been held to determine the feasibility of implementing
a terminal low altitude approach to Chu Lai. The agency controlling the airfield
does not indicate that the commissioning of an ADF approach would be possible
until another agency replaces the Marine element now responsible for traffic
control.
1 Incl D. TOWNSEND
as COL, INF
Commanding
AVDF-ABB 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Army Aircraft Accident, UH-1H, SN: 68-16262, 17 Mar 70, Pilot:
Pike
DA, Headquarters, 123d Aviation Battalion (Combat), APO 96374 22 Apr 70
TO: Commanding Officer, 16th Aviation Group (Combat), APO 96374
Forwarded for necessary action.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
1 Incl JOHN C. HEINRITZ
nc 1LT, IN
Adjutant
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AMERICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, 14TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96374
AVDF-ABAX 11 April 1970
SUBJECT: Army Aircraft Accident, UH-1H SN 68-16262, 17 March 1970, Pilot Pike
Commanding Officer
16th Aviation Group (Combat)
Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374
Inclosed are three copies of subject report
1 Incl Signed (O.R. Hite)
as (trip) O.R. HITE
MAJ IN
DISTRIBUTION: ACCIDENT BOARD PRESIDENT
Cy #1-USABAAR
Cy #2-HQ USARV
Cy #3-APPOINTING AUTHORITY
REPORTS
TAB A - Findings and Recommendations
TAB B - Narrative of Accident
TAB C - Witness Statements
TAB D - General Information
TAB E - Wreckage Distribution
TAB F - Failure or Malfunction
TAB G - Flight Surgeon's Analysis and Recommendations
TAB H - Flight Surgeon's General Information
TAB I - Copy of DD Form 1322
TAB J - Copy of A/C Record
TAB K - Copy of A/C Clearance & Manifest
REPORT OF U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT [X] MAJOR
Section A - Location and time
1 a. Date of accident [17 Mar 70]
1 b. Time of Accident (Local) [1607 to 1615]
2. DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST MILITARY INSTALLATION
[7 miles west of Chu Lai West]
3. Place of accident (state, Foreign Country, Town, Distance and Direction)
[RVN]
4. Accident Occurred [Day]
Section B - Aircraft
1. a. Type, Model and Series [UH-1H]
2. b. Aircraft Serial Number [68-16262
3. INSTL where aircraft assigned (A Co. 123 CAB
4. Organization under whose control the aircraft was operating
[Hq, Americal Div]
5. What was mission? [Combat]
Section C - Weather
Weather was considered a factor in this accident.
Section D - Airport and/or airway facilities
Skater 62 was under the control of MATCU-67, Chu Lai, Vietnam. Skater 62
initially requested a radar monitored descent to VFR conditions underneath
the overcast. Poor radio communications existed. Their intentions were to
vector the aircraft to a point East of Chu Lai and descend it to 1700 feet,
minimum vector altitude for that area. On a heading of 180 degrees, Skater 62's
transponder squawking normal began ringing the radar scope. Affective radar
control was lost at this time, 0803/30Z. The aircraft was instructed and
acknowledged a turn to 140 degrees. When instructed to squawk low, the ring
disappeared as well as the squawk. No primary target was seen, and the controller
told Skater 62 to squawk normal. The ring reappeared. At 0805/45Z, Skater
62 reported at 1700 feet, IFR, requested a GCA, and stated minimum fuel. VFR
lost commo instructions were issued due to minimum fuel and the fact that
there was not a suitable alternative instrument approach that the aircraft was
capable of executing. The aircraft was not equipped with TACAN. Lost radar
contact was given to the pilots at 0808Z. There was a delay of 4 minutes and approximately 45 seconds between radar contact lost and informing the pilots.
During this time, Skater 62 descended from 3500 to 1500 feet. The confusion
in the transponder instructions, poor radio communications, the change of request to a GCA were factors that caused the delay. The accident investigation board
considered the length of the delay excessive. Neither radar or radio contact
was regained. After detailed analysis of all the evidence, it appears CW-2
Pike, AC on Skater 62 made an erroneous turn to heading 230 or 240 degrees
when he was directed to turn left to 140 degrees. The aircraft crashed 7
miles west of Chu Lai West Airfield between 0807/30Z and 0815Z.
Section E - Personnel involved
Military Civilian
Number of Aircraft occupants involved 8 0
Number of bystanders involved 0 0
No injury Minor Major Fatal Unk Missing
Number of people injured: 0 1 5 2 0 0
Other occupants of aircraft: 0 0 0 0 0 0
Military bystanders 0 0 0 0 0 0
other bystanders 0 0 0 0 0 0
DA FORM 2397-1
TECHNICAL REPORT OF U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
1. FINDINGS.
a. ESTABLISHED CAUSE FACTORS
Operational-the aircraft accident was precipitated by the failure of the pilots
to correctly follow instructions given them by ATC.
b. Operational: The pilots flew into a marginal weather situation in which they were unable to cope. Pilots actions indicate that hi knowledge of pilot
instrument procedures were questionable. Instrument minimums and requirements
are waived in SEA.
c. NONRELATED FACTORS
NONE
2. RECOMMENDATIONS (Recommended Corrective Actions in Order of Importance)
a. That Commanders at all levels review or establish programs to insure that all
pilots are familiar with proper pilot instrument procedures.
b. That as tactical necessity permits, Commanders insure that best qualified
aviators are assigned the high priority missions where marginal weather is apt
to be encountered.
c. That all services insure proper and timely techniques are utilized by personnel
controlling IFR traffic.
d. That Commanders should insure classes be conducted periodically on the proper
use of the transponder.
BOARD MEMBERS (Signature, Grade, Branch and Rating)
President -
HHC, 14th CBT AVN
71Sst AVN CO, 14th CAB, APO 96374 3196
Reviewing Official
STATEMENT OF REVIEWER WILL INCLUDE CONCURRENCE, NON-CONCURRENCE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.
1. Concur with the findings and recommendations of this investigation.
2. Command emphasis has been placed on the logging of hood and GCA as required by 16th CAG Reg 95-1.
3. Aviator qualification is a prime consideration in the selection of flight
crews for missions.
4. The use and function of the APX-44 and APX-72 transponders has been reviewed
at weekly unit safety meetings.
5. Emergency UHF radios (URC-10) are carried on the basis of one per aircraft
due to a local shortage. Functional operation is checked every 15 days.
22 Apr 70 LTC, ADA, SRARAV, 123d Avn Bn. John F. Brosnan
APPROVAL AUTHORITY
Remarks of the approving authority
1. The findings and recommendations of the accident investigation board are approved.
2. The estimated cost of repair is in excess of the limits established by TB 750-99-15. The estimated cost of damage is amended to read $344,345, the replacement cost of the UH-1H.
3. Corrective actions are adequate.
Brigadier General
USA GEORGE W. PUTNAM, JR, Aviation Officer
TECHNICAL REPORT OF US ARMY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
PART III (continued)
Section B - TRAUMA Information
Last Cause Method
1a.Name b.Svc number 2.TRAUMA DESCR. 3.of Death 4.and agent
Yes | NO
| Decelerative Forces;
PIKE 161-36-XXXX SEE NARRATIVE | X Shoulder Harness.
|
FRANSON 562-76-xxxx SEE NARRATIVE | X Decelerative Forces;Head
| Striking Solid Object.
MURPHY 307-54-3925 SEE NARRATIVE X | Decelerative Forces;Head
| Striking Solid Object.
REED 312-54-xxxx SEE NARRATIVE | X Decelerative forces;(L) side
| of body striking solid object
RAMSEY 400-54-xxxx SEE NARRATIVE | X Decelerative Forces;JP4 Fuel
| in contact with skin.
THOMAS 517-24-3130 SEE NARRATIVE X | Decelerative Forces; Head
| Striking Solid Object.
RUFFING 165-34-xxxx SEE NARRATIVE | X Decelerative Forces; Body
| Striking Solid Object.
TUCKER 273-40-xxxx SEE NARRATIVE | X Decelerative Forces; Head
| Striking Solid Object.
5. AUTOPSY Will be forwarded when available
6. Blood or Tissue Specimens will be forwarded when available.
Section C - Flight Surgeon's Analysis and recommendations
On 17 March 1970, a UH-1H carrying the Commanding General of the Americal Division crashed into the mountains approximately 7 miles west of Chu Lai while on a radar vector for landing in Chu Lai. The exact time of the crash is unknown, but occurred sometime between 1605-1620. The events surrounding the crash are well documented in the main body of this report. There was no post-crash fire and no hostile fire was encountered before or after the crash.
All eight (8) men aboard the aircraft sustained injuries, ranging in severity
from cerebral concussion to loss of life. I will attempt to correlate the degree
of injury with a possible cause factor in each case.
The A/C, CW-2 Pike, was occupying the right front seat. He was monitoring
instruments and the radio at the time of the crash and stated he felt tired that
day. (see DA 2397-7, para 5b) A thorough review of Mr. Pike's health record and
past history reveals no physical nor emotional problems. He sustained multiple
body contusions, including bilateral shoulder burns from forces exerted on the
shoulder harnesses he was wearing. He also suffered a fracture of the spinous process of C7, believed caused by the decelerative forces involved in the crash. CW-2
Pike was wearing jungle fatigues, leather gloves and leather boots. He stated
his Nomex gloves had been stolen.
(continued)
(continued)
WO-1 Franson, the Co-Pilot, was occupying the left front seat and was in control
of the aircraft preceding and at the time of the crash. He was substituting for
the regular Co-Pilot who was grounded that day for excessive flying hours. [Historian Note: the Co-Pilot who was grounded for excessive hours was Don Bullard of Wilmington Island, North Carolina] (134 hours in preceding 30 days). He sustained a compression fracture at the T5-6 level, multiple contusions and a cerebral concussion with retrograde amnesia, the latter-most preventing him from giving an accurate account of events leading up to the crash. Decelerative forces and his helmet striking an unknown solid object are believed to be the agents of production. He was wearing jungle boots and a Nomex flight suit, but only liners for gloves as he feels Nomex gloves impede his touch control As with CW-2 Pike, there is no past history of emotional or physical ailments and fatigue was not believed to be a factor.
Sp/4 Murphy, the Crewchief, was occupying the right gunner's well and sustained
fatal injuries. The Crewchief normally occupies the left gunner's well but in the
CG aircraft, he sits on the right side. He sustained numerous fractures as follows:
fx. (R) humerus, (R) radius, (R) ulna, fx. (L) clavicle, fx. sternum with anterior
mediastinal hemorrhage. Preliminary cause of death by post-mortem examination was
due to cerebral edema (1850 gram brain) and contusion with uncal herniation.
Date of Report | Flight Surgeon's Typed Name and Grade
10 Apr 70 | HENRY C. SCHNEIDER JR. CPT. MC, FS SIGNATURE
DA FORM 2397-8
DA FORM 2397-7, Section C, PIKE ACCIDENT, cont'd. -
Reliable observers among the survivors noted irregular breathing regarding
Sp/4 Murphy for approximately four (4) hours following the accident. The
only notable injury was a cut over the left eye, which did not appear to
be bleeding excessively. I doubt if local first aid would have benefited
the crewchief and it is doubtful that immediate air evacuation to a
hospital with major surgery would have made any difference in the out-
come. The agent of production is believed to be decelerative forces
with his helmet striking a solid object, most likely the Commanding
General's armored seat.
It is noteworthy that the other man who was killed was sitting in
the same relative position as the crewchief. (LTC Thomas was in the
right jump seat, facing outwards). I believe the forces involved in
the crash were most marked on the right side of the aircraft. A Study
of the seats shows complete collapse of both the right gunner's and
right jump seat, whereas the right pilot's seat and CG's seat were
completely intact. (see tabs 8). A helmet found in the wreckage
was totally battered and split open down the middle, and though it
cannot be proved conclusively, it is my belief that it belonged to
the crewchief. (see tabs 8). In addition to a helmet, Sp/4 Murphy
was wearing all the recommended flight gear.
Sp/4 Reed, the Gunner, was occupying the left gunner's well and was
wearing jungle fatigues, jungle boots and Nomex gloves. He states
his helmet came off with the crash and his seat collapsed. He did not
lose consciousness and suffered no amnesia. He sustained a fracture
of his left maxilla and left humerus, both believed secondary to
decelerative forces.
MG Ramsey, Commanding General of the Americal Division, was sitting
on the far right side in an armored seat facing forward and was
wearing a helmet as protection. The seat was remarkably free of damage.
(see tabs 8). MG Ramsey sustained the following injuries secondary
to decelerative forces; A Comminuted spiral [?] fracture of (L) humerus;
a questionable compression fracture at T5 level; a chip fracture,
anterior lip of L2; mild traumatic ecchymosis (bruise) to both eyes.
In addition, he was noted to suffered second degree burns (blisters)
to his left forearm, believed caused by contact of the skin with JP-4 Fuel.
LTC Thomas from the 23rd AG Replacement Company was killed instantly
in the crash according to observers. He was sitting in the right jump
seat and was wearing no protective head gear. Post-mortem X-Ray
examination revealed multiple skull fractures including the base of the
skull between the anterior and middle cranial fossa, a fracture dis-
placement of the mid-portion of the mandible, a questionable fracture
at the C2-3 level of the vertebrai Column (broken neck), multiple rib
fractures and a fracture of the (L) humerus. It is my feeling that the
decelerative forces involved in the crash caused his head to strike
the right front pilot's seat which led, i nthe absence of protective
head gear, the instantaneous death. In addition, his jump seat was
totally collapsed. (see tab 8).
(continued)
(continued)
CPT Ruffing, the General's Aide, was sitting right next to MG Ramsey
in the center row of seats in front of the console. He was wearing a
flight helmet and sustained the following injuries secondary to decel-
erative forces: fractures of the ribs 3-10 posteriorally causing hemo-
thorax and subcutaneous emphysema of the right chest; lacerations of
(L) leg and (L) arm.
CPT Tucker was sitting just to the left of CPT Ruffing in the center
row of seats and was wearing no protective helmet. He suffered a
cerebral concussion but no other injuries were noted. Of all eight
men aboard, CPT Tucker certainly escaped with the least amount of
injury and is the only survivor who will not be evacuated out of Vietnam.
Mention should be made of the rescue and survival phase of the
accident. Because of IFR conditions, rescue aircraft were unable to
pinpoint the exact location of the downed aircraft for many hours despite
numerous heroic attempts. A survival radio operated by WO-1 Franson
established contact with rescue aircraft and Chu-Lai. A lack of
adequate signal devices delayed rescue but the presence of the radio
is what really saved the day.
DA FORM 2397-7, Section C, PIKE ACCIDENT, cont'd.
None of the survivors remember how they got out of the aircraft.
All were unconscious or had amnesia for the immediate post-crash
period. They endured the cold and wet mountainous environment for
approximately 18 hours until rescue aircraft could pinpoint their
location. Then followed a spine-tingling rescue by the battalion
surgeon from 1/6 Inf. 198th Bde. as he was lowered down to the crash
site on a jungle penetrator from a hovering aircraft. All six (6)
survivors were rushed to Chu Lai hospitals: two men went to the 27th
Surgical Hospital, the other four to the 91st Evacuation Hospital.
All are doing well at present and all but one are to be evacuated
out of Vietnam.
There was some discrepancy between initial accounts of the accident
in interviews of survivors as compared with later interviews after
other evidence had been presented. It is my feeling, medically and
psychologically, that a man's initial response is the more reliable.
Trying to second-guess what happened leads to unintentional influencing
of the minds of those being interviewed and as such cannot be heavily
relied upon as concrete evidence trying to build a case for this
or that. The board has done a fine job, I feel, in sorting out the
facts and presenting a logical, coherent argument for what transpired
prior to the accident.
In conclusion, the following recommendations are offered:
1.) The proper wearing of recommended protective flight gear cannot
be over emphasized. All crewmembers must wear Nomex gloves and
clothing, in addition to leather boots and a properly-fitting helmet.
This should receive Command emphasis at the local unit level.
2.) As this accident poignantly reveals, survival equipment, most
notably a survival radio, is of in-valuable assistance in effecting
any rescue, especially in rugged inaccessible countryside and in IFR
conditions. Personal survival gear should be stressed in the units
and periodic inspection of survival radios to make certain they are
functioning properly is recommended.
3.) Experience has shown that seats other than those used by the
pilots do not hold up under extreme G-forces such as are encountered
in most crashes. Recommend that steps be taken to further evaluate
the safety of passenger seats and restraint devices.
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Section G - Narrative of Accident
1. General: The president of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was
notified 1900, 17 March 1970, of the accident. All members were notified
and told to meet at A Company, 123d CAB Operations, Chu Lai Vietnam. Due
to the unfavorable weather, the board was unable to get to the scene of the
accident until 0900, 19 March. The afternoon of 18 March was spent interviewing
the survivors and the Chu Lai Approach Control personnel. The board listened to
the tape of the radio transmissions from Skater 62 and Chu Lai Approach Control.
At 0900, 19 March, the weather improved and the President of the Board, Flight
Surgeon, and Safety Officer of the 123d CAB investigated the scene of the accident.
The number of board members to investigate the scene was limited due to the weight
requirement placed on the aircraft because it was unable to land due to the slop[e]
of the hillside. Photographs of the scene were taken by the Safety Officer of
the 123d CAB.
2. Identification: The aircraft was a UH-1H, serial number 68-16262, piloted
by CW-2 Stephen C. Pike W161-36-xxxx, aircraft commander and WO1 Ronald D.
Franson, W562-76-4422, pilot. The remaining occupants were MG Ramsey 400-54-xxxx,
LTC Thomas, 517-24-xxxx, Ruffing CPT 165-34-xxxx, Tucker Cpt 273-40-xxxx, Reed SP/4
312-54-xxxx and Murphy SP/4 307-54-3925. The scene of the accident was seven (7)
miles west of Chu Lai West Airfield, coordinates BS 429994. The exact time of the
accident was undeterminable between 1607 and 1615 hours, 17 March 1970. The
aircraft was totally destroyed. Of the 8 passengers and crew on board, one
was killed instantly, and one died before rescue teams could reach the aircraft.
the other 6 were hospitalized with injuries. (see Flight Surgeon's section)
3. Description of Accident: CW-2 Stephen C. Pike, aircraft commander, and
WO-1 Ronald D. Franson, pilot, departed LZ Center, coordinates BT052250, Vietnam
on or about 1530 hours, 17 March 1970, in UH-1H, SN 68-16262, enroute to Chu
Lai, Vietnam. Due to the broken cloud layer at 2000 feet indicated altitude,
the AC chose to climb through a hole in the clouds and fly VFR on top. Skater
62 contacted Chu Lai Approach Control at 1555 hours for radar assistance.
After difficulty establishing radio contact, radar contact was confirmed at
8 miles north north-west of Chu Lai West airfield at 1600 hours. The radar
contact was established by observing a target correctly respond to instructions
to turn more than 30 degrees. After CW-2 Pike requested and received permission
to test his transponder in the emergency code, a different target was located
11 NM north-east at 1601 by observing a target respond to 2 transponder squawks.
Assuming that he had made a mistaken identification the first time, the controller
issued direction and instruction to the transponder target. Only one attempt
was made to check the position of the first target with negative results.
(continued)
(continued)
Skater 62 requested a radar monitored let down to VFR conditions underneath
the overcast. Chu Lai was reporting a ceiling of 2000 scattered. Skater 62
was told to turn to a heading of 180 and descend to 1700 feet, minimum vectoring
altitude for the area east of Chu Lai. Poor radio communications existed between
approach control and the aircraft. Radar contact was lost at 1603 due to the
close proximity of a transponder squawking normal within 5 to 7 miles of the
radar set. Skater 62 was told to turn left to a heading 140 degrees and report
VFR conditions. At 1605 hours and 30 seconds, Skater 62 reported level 1700
and IFR. He requested a GCA and stated minimum fuel. Radar contact was never
regained. Radio contact was lost at 1607 hours and 30 seconds.
Chu Lai Approach Control continued to transmit to Skater 62 on guard and in
the blind. At about 1615 after a ramp check at Chu Lai East and West showed
that Skater 62 had not landed, air-sea rescue was launched and directed to
search 5 miles Southeast of Chu Lai. At approximately 1630, TACP Tam Ky,
Vietnam, monitored a distress call: "Skater 65 approximately 5 miles Northeast
of LZ Pineapple/IFR and come up to some mountain." Skater 62 used several call
signs after the accident occurred. There were no witnesses of the aircraft
crash due to the IFR conditions. Rescue operations wer[e] hindered until the
following morning due to poor visibility.
It is the conclusion of the Aircraft Investigation Board, drawn from the
evidence gathered at the crash scene that the aircraft impacted on a
southwesterly heading. The aircraft probably first st[r]uck the main body of
the tree, depicted in Tab 8 in a nose high attitude. The indicated altitude
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Section G - Narrative of Accident
at the time of impact was 1545. After contacting the tree, the aircraft
bounced into the air experiencing severe mast bumping and again impacted in
a left skid-low attitude with the main rotor and tail rotor blades striking
the ground. The tailboom and rotor hub assembly separated from the main
fuselage. The main fuselage then rolled down the slope coming to rest inverted.
The main components fo the aircraft came to rest on the hillside as depicted
in Tab E. There was no post accident fire. The immediate actions of the
survivors for a brief period of time after the crash have not been determined.
All regained consciousness outside the aircraft wreckage.
The search for the crash site first centered SE of Chu Lai because the last acknowledge heading was 140 degrees. Not until the emergency radio (URC-10)
was monitored by Major James, aircraft commander who located the crash, did the
search shift westward. (see Tab C) Major James had taken off immediately
after notification of a crash and had headed north to Tam Ky. About 3 miles
southeast of Tam Ky, he heard the emergency signal. He immediately turned south and the signal became stronger. As he passed a valley, the signal faded.
He then turned and flew up the valley. By this time voice communications had been established with the survivors. By making several passes through the
many valleys and using a build and fade method of tracking, Major James was
able to determine the general area of the crash. The clouds covering the crash
site hindered the exact location from being spotted and there fore the recovery
of the survivors was not completed until the following morning, 18 March.
4. Details of the Investigation: Written statements from the ATC controllers
were requested as well as a written transcript of the tape of radio transmissions
involving Skater 62. Interviews were held with all the survivors. Records and
aircraft forms were gathered. Flight records revealed that both the Aircraft
Commander and pilot had expired tactical instrument tickets. CW-2 Pike
was an experienced aviator with 2452 hours total time and over two years rated
experience. WO-1 Franson had 1086 total hours. They had flown 78 hours (Pike),
70 hours (Franson) during the last 30-day period. They were both said to be
responsible, skillful aviator,s and although not current on instrument,
practiced GCA's often. Inspection of the crash site revealed the following:
(1) Aircraft altimeter indicated 1545 feet. It was broken on impact.
Altimeter was set with 29.77 in the Koleman window which was the current altimeter
setting at the time of the crash with no corrections.
(2) Aircraft impacted on a southwesterly heading as evidenced by broken trees.
(3) Fuel gauge indicated 475 pounds of fuel remaining.
(4) UHF radio was set on pre-set, channel 14 which proved to be frequency
383.1 mills which is Chu Lai Approach Control primary UHF frequency.
(5) ADF radio was tuned to 850 kHz, AFVN, Da Nang.
(6) The transponder was set mode 3, 7000 normal.
(continued)
(continued)
Several interviews were held jointly with a Marine ATC investigation team.
Inspection of the MATCU-67 radar and radio equipment revealed that the radar
equipment was in good operational condition and all normal maintenance had
been performed. (Tab 6) All radio equipment was operational but weak and
broken with loud background noises in the transmitter. The controllers were well
trained, experienced personnel. (Tab 6) The transcript of the tape (Tab 6)
indicated the following:
(1) First radio contact was at 1555 hours.
(2) First (mistaken) identification was at 1600 hours at position 8 miles
NNW.
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Section G - Narrative of Accident
(3) Second identification was at 1601, position 11 NM northeast.
(4) Radar contact was lost at 1603 dure to the transponder squawking
normal in close proximity of radar receiver. Radio contact lost at 1607/30
seconds.
(5) Ramp check performed; air-sea rescue launched; aircraft presumed
down SE of Chu Lai.
A copy of the tape has been requested and will be forwarded to FAA, Washington
for analysis.
5. A Discussion of Observed Wreckage:
(1) The main fuselage minus the tailboom, engine, rotor hub assembly
landed inverted with the nose facing generally west. (see Tab E) The top
deck was completely mangled and caved in. The belly was only slightly damaged.
The left skid was badly bent. (see Tab 8)
(2) The main rotor blades and hub assembly separated at the static stops
of the mast. The rotor blades were broken in several places and mangled.
Rotor hub assembly came to rest about seven (7) meters south of fuselage and
upslope. Evidence of extreme mast bumping before the hub and main rotor blades
separated was noted by the pinching of the mast and clean out at the static
stops. (see Tab 8)
(3) The tailboom was severed at the attaching bolts and came to rest
up slope of the fuselage approximately 50 to 75 feet to the south. The
forward end of the tailboom was facing northeast.
(4) Tail rotor blades were broken and mangled. The 90 degree gearbox
was separated but remained in general vicinity of the aft end of tail boom.
(see Tab 8)
(5) Only seats that remained intact were the two pilot's seats and the
Commanding General's seat. (see Tab 8)
(6) The command console was mangled due to the collapsing top of the
aircraft and lower portion of the transmission and transmission mounts falling
forward.
(7) The instrument panel was badly damaged but intact. The clock was
operative.
(8) The UHF radio was extensively damaged. The transponder was slightly
damaged.
6. Further Investigation by the Board Revealed the Following Information
(1) The exact times involved were impossible to determine due to the
use of several clocks. The log at LZ Center showed the aircraft departed
at 1525. They, however, admitted it was only accurate to within plus or
minus 10 minutes. CW Pike called A/123d CAB operations at 1535, A/123d
CAB time, as soon as he reached altitude 4000 feet. Therefore the exact
takeoff time from LZ Center is not known. It was approximately 1530 plus
or minus 5 minutes.
(2) CW2 Pike, AC, stated that he flew a heading of 120 degrees for 10
to 15 minutes. Then attempted to contact Chu Lai Approach Control. The
flight time would have placed him northwest of Chu Lai in the vicinity of the
first radar contact. (see Tab 6)
(continued)
(continued)
(3) If the flight time is calculated by the elapsed time between level
at 4000 feet, 1535 hours, to the time of first radio contact with Chu Lai
Approach, 1555 hours, the time would be 20 minutes. This flight time would
place the aircraft over the water north northeast of Chu Lai. If he would
have followed the heading changes instructed by Chu Lai Approach, the
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Section G - Narrative of Accident
aircraft would have been in the vicinity of the second radar contact. (see
Tab 6)
Therefore neither possibility could be disproved, so both could be possible.
Hence both flight routes depicted on chart, Tab 6, were studied by the
board.
(4) The approach controller considered the second radar contact to be
the correct one because it was established by use of transponder and correct
response to instructions to turns. Except for one quick check with negative
results, the controller did not follow the possible flight route of the first
radar contact. This was due to the fact that when tracking a transponder
target, the interrogator on the radar set restricts skin painted or primary
radar targets.
(5) CW-2 Pike stated that he thought he had 650 pounds of fuel when he
departed LZ Center. The fuel quantity gauge indicated 475 pounds at impact,
therefore only 175 pounds of fuel was used. The board was unable to accurately
determine a rate of consumption for a UH-1H with configuration of Skater 62,
therefore, no accurate time of flight could be determined.
(6) A post-accident transponder check was performed in flight. The
transponder proved to be operational.
(7) Based on the map studies (Tab 6) corrected for known wind conditions,
the flight paths of each of the radar contacts would approximately be as
depicted. Therefor if Skater 62 had followed all instructions given by Chu
Approach Control, they would not have crashed at the crash site. Therefore
it is the opinion of the board that the pilot must have made an erroneous turn
to a westerly or southwesterly heading after radar contact was lost.
Captain Ruffin, a regular passenger on the aircraft, stated in his interview
with board members that he well remembers seeing mountain peaks out the front of the aircraft when they were flying on a southwesterly heading just prior
to entering the cloud layer. Based on this statement, it is reasonable to
assume that the pilot turned to a heading of 240 degrees when directed to
turn to 140 degrees. The tape of radio transmissions, time 0804 Z verifies
that the aircraft was around 3500 feet indicated altitude at this time. CW-2
Pike further stated that he remembers flying a heading of 230 degrees. He
did not recall a heading of 140 degrees. Again referring to the chart,
if Skater 62 had turned to a heading of SW instead of SE, the probable
aircraft flight path would have crossed the crash site.
(8) The exact time of the accident was also impossible to determine.
Assuming the time of the accident was the time of lost communication, the
distance the aircraft could fly in the elapsed time (4 minutes) would be
approximately 7 NM. This pint tends to indicate the western most flight
path was the correct one. Further weight may be added to this theory if the
analysis of the strange noises at 0807 minutes and 30 seconds on the approach
control tape proves to be the sound of the crash.
(continued)
(continued)
(9) There was indeed a target following the directions of the controller
to the northeast of Chu Lai. If the first (mistaken) ident was Skater 62,
then another aircraft was following the instructions meant for Skater 62.
A search for the ghost aircraft had negative results.
(10) The aircraft transponder proved to be operational during post-
accident check. Therefore if the pilots correctly operated the transponder,
Skater 62 was the second radar contact, 11 NM northeast of Chu Lai.
(11) Out-dated Low Altitude Instrument Approach plates were found in
the aircraft wreckage.
(12) A study of the tape of radio transmissions reveals that CW-2 Pike
was not proficient in the IFR pilot procedures.
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Section G - Narrative of Accident
(13) He failed to inform the controllers of his lack of operational navigational
radios. (No TACAN, no VOR, and ADF inoperative). (He considered the ADF inoperative, however, there are no remarks on the aircraft's 2408-13 to substantiate this claim). Failure to report radio malfunctions is not in accordance with AR 95-2 and DA FLIP, section II.
(14) The passenger manifest (DA From 1080) did not reveal all passengers on the
aircraft, this is in violation of AR 95-1 para 3-9b(3).
(15) WO1 Franson failed to log two hours of hood time monthly which is in
violation of 16th Aviation Group letter dated 22 December 69, Subject: Helicopter Instrument Flying.
(16) CW2 Pike did not state his intended plan in case of radio failure when the
controller advised to disregard TACAN portion of the lost communications
instructions.
(17) CW2 Pike descended two hundred feet below his assigned altitude in his
attempt to regain VFR conditions.
7. Analysis of the Accident:
(1) Weather was a factor in that the aircraft was IFR just prior to impact.
(2) The MATCU-67 controllers were correct in assisting Skater 62 in that they
provided Skater 62 with what he had initially requested, a radar monitored let down
to VFR conditions. They planned to bring Skater 62 down to the minimum vectoring
altitude, 1700 eastern sector, at a point approximately 3 miles to the east of
Chu Lai. If Skater had followed their instructions, he should have regained VFR conditions at that point, if he was in fact where the controllers considered
him to be.
The controllers were slow to detect that an emergency condition existed. Referring
to the tape (Tab 6): at 0803 hours and 15 seconds (1603 local time) Skater 62's
transponder squawking normal caused ring to develop around the center of the
radar scope. Effective radar control was lost at this time. After many trans-
missions and only after radio contact failed did the controllers inform the
pilot that radar contact was lost, (time 0808Z). During these 4 minutes and
about 45 seconds, Skater descended from 3500 feet to 1500 feet.
Whether or not the pilot would have continued his descent if he knew he was not
under radar contact is pure conjecture. If he had not continued to descend,
this accident may not have happened. The board considered this delay as excessive
and crucial. It is not in accordance with the controllers manual, TM 11-2557-29,
page 129, paragraph 601, which states: "Inform aircraft when radar contact is lost.
Phraseology, 'Radar contact lost'. (Alternative instructions, if required)."
(3) The experience level of the pilots was a contributing factor in that
both pilots had expired instrument tickets. IFR pilots procedures demonstrated
by the pilots were questionable. Instrument proficiency requirements are waived
while in SEA IAW DA message 27116502 Feb 1968.
(continued)
(continued)
(4) The pilots did not intend to fly IFR When they climbed to VFR conditions
on top. They intended to descend through holes in the clouds that had existed
earlier.
(5) There was no evidence of material failure.
(6) The pilot fatigue level was not a contributing factor in the accident,
although mentioned in the Flight Surgeon Report (TAB G).
(7) Based on all the information gathered by the board, the board concluded
that the accident could have happened in one of the two following possible ways:
(a) The aircraft departed LZ Center at approximately 1530 hours. After
climbing through a hole in the clouds and proceeding on a SE heading, the pilots
were unable to find a hole through which to descend. With no ground references
except the peaks to Pineapple and an unconscious loss of time, CW2 Pike thinks he
is over the coast northwest of Chu Lai when he is in fact over the ocean,
northeast of Chu Lai. He requests radar assistance, and the first
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Section G - Narrative of Accident
mistaken radar identification with the turn of a heading of 090 takes him further
out to sea. Therefore when radar contact is made with the transponder he is 11
NM northeast. He follows the instruction given him by the Approach Control
until instructed to turn left to 140 degrees, he turned right to 240'. He
descends to 1700 feet, requests a GCA and accepts lost communications procedures
that he is unable to perform. He experiences loss of all communications and
maintains what he believes is the last assigned heading until impact.
The factual information tends to support this conclusion. However this flight
path would have placed him over known VFR conditions (see FIREP's Tab C) at
1700 feet at which time he should have visual contact with the ground through
at least broken or scattered conditions. It is difficult to apply the information
received from the interviews with the survivors to this proposed flight path.
This flight path would also require that an experienced pilot fly a heading
that he knew would place him in the mountains for a period of about 8 minutes
with no communications. This path would also require him to maintain the low
altitude (1500 feet) for this same period of time (approximately 8 minutes).
(b) The second possibility is based primarily on the statements
made by CW-2 Pike. The aircraft departed LZ Center, climbed through a hole and
flew a heading of 120' for ten to fifteen minutes. After being unable to find a
hole to descend through, radar assistance wa requested. Without adequate know-
ledge of the weather, he requested a radar monitored let down to VFR conditions.
His position was in fact 11 NM northwest of Chu Lai. Although his transponder proved to be operational, it did not transmit because of an error in setting
up the transponder. A ghost aircraft, possibly thinking Skater 62 was making
a practice GCA, performed the transponder squawks and turn instructions trans-
mitted to Skater 62. The ghost ship would have been in fact 11 NM northeast
having no difficulty maintaining VFR. Pilot reports indicate the weather east
of the coast and over the water was much better than from the coast inland.
Skater 62 continued the descent. Skater 62 turned to a heading of 240' and
shortly after that descended into the cloud bank. Just prior to going into the
clouds, altitude 3500 feet, at about 0803Z on the tape (see Tab 6) Cpt Ruffing
noticed the mountain peaks off the nose of the aircraft. Skater 62 descended
to 1500 feet, reported IFR conditions, requested a GCA and initiated a climb back
to 1700 feet. At that time they hit the mountain. The time of impact was
0807/30 seconds or the same time of radio failure. CW-2 Pike does not
remember receiving any instructions on the guard channel. All the factual
information such as an operative transponder, and the fact that a target over
the water was following all the instructions tend to rule out this theory. All
the circumstantial information such as CW-2 Pike's account of the accident, the
sudden and total loss of communications, and the fact that he would not have
broken out of the clouds along this flight path tend to support this conclusion. A strange noise was noted on the tape at 0807/30Z just prior to the loss of communications and at the theoretical time of impact.
(continued)
(continued)
Regardless of which flight path was the correct one, Skater 62 crashed on a
southwesterly heading as evidenced by the broken trees at the crash site. There-fore it was the opinion of the board that Skater 62 made an erroneous turn to
the southwesterly heading after radar contact was lost although he had
acknowledged the heading of 140, three times.
After the aircraft crashed, all passengers and crew regained consciousness
outside the aircraft. Most of the seat belts were intact therefore it is not
believed they were all thrown from the aircraft.
Rescue was first launched to the southeast and the attention was not directed
to the west until the emergency radio call and beeper were monitored. Location
of the crash site was made partially by UHF direction finding equipment of
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Section G - Narrative of Accident
Marine and Air Force rescue aircraft. Due to the extremely poor visibility,
the larger rescue aircraft were ineffective in pin pointing the location.
An Army UH-1H piloted by Major James (see Tab C), was instrumental in the
eventual location of the crash site. The general location of the crash site
was determined on the night of 17 March. The rescue of the survivors was not
completed until the morning of 18 March due to the weather conditions.
It appears that every reasonable effort went into the selection of the crew for
this mission. The pilots although not current or proficient on instruments,
were killed, experienced VFR pilots that appeared to be highly motivated and
possessed the personal and professional qualities desirable for this mission.
8. Cause Factors:
Operational:
(1) The aircraft accident was precipitated by the failure of the
pilots to correctly follow instructions given them by the ATC.
(2) The pilots flew into a marginal weather situation in which
they were unable to cope. PIlots actions indicate that his
knowledge of pilot instrument procedures were questionable.
Instrument minimums and requirements are waived in SEA.
(3) The air traffic controllers were late in detecting an emergency
situation developing and delayed 4 minutes and 45 seconds in
notifying the pilots that radar contact was lost.
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Section I - Wreckage Distribution
N
^
| (1) BROKEN TREE
| (2) ENGINE
| (3) CARGO DOOR
| (4) MAIN FUSELAGE
| (5) M/R HUB & BLADES
| (6) TAIL BOOM SECTION
| (7) 1 TAIL ROTOR BLADE
X (1)
/
/
(2) /
X /
(3) /
X /
(4)X /
/
/
/ X(5)
/ X
/ (6)
/ X
/ (7)
\/
240'
DA 2397-5
DA FORM 2397, Section A, PIKE ACCIDENT, cont'd.
5. Human Factors, cont'd
e. A/C was told to assume heading of 140 by Chu Lai Radar Approach Control
after flying 180. Despite acknowledging a heading of 140 three times, the air-
craft was actually on a heading of 240. Suspect pilot fatigue unrelated to flying
hours and subconscious desire to head to the west is the reason behind the ap-
parent discrepancy in communication between A/C and Radar Approach Control.
f. Suspect inexperience in flying under IFR conditions may have contributed
to the accident.
h. Aircraft had initial radio communication difficulties and later, trans-
ponder communication problems. Doubt this contributed to accident in that pilot
thought he was on the heading directed him by Radar Approach Control.
i. In the presence of IFR conditions contributed to events surrounding the crash.
7. Injury Factors, cont'd
g. cont'd. Reliable observers among the survivors noted irregular breathing
regarding the crewchief for approximately four (4) hours following the accident.
A preliminary post-mortem report revealed cerebral edema (water on the brain)
with herniation of the uncal portion of the brain.
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
CW-2 Stephen C. Pike Occupation Army Age UNK
Address (include ZIP code)
A Company, 123d Aviation Battalion Date of accident [17 Mar 70]
APO San Francisco 96374 Date of statement[18-21 March 70]
Aviation Experience and Background Interviewer
2 1/2 years R/W Aviator Accident Investigation Board
Witness statement of CW2 Pike at 91st Evac. Hosp. 1100 hours, 18 March 70.
Board Member: Okay Steve, were you the A/C or Co-pilot in this crash, do you
remember?
CW2 Pike: I was the A/C.
Board Member: Okay, do you remember what happened exactly?
CW2 Pike: I remember just about exactly what happened. We went in to LZ
Center, the weather was kinda marginal, about 2000 feet broken,
so we went up on top, VFR on top, had a big hole and went down through to Center. We stayed for about 20 minutes, came out,
there was a smaller hole. We got up through to VFR on top to
4000 feet. Actually tops were 3500 feet, we flew at 4000.
We looked for holes on the way coming down to Chu Lai. We
were going directly back to VIP from there. We couldn't find
any holes so I, but I knew the ceiling was pretty high, about
1500-2000 feet, so I tried to call Chu Lai. I called them about
at least 10 times, maybe more. And they were having radio
troubles. We called them by Standard Uniform, Approach Control,
we called them on Final Control, we called them on Victor and
we had very unsatisfactory results. Finally, we got them on
the Standard Uniform again. They were coming in with a loud
squeal in the background, and sometimes they were unreadable.
Board Member: Okay, can you..............
CW2 Pike: But this is important though.
Board Member: Okay go ahead.
(continued)
(continued)
CW2 Pike: So I couldn't really read them. And I requested a GCA vector
to VFR conditions on bottom and I remembered them saying we
told them, let's see .... our altitude was 4000 feet and our
heading at that time was about 150. We had flown 120 for about,
fift...., 10 to 15 minutes, and then we thought we were
far enough out by the road, by the main highway, then we started
heading 150, and we told them our heading and altitude. They
told us to turn left, 090 and maintain 4000, I believe.....I'm
not real positive about the altitude. And then, I told them I
wanted a vector to VFR conditions on bottom and they told me to
turn right, and I...I swear they told us, me, to turn right.
First of all, we were making the checks with our transponder
so they could pick us up. And there seems to be some confusion
there because our transponder does work. Evidently their
equipment is not reliable. So anyway, after the turn to 090,
they told us to turn to 240, I believe it was 240, either 240
or 270, one of the two. And they told us, turn to 240, descend
and maintain 1700 feet. I though that I was out over the water
so I descended. My co-pilot was doing all the flying; I was
just monitoring the instruments. We got to 1700 feet and we still
were IFR and....my fault, I let him continue below, I let him
go down to 1500 feet, we were still IFR. He was in the process
Witness statement of CW2 Pike continued
of bringing back in power. He had already made a call, stating
that he did not break out at 1700 feet, even though he went to
15, and he was climbing back out and going to request GCA.....
and that's when we crashed...I heard it go through the trees;
I looked out and saw the trees through the clouds and we started
spinning around a couple times. We were both fighting on the
controls. I'm sure the tailboom and rotor was gone then.
Board Member: Okay....fuel starvation was not the problem?
CW2 Pike: No. NO. It was about down to 500 pounds of fuel, which was
adequate.
Board Member: Was there any vertigo or disorientation up there?
CW2 Pike: Nope, no vertigo involved at all. We thought we were flying
what Chu Lai told us to fly, and evidently there is some
misunderstanding.
Board Member: They told you to turn right to a heading of 240 or 270.
CW2 Pike: Yes, I hope I have tapes of it cause I could swear that's what
they said.
Board Member: And you were on that heading?
CW2 Pike: Uh-huh.
Board Member: Okay, thanks a lot Steve.
CW2 Pike: Okay.
The following is a composite of several interviews the board had with
CW2 Pike after his initial statement:
Interviewer: What was the mission that you were flying?
Pike: We were flying MG Ramsey's command and control ship.
Interviewer: Who was on board the aircraft?
Pike: I was the A/C. Mr. Franson was the pilot. He was standing in
for my regular pilot so he could have a day off.
Interviewer: What were the details of the mission prior to arriving at LZ
Center?
Pike: We had been down South. We refueled at Duc Pho at 1300 hours.
We then went to LZ Liz and then Hawk Hill. From Hawk Hill we
climbed on top of the clouds and went to LZ Center. There
was a hole over Center that we let down through.
Witness statement of CW2 Pike continued
Interviewer: What were the details of the flight after you departed LZ Center?
Pike: We climbed back on top of a cloud layer, the bases were at about
2000 feet. We climbed through a hole northeast of Center. We
were above the clouds at 3500 feet but we continued to climb and
level off at 4000 feet. We flew at a heading of 120' for 12 minutes.
We had 650 pounds of fuel when we left LZ Center. I thought we
were over the road so we turned to a heading of 150' and attempted
to contact Chu Lai Approach Control. I had trouble establishing
radio contact with them. I must have tried to call them at least
10 to 12 times on all radios and frequencies. I finally got them
on the primary UHF frequency. I told them I was 12 miles north-
west on the 320 radial. They said they were not receiving my
transponder and told me to turn left to a heading of 090'.
I know my transponder was working so I requested to recheck it.
They said to squawk emergency, and I did. They said that they
had received my squawk and told me to turn right to heading
180 and descent to 1700 feet. Franson was flying the aircraft from
the left seat and he requested the GCA. Suddenly there were trees to
the right front. There were two impacts. We hit first then
after two or three seconds, we hit again. We were spinning.
Interviewer: What time did you take off from Center?
Pike: I don't remember.
Interviewer: How long did you fly before contacting Chu Lai Approach?
Pike: I flew heading of 120' for about 12 minutes.
Interviewer: Do you remember having a loss of communications?
Pike: No, we had commo until the crash.
Interviewer: What was the weather at Chu Lai?
Pike: They were reporting 2500 overcast, I think.
Interviewer: What was your airspeed on climb out from Center?
Pike: 40 knots indicated and a fast rate of climb.
Interviewer: What was your cruise altitude to Chu Lai?
Pike: 4000 feet, VFR on top.
Interviewer: What time did you make radio contact with Chu Lai Approach?
Pike: I don't know.
Witness statement of CW2 Pike continued
Interviewer: What heading did you turn to for radar identification?
Pike: 090.
Interviewer: Did your transponder work?
Pike: Yes.
Interviewer: After heading change to 180', what heading do you remember?
Pike: 230.
Interviewer: Do you remember heading 140'?
Pike: No.
Interviewer: What was your assigned altitude that you were cleared to descend
to from 4000 feet?
Pike: 1700 feet.
Interviewer: What was the lowest altitude you flew during the let down?
Pike: We descended to 1500 feet and started to climb back to 1700
feet when we hit.
Interviewer: What was your airspeed in the descent?
Pike: I don't remember but I try to keep it around 90 knots in the
clouds.
Interviewer: What was the last heading that you flew or remember?
Pike: 230 or 240 degrees.
Interviewer: What were the lats commo procedures that you received?
Pike: I don't remember.
Interviewer: Why did you declare minimum fuel?
Pike: I didn't Franson said that, we had plenty of fuel.
Interviewer: Where did you first see the trees?
Pike: I heard the rotor blade cutting into the trees before I saw them.
They were on my right.
Interviewer: What was your heading on impact?
Pike: I am not sure. I think it was 230'.
Witness statement of CW2 Pike continued
Interviewer: What actions were taken prior to hitting the trees.
Pike: We were starting to climb back to our assigned altitude. We
were at about 60 knots airspeed. We hit just after requesting a
GCA.
Interviewer: How long was it between your request for the GCA and the crash?
Pike: A couple of minutes at the most.
Interviewer: What time do you think it was when you crashed?
Pike: I don't know.
Interviewer: Who called on the emergency radio and said you were down in the
mountains?
Pike: Franson, I think.
Interviewer: Did you see any other aircraft during your flight from Center?
Pike: No.
Interviewer: Could you see Pineapple?
Pike: Yes, it was off my right at about two o'clock.
Interviewer: What heading were you on when you Pineapple?
Pike: I am not sure, 150' I think.
Interviewer: How much fuel did you have when you departed LZ Center?
Pike: 650 pounds.
Interviewer: Where was the last refueling stop prior to the accident?
Pike: We refueled at Duc Pho.
Interviewer: Were all the instruments working or radios working?
Pike: No, the ADF was inoperative. It had been written up several days.
All other instruments were working.
Interviewer: Did you see any water during your flight?
Pike: No.
Interviewer: How long did you fly after radar contact until your crash?
Pike: I don't remember. It wasn't very long.
Witness statement of CW2 Pike continued
Interviewer: How long did it take to make radio contact with Approach Control?
Pike: I had a lot of trouble getting them at first. I called them
about ten times before they answered me. They must have been
having radio problems. My radios work good. Even after I got
them, they had a loud background noise in their transmitter.
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
CPT Thomas J. Ruffing 165-34-xxxx Occupation Army Age 26
Address (include ZIP code)
HHC Americal Division Date of accident [17 March 70]
APO San Francisco 96374 Date of statement[28 March 70]
Aviation Experience and Background Interviewer
None WHITNEY L. YOUNG, CPT, FA
Interviewer: Cpt Ruffing, you initially remembered very little about the accident
and events just prior to the crash. Is your memory improving now?
Ruffing: Yes, I can remember most of the things that happen.
Interviewer: What time did you take off from LZ Center?
Ruffing: We left LZ Center about 1640 plus or minus 10 minutes. I called
the TOC just after take off for flight following.
Interviewer: After you climbed through the hole to VFR on top, did you see any
land marks through the holes or did you see any water to the east?
Ruffing: No, we did not see any other holes. It was a solid overcast.
I especially remember looking toward the east, I could not see
any water.
Interviewer: Did you see any land marks prior to entering the clouds?
Ruffing: Yes, just before we entered the clouds, I saw three mountains
peaks sticking through the clouds out the front of the aircraft.
We were on a heading of SW. I asked the pilots about it and they
said that we were on a GCA and were in the pattern. We had made
GCA's on previous occasions so I didn't think any more about it.
Interviewer: Are you sure the mountain peaks were off the nose of the aircraft
and not out the right door?
Ruffing: Yes, I definitely remember them being to the front of the aircraft.
Interviewer: Do you remember anything about the actual impact itself?
Ruffing: Yes, a little, we broke out of the clouds and the mountain was
right there. There was no hope of missing it. The pilots flared
the aircraft and tried all sorts of maneuvers to attempt to miss
it but it was impossible. I think they did a good job. If we
had just flown straight into the side of the mountain, I am sure
we would all have been killed.
Interviewer: Do you remember the time of the crash?
Ruffing: No
Interviewer: you were knocked out on impact. What do you remember after you
regained consciousness?
Ruffing: I was outside the aircraft when I woke up. Everybody was outside
the aircraft. It was still daylight out so I don't think I was
out very long. I was on the down-hill side of the aircraft.
The two pilots wee moving around on the other side of the
aircraft.
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
SSgt Richard M. Szuba Occupation Marine Age UNK
Address (include ZIP code)
MAG 13 Date of accident [17 March 70]
FPO San Francisco 96602 Date of statement[18 March 70]
Aviation Experience and Background Interviewer
Air Traffic Controller Statement
MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT 67
Marine Air Base Squadron 13
Marine Aircraft Group 13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602
RMS: dgc
3750
18 Mar 70
STATEMENT OF: SSG Richard M. SZUBA 1481375/6724 USMC
I certify that the following is a true statement of the events which I observed
of the aircraft incident of 17 March 1970.
At 0758Z Skater 62 contacted Approach Control at 15 NM northwest, 4000 feet VFR
on top, heading 135', requesting radar vectors to VFR below. The aircraft was
told to squawk Mode 3 Code 7000. A negative squawk was received from his
transponder. There were three targets in that area. Two were squawking a code
other than 7000, the third target was a primary radar target about 135' and
was at 12 NM. The aircraft was given a heading of 090' and observed in a left
turn rolling out to 090'. Radar contact was given at this time, 8NM northwest.
the SIF controls were turned off at this time, as the target was heading for
the two other targets' SIF squawks, and I observed the track of the aircraft. The
aircraft then requested to check his emergency squawk and was told to squawk
emergency for five (5) seconds. The SIF controls were turned back on and the
emergency squawk was observed 12 NM northeast of Chu Lai. The aircraft was then
told to squawk standby and then squawk normal, which the target at this point
did. A new radar position was given and the aircraft was given a heading of
180' and told to descend to 2500 feet. This heading would bring the aircraft
toward the station. The SIF control was again turned off so as to observe the
targets to the northwest to see if the target at that point was heading south.
There were only two targets in that area and both corresponded to the SIF squawks.
I did not see a third target and neither of the targets were heading south.
The SIF was then turned on again. The aircraft heading 180' was told to descend
to 1700 feet and report VFR. When the aircraft reported 1700 feet IFR he
requested a GCA and stated minimum fuel. The aircraft was given a heading 140'
and radar lost comm: "Maintain VFR, contact Tower on 340.2, if unable, continue
(continued)
(continued)
with a TACAN approach to 32W." The aircraft stated he did not have a TACAN and
was told to disregard his TACAN lost comm. The SIF target was now ringing the
station and the aircraft was told to squawk standby. No primary radar target
was observed and the aircraft was told to squawk normal and advised we had no
radar contact. The aircraft was told to squawk low and all SIF ringing the
station disappeared. The aircraft was told to squawk normal and contact Approach
Control 329.4. Radio contact was not reestablished. The aircraft was given
a heading of 230' on guard, as the crew chief was watching a target head 140'
on Par. The aircraft was asked on guard "If you hear, come up 383.1" with
no response. The aircraft was given a heading of 300'.
STATEMENT OF SSG RICHARD M. SZUBA CONTINUED
The crew Chief did not observe a turn and stated that was not our target and
that the aircraft must have gone down. The reported weather during this period
was 2000' scattered, 5 miles with haze.
Before radio contact was established, the aircraft made numerous attempts
to contact Approach Control, but was very weak and unreadable. The intercom
between Approach Control and the Crew Chief seemed good, but I had a very weak
background tone. The radar wa down for maintenance from 0930 to about 1530
local time. The Crew Chief and I checked the radar out and it was up. There
were numerous primary targets inside ten miles and numerous outside ten miles.
the radio on 383.1 was good and readable with other aircraft.
RICHARD M. SZUBA
SSGT USMC
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
Gy Sgt John J. Carr Occupation Marine Age UNK
Address (include ZIP code)
MAG 13 Date of accident [17 March 70]
FPO San Francisco 96602 Date of statement[18 March 70]
Aviation Experience and Background Interviewer
Air Traffic Controller Statement
MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT 67
Marine Air Base Squadron 13
Marine Aircraft Group 13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602
RMS: dgc
3750
18 Mar 70
STATEMENT OF: Gy Sgt John J. CARR 1572209/6724 USMC
I certify that the following is a true statement of the events which I observed
of the aircraft incident of 17 March 1970.
My duties at MaTCU-67, Chu Lai are Radar Crew Chief. At 0758Z on 17 March 1970,
I was monitoring operations within the Radar Control Van. At this time Skater
62 contacted Approach Control stating he was 15 NM north-west at 4000 feet,
VFR-on-top, requesting a radar let down to VFR conditions. Skater 62 was instructed
to squawk 7000 on his transponder. A 7000 squawk did not appear on the radar
scope and the pilot was asked his heading. Stating his heading was 135'; a
primary target was observed 12 NM north-west tracking 135'; an I.D. turn to
090' was issued and subject target took the turn. Radar contact was then
issued 8 NM north-west(1 on diagram). The pilot then requested to try his
emergency squawk. Told to squawk emergency for five (5) seconds, an emergency
squawk was observed 11 NM north-east tracking 090'. The pilot was then in-
structed to squawk standby and the emergency squawk no longer appeared. He
was then instructed to squawk normal and a 7000 squawk re-appeared in the
same position. Pilot was then advised his radar position was 11 NM north-east
(2 on diagram). At this point it was assumed that the original target1
was not Skater 62 as the sequence of transponder checks was a more conclusive
means of establishing radar contact. In view of this, control was then
centered on 1 and I no longer observed 1 as I assumed this was probably an
aircraft making an approach to East Field because many targets are observed
daily flying similar patterns into East Field. Skater 62 was then instructed
to turn right to 180'. The 7000 squawk identified as 2 then came right to a
(continued)
(continued)
track of 180'. The pilot was then instructed to descend to 2500 feet
and further instructed to descend to 1700 feet which is the minimum vectoring
altitude. The reported weather at this time was 2000 scattered visibility
five (5) miles with haze. The planned approach was to place the aircraft
about three miles east at 1700 feet which should enable the pilot to recover
VFR as per his request. The pilot then advised us he was levelling at 1700
feet and was still in the clouds. He then requested GCA Precision Approach
and stated he was minimum fuel.
STATEMENT OF BY SGT JOHN J. CARR CONTINUED
I then told the Flight Data man to go outside and give me some back door
weather to the East. He advised me it appeared to be about 2000 overcast
rather than 2000 scattered. Skater 62 then was issued a turn to 140'
and given lost Communications Procedure Instructions at this point the
aircraft's close proximity to the station caused the SIF squawk to ring
around the scope, to avoid this, instructions were issued to squawk low and
the ring disappeared. No primary target was observed and instructions
were issued to squawk normal but the ring did not reappear. The pilot
was advised he was no longer in radar contact. I then went back to my
precision controller and told him to switch to surveillance scan and
look for a target about five (5) NM east-south-east heading 150'. A
target was observed at six (6) miles tracking 150' (3 on diagram) numerous
attempts were made to have the pilot come up on frequencies 329.4 and
383.1 as radio contact was also lost. A turn to 230' was then issued on
guard and subject target 3 took the turn. As the target approached the
extended center-line this target turned back to a south-easterly heading.
I then assumed that this was not Skater 62 and that he went down east of
Chu Lai. I then initiated a search with different agencies. Approximately
ten (10) minutes later Duc Pho advised us they had heard a transmission on
guard that "A Skater 26 [62] was west of Chu Lai going down". This transmission
was not heard by us. The search was then centered west of Chu Lai and the
downed aircraft was located seven (7) miles southwest. During the entire
sequence radio communications with Skater 62 were extremely poor. Initially,
the aircraft transponder seemed intermittent, and the aircraft was not
equipped with navids to facilitate a non-radar instrument approach to
Chu Lai. A Lost Comm procedure to execute an ADF Approach to Quang Ngai
was not issued due to the aircraft being minimum fuel.
JOHN J. CARR
GySgt USMC
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
Major Tommie P. James Occupation Army Age 34
Address (include ZIP code)
71st Avn Co (Aslt Hel) Date of accident [17 Mar 70]
APO San Francisco 96374 Date of statement[20 March 70]
Aviation Experience and Background Interviewer
9 years Written Statement
On the afternoon of 17 March I was inspecting my Company Flight Line. At
approximately 1620 hours CPT Hitt, 71st Avn Co Operations Officer informed
me that an aircraft (UH-1) believed to be carrying a General Officer was missing
and presumed down near Tam Ky. The Battalion Commander requested that I
proceed to the area of the crash and coordinate S&R operation.
After take-off we proceeded toward Tam Ky. Prior to reaching Tam Ky (about
3 miles South-east) I received a Beeper signal on the UHF emergency frequency.
Voice commo was established with Skater 62 (later changed to Skater 67) who
informed me that he had crashed near LZ Pineapple.
At this time King 6 (Air-Sea Rescue C-130) and Jake (Forward Air Control O-2)
were on station. I informed King 6 of the message and headed forward LZ Pineapple. On entering the valley that runs east and west just north of LZ Pineapple the signal from Skater 67 was much stronger, as we proceeded up the
valley (West) and passed north of LZ Pineapple the signal began to fade. By using
this build and fade method, I determined that Skater 67 was located somewhere
east of LZ Pineapple. We turned and came back down the valley (East) until we
were just to the northeast of LZ Pineapple. At this point we were getting
a clear, strong signal from Skater 67. We turned south up a smaller valley
that runs north and south, east of Pineapple. Skater 67 confirmed a helicopter
approaching. The W/X at this time was solid overcast with a ceiling of 1050
feet. We continued up the valley to a ground elevation of 1000 feet, at this
time we were hovering at tree top level just below the clouds. We hovered
back and forth while getting directions from Skater 67. His directions were
confusing. At one time while hovering up a small draw he indicated that we
were coming closer. When we started back out of this draw because of fog he
indicated that we were still coming towards his location. After two more such
directions from Skater 67, I determined that it was not our aircraft that was near his location. I informed King 6 of this. He indicated that a hole
had opened up southwest of the downed aircraft but it was not large enough
for the Jolly Green Giant air-rescue helicopter to get through. I informed
King 6 that we would climb to VFR on top and he could direct me to the hole and
we would give it a try form that side. When we broke out on top King 6 turned
us over to the Jolly Green Giant aircraft who directed us to the opening in
the clouds. We descended through the hole to tree top level and began hovering
at tree top level to the Northeast. After approximately 15 minutes we came to
the top of a small ridge and could go no further. At this time we could not
make contact with Skater 67. The weather had closed in behind use. Once again we had to climb to IFR in order to move out of the area. After reaching VFR
(continued)
(continued)
condition at about 3500 feet we proceeded east toward the coast. While enroute
I contacted King 6 and told him we were unable to contact Skater 67 while
on the south side of the mountain. I determined from this that the crash
site was on the north side of the major ridge lone. Just short of the coast
(approximately six miles from the crash site) we were able to get down VFR.
After getting under the cloud cover we proceeded back to LZ Pineapple. On
entering the large east-west valley we again flew past LZ Pineapple. We got
a noticeable decrease in the strength of signal from Skater 67 after
passing to the northwest of LZ Pineapple. This further confirmed my belief
that the crash site was on the east side of Pineapple. We proceeded back
down the valley (east) to a point just northwest of Pineapple and turned south
up the small north-south valley. Skater 67 confirmed an aircraft approaching
his position. We went as far as possible up the valley then turned north and
came out of the valley. Skater 67 confirmed an aircraft departing the area.
Once again we flew into the valley. Skater 67 confirmed an aircraft approaching.
Witness Statement of MAJ James continued
From this, with the increased signal strength from the radio, I felt certain
we were in the right location after all. We came to a hover just over the
trees in the south end of the valley at about 1000 feet. We hovered back and
forth while talking to Skater 67 trying to pinpoint the crash site. He could
only indicate when were closer. After about 5 minutes I felt we had the location
of Skater 67 pinpointed. We began hovering up the hill with Skater 67 giving
us directions by telling us we were getting closer or further away. At times
the fog was so thick the crew chief and gunner could not see the tail rotor.
I had to stop several times and hold for as long as 5 minutes to allow the
fog to clear before we moved on. Our visibility was at be[s]t 40 feet and down as
low as 10 feet. I was able at all times to maintain visible contact out the
right window. As we continued up the side of the hill the aircraft began to lose
power because of the increase in altitude. At about 1600 feet I ordered the
crew to dump ammo in order to lighten the load. I requested the Jolly Green
Giant to try to steer me into Skater 67 location by using his radio direction
finder. This was attempted but with poor results. At an altitude of 1750
feet it was evident we had passed the crash site. It was impossible to hover
down the hill. The crew chief and gunner could not clear the tail rotor for
me. It was necessary to keep the nose of the aircraft toward the hill in order
to maintain visual contact. At this time with less than 10 minutes station
time fuel remaining I elected to make an instrument take-off and climb on
top and return to CL for more fuel. I very carefully explained to the Jolly
Green Giant my intentions and ask for a recommended heading out of the area.
I was given a heading of 330. We wer not able to turn the aircraft to a heading
of 330 because of the crews inability to clear the tail rotor. We departed
the area on a heading of 270 turning quickly to 330. We climbed at an airspeed
of 30 knots in order to gain altitude as soon as possible. Shortly after take-
off Skater 67 called and said it sounded as if we had passed directly over his
position. We broke out at about 3000 feet and continued to chu Lai. ON the
way we were told that ground troops were on their way to the crash site and
because of poor visibility and approaching darkness we would not make another
attempt to reach the crash site.
At this time on one could pinpoint the crash site on a map. We were all sure
it was east of LZ Pineapple, but beyond that it was still a guess as to their
exact location. I feel had there been more daylight left we could have located
them that afternoon.
The following morning a briefing was held in the Division Conference room.
It was decided that the 14th Avn Bn Commander and myself would coordinate
rescue operations and act as command and control for the air landing of troops
in the vicinity of the downed aircraft.
After a stop to pickup the Battalion Commander and surgeon of the ground unit
to be air lifted we proceeded to the crash site area. The weather was the
same as the preceding day, 1000 feet overcast. With the low ceiling it was
impossible to land troops near Skater 67. As we turned up the north-south
valley east of LZ Pineapple Skater 67 came on the radio (there first time in
about 4 hours) and confirmed an aircraft approaching his location.
Witness Statement of MAJ James continued
We came to a hover just above the trees at an indicated altitude of 1000 feet.
We were about 50 meters west of the location where we had started up the hill
the day before, Skater 67 said we were very close. We started up the hill very
slowly. After about 15 minutes Skater 67 said he saw us and we should turn
left. We were about 50 feet from the crash site before we actually saw it.
The aircraft was badly torn up and lying upside down. The pilot (Skater 67)
was standing about 15 feet from the aircraft on a large rock. Skater 67 asked
us not to come any closer, he was afraid the rotor wash would cause the wreckage to roll down the hill.
It was impossible to land near the crash due to the heavy brush and trees.
The doctor was lowered by rope near the wreckage. Even though he was lowered
only 20-30 feet away, it took him at least 10 minutes to reach the wreckage
due to the heavy undergrowth. It was necessary for the crew chief and gunner
to give him arm and hand signs in order to keep him going in the right direction. Shortly after reaching the wreckage the doctor called for stretchers
to be dropped. Our only landing point for pickup of the survivors would be on
the wreckage itself. After pickup it would be necessary to make an instrument
take off and get a radar steer to Chu Lai. This was coordinated with King 4
(air-sea rescue C130 on station) and Chu Lai, GCA. We were ready to attempt
pickup when our crew chief informed us that the weather was breaking up in the
valley below. I informed King 4 of this and requested a Jolly Green aircraft
be sent to our location to make the pickup. The Jolly Green aircraft was sent,
however he had problems finding us. It was necessary to go down in the valley and lead them to the crash site. After the weather lifted enough to get Jolly
Green aircraft to the crash site the rescue operation was completed very quickly.
I should like to bring out the following points:
1. Were it not for the emergency radio this rescue operation would have had
little chance of success.
2. All Army aircraft should be equipped to home on UHF. Had our aircraft been
so equipped the crash could have been located in about 10-15 minutes the first day.
3. When operating in these conditions the pilot must be instrument qualified
and keep in mind a safe heading should he go IFR.
4. For rescue operations of this type the aircraft should be equipped with a
Hoist.
5. If possible get the Jolly Green aircraft on station. They are equipped
with UHF Homing and Hoist, they also have trained medical personnel as part
of their crew.
6. There should be only one person or agency controlling the operation, as in
this case King 6 and later King 4.
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
WO-1 Voss Occupation Army Age 34
Address (include ZIP code)
A/123d Avn Bn Date of accident [17 Mar 70]
APO SF 96374 Date of statement[20 March 70]
Aviation Experience and Background Interviewer
SEE BELOW Statement
1. WO1 Aviator
Flight Time: 480, ow which 280 are in country.
Tactical Ticket holder
Fixed wing time: 60 hours civilian
Civilian Ratings: Commercial Ticket-Rotary Wing, Private Pilot-Fixed
Wing weather
2. 17 Mar 70 from 1300 to 1445. The weather became worse as the time elapsed.
At one point during the middle of the period we tried contacting Chu Lai Metro
to give a Pirep. The Pirep we were going to give was 8 scattered and high
overcast. Visibility-4 to 5 miles in haze. The tops of the clouds were rather
distinctive at about 2500 feet.
From 1445 to 1700 the weather had worsened toward the highway. During the early
part of the period (around 1500) I climbed to 2500 feet along the coast, some-
where north of Brown Spot and south of Tam Ky, and decided to do my work at
2000 feet and below, due to the low visibility in haze at 2500 feet. I remained
along the coast through most of the period because the clouds were inland and
along the coast I only had the haze (4 to 5 miles) to worry about. The
weather from the coast to the highway had decreased to about 1000 feet broken
and high overcast. I am unable to give the tops but I was at 2000 feet at
times and the clouds seem to extend further upward from my altitude-The tops
were not definite.
3. General Comments:
During the second period (1445 to 1700) I monitored the transmissions between
Chu Lai and Skater 62. I am unable to recognize specific directions and
instructions given by Chu Lai but I did recognize the call sign and Mr. Franson's
voice, because I flew with Mr. Franson for a period of approximately 2 weeks.
Both Chu Lai and 62 were clear. I did have the radio turned down. I can
remember a transmission on Guard by Chu Lai asking 62 to squawk emergency.
I did not hear 62's roger.
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
CPT Philip G. Carthage Occupation Army Age 34
Address (include ZIP code)
A/123d Avn Bn Date of accident [17 Mar 70]
APO SF 96374 Phone 3382 Date of statement[20 March 70]
SEE BELOW Statement
1. Background information on person making this statement:
A. CPT, FA
B. Duty MOS 1985, acting instructor for 16th Group Helicopter Instrument
Instructor Course. Assistant Standardization Officer 16th Group.
C. Experience: 2 years as Instrument Instructor, Hunter AAF; Qualified
Instrument Flight Examiner; 2nd tour Vietnam; 1700 combat hours, 2600
total Helicopter, FAA Rated: Commercial, Helicopter, Instrument.
2. Weather Situation: Operated from 1300 to 1700 on 17 March 70 within area
parallel to coastline vicinity Tam Ky to Minuteman Pad. 1st Training period
(1300 to 1445) visibility along coast estimated at 4 to 5 miles in haze. Haze
towards ocean totally obscured horizon. Encountered scattered cloud deck
vicinity of Ky Ha at 8 to 1000 feet, tops approximately 1700; broke up towards
north where cloud deck dissipated. Westward observed solid cloud bank, bottoms
indeterminate, estimate around 1000, tops distinct but above highest altitude
flown (e.g. 25000).
2nd training period (1500 to 1700) initially similar situation, noted cloud bank
to west appeared to move eastward limiting training area to coastline. Towards
end of period noted improved distinction of cloud tops to west at a higher
altitude than flying (2000). Cloud bank to west ran roughly parallel to the
road. Noted occasional strong sunlight penetrated hazy condition overhead.
Haze prevented determination of whether or not a positive ceiling existed over
our position. Except for a two minute period when we got too far west we were
VFR. The incident of marginal visibility occurred around 1545 plus or minus
15 minutes. We had not passed over the road. (About 7 mile NW of Ky Ha.)
3. General Comments:
A. Noted weather 1st period and asked student IP to contact Chu Lai Metro
for forecast and give them a Pirep. Unable to make contact.
B. Noted apparent radio problems on Chu Lai approach at beginning of second
period, broke squelch but no modulation. Later heard several calls,
traffic appeared light.
(continued)
(continued)
C. Around 1600 monitored several calls involving Skater 62 and Chu Lai
Approach Control, unable to verigy [verify] exact conversation but the following
generalities were noted:
1. A transmission from Chu Lai to Skater 62: Commo check. Did not
hear 62 respond.
2. Heard no request from 62 for vectoring or GCA.
3. Heard Chu Lai give 62 turns and squawk. Unable to verify headings.
Heard 62 respond.
4. Heard call by parties unknown to squawk 7700.
5. Heard call on Guard to 62 to turn to a heading, heard no response.
D. Enroute to Ky Ha at end of period called control (Skater 31) requesting
STATEMENT OF CPT CARTHAGE CONTINUED
transportation (had student IP do it, as my control box in back was
missing the selector knob). Was asked if we had heard from 62. When
on the ground I called control from the front seat and told them what
I had monitored and suggested they call Chu Lai.
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
WO-1 McCoy Occupation Army Age Unk
Address (include ZIP code)
D 1/1 Cav Date of accident [17 Mar 70]
APO SF 96374 Date of statement[20 March 70]
SEE BELOW Statement
I. Background information on person attesting to statement:
A. Occupation: Rotary Wing Aviator
B. Rank: WO1
C. Flight Experience: Approximately 212 hours flight school training
(including 70 hours instrument training). Approximately 225 hours in country
(including approximately 10 hours weather and 10 hours night).
D. Rated in OH-23D, UH-1D, A, B, H with Tactical Instrument Card.
II. Weather:
During the first period of our training (1300-1445) the approximate weather
conditions west of the coast line were 800 feet scattered with tops of 2000
feet and an overcast of undetermined height. The visibility was 4 to 5 miles
with haze. East of the coast it was approximately 2000 scattered with broken
ceiling of undetermined height, visibility 5 to 6 miles with haze. South of the
training area it was generally 2000 scattered with visibility 8 to 10 miles.
As the period progressed the weather became more marginal. During the second
period (1445-700) west of the coast it was approximately 800 broken and the
overcast condition was still undetermined but was thicker, visibility approximately
3 miles. East of the coast it was approximately 2500 broken with 4 to 5 miles
visibility.
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
Technical Report of U.S. Army Aircraft Accident
Part I (Continuation)
Name of Witness
SEE BELOW Occupation Army Age Unk
Address (include ZIP code)
AMERICAL DIVISION Date of accident [17 Mar 70]
Date of statement[19 March 70]
STATEMENT
The board held interviews with all the survivors of the accident. Due to the
retrograde amnesia, MG Ramsey, Cpt Tucker, WO-1 Franson, and SP/4 Reed did
not remember any details that were beneficial to the board. (See Flight
Surgeon's Report)
/ / / / / / END OF STATEMENT / / / / / /
The rest of the documents in the file will only be summarized as the
details are more personal or technical types of information.
1) Section F. Operator- Pike, Stephen C. WORWAC 24 October 67
Total hours 2452 (with details)
Training UH-1H 16 Aug 69, UH-1A, B, C, D, Oct 67.
2) Personal data - Pike Stephen C. Last proficiency check 9 Mar 70.
3) Individual Flight Record. Pike, Stephen C.
Aircraft type model series - Aircraft qualifications:
TH-55A OCT 67
UH-1A, B,C,D OCT 67
UH-1H AUG 69
Remarks: Authority to record combat time IAW AR 95-1 and DA msg 714664 dtd 7 May 65.
Aviator qualified in the UH-1H aircraft on 16 Aug 69 IAW AR 95-1.
Aviators Tactical R/W instrument certificate "EXPIRED" 2 Dec 69.
Aviator involved in major aircraft accident 17 Mar 70. " Instrument proficiency, night flying requirement and completion of annual written examination waived while in SEA. Instrument qualifications must be reestablished within six months after arrival at new unit. IAW DA msg 2716502 Feb 68 unless further exempted under the provisions of para 1-3B, AR 95-63. Current Army aviation annual written examination will be completed within 90 days after arrival at new unit IAW para 3-11b AR 95-63" Records closed this station 20 Mar 70, Med-VAC.
4) Flight hours accrued = total hours flown by month.
Pike, Stephen C. 12.1 as A/C, 21.5 as First Pilot, 1.5 night VFR.
5) Section F. Operator- Franson, Ronald D. WORWAC 9 April 69
Total hours 1086 (with details)
Training UH-1H 20 May 69.
6) Personal data - Franson, Ronald D. Last proficiency check 20 Dec 70.
7) Individual Flight Record. Franson, Ronald D.
Aircraft type model series - Aircraft qualifications:
TH-55A 8 Apr 69
UH-1B,D,H 20 May 69
Remarks: Authority to record combat time IAW AR 95-1 and DA msg 714664 dtd 7 May 65. Aviators Tactical R/W instrument certificate "EXPIREd" 13 Oct 69.
Aviator appointed aircraft commander in the uH-1D/H aircraft 24 Aug 69.
Aviator involved in major aircraft accident 17 Mar 70. "Instrument proficiency, night flying requirement and completion of annual written examination waived while in SEA. Instrument qualification must be reestablished within six months after arrival at new unit. IAW DA msg 2716502 Feb 68 unless further exemp[t]ed under the provisions of para 1-3B, AR 95-63. Current Army aviation annual written examination will be completed within 90 days after arrival at new unit IAW para 3-11b AR 95-63", Records closed this station 20 Mar 70, Aviator MED-VAC.
(DA Form 759)
(continued)
(continued)
8) Flight hours accrued = total hours flown by month.
Franson, Ronald D. 35.1 as A/C, 7.3 as First Pilot, 3.5 night VFR.
9) Flight Surgeon.
b. A/C stated he felt tired during the end of the flight. Flying time reveals 78.0 in the preceding 30 days, 4 hours in the preceding 24-hr. period, and 3.8 hrs.
the day of the crash. Suspect pilot fatigue may have contributed to accident by making A/C less aware of what he was told to do by radar approach control. CoPilot
denied feeling tired and flown 70.0 hours in past 30 days, 0 hours in the past 24 hours.
c. A/C was wearing jungle fatigues and leather gloves. CoPilot was wearing only glove liners and jungle boots. Gunner was wearing jungle fatigues, jungle boots and Nomex gloves.
d. Gunner lost helmet during the crash. Head injuries believe unrelated to loss of helmet.
g. It took approximately 18 hrs. for the survivors to be air-evacuated following
the accident. One man, the crewchief, died during the period while awaiting rescue. It is
doubtful this man could have been saved had been rescued even minutes after the crash (cont'd)
10) DA FORM 2408-12 Army Aviator's flight Record. Lists and identifies crew assignment and passengers, but hours were not completed for the day's missions.
11) DA Form 2408-13. Acft time to date: 435hr 10 minutes.
Next inspection: 447 hours.
Faults and/or remarks: Still outstanding: (26 Feb 70_ KY 28 will not stay
keyed possible switch inop. R. Murphy has signed all entries.
Eng oil sample due at 435:40 A/C hours Taken on 16 Mar 70 by R Murphy
landing light burned out req# 0061-304 1 Mar 70 R E Reed
Crack on inside hinge of copilots door waiting PE R E Reed
Left cyclic eraverable valve seeping waiting PE R E Reed
(Note: this information makes it look like Reed may actually have been the
crewchief as door gunners normally don't requisition parts.)
12) Local flight clearance: listing of crew and passengers.
This record was last updated on 01/25/2009
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