I am currently writing a new forward chapter to a book written back in
the 1970s by a former 101st AirBorne para who was on the FIRST WAVE of
choppers to land at the dry - not wet - rice paddies next to the
village of An Ninh, Sept. 18, 1965. According 101st para Larry
Grathwohl and the 101st Air Borne combat photographer who came in on
the SECOND WAVE of slicks that morning, NO Huey slicks were SHOT DOWN
DURING THE LANDING OF THE FIRST WAVE. This is one of the key facts
that made the battle for An Ninh so deadly, is not only did the NVA
KNOW the 101s was coming and WHERE they were likely to land but that
the 101st didin't have nearly enough choppers to properly carry out
the operation, forcing the 101st COs to carry out the assault IN
WAVES. The VC/ North Vietnamese plan was to allow the first wave of
para's to land, then carry out a slaughter by shooting down the second
and following waves of Hueys filled with 101st Air Born troopers. The
ultimate VC/NVA goal was to carry out a final coup by over running the
heavily out numbered and trapped first Wave of 101st Air Borne, either
shortly after knocking out the desperate attempts to rescue the paras
in the rice paddies or after sun went down that night.
According to my two former 101st Air Borne sources who were there,
what made this battle so deadly was the fact THERE WAS NO ENEMY FIRE
during the insertion of the first landing of the 101st Air Born. So
your outline of the battle has two choppers being downed in the first
wave is wrong. (see the after action reports, Hackworth's ABOUT
FACE, p.486-7 and the less accurate account in THE RISIE AND FALL of
an AMERICAN ARMY by Stanton, pp. 49-50) and finally, go online and
google Johnnie William Faircloth/battle of An Ninh who died not long
after he and a handful of paras made a desperate attempt to land and
link up with the first wave of 101st Troopers trapped in the rice
paddies. (I think SSG Faircloth was on the third wave of choppers to
land) and was awarded the Silver Star phosthumously.)
I tried to check your source for the inaccurate information, MAD
MINUTES by Michael Clodfelter but as yet I haven't been able to get a
copy of his book. It is my understanding Clodfelter was sent to
Vietnam May 1965 with the 101st so no doubt he was among those who
were supposed to be part of what the101st Command had dubbed Operation
Gibralter later that September.
The battle was such a major screw up by the 101st commanding officers
that Westmoreland and others tried to cover it up by calling it "a
major victory for US troops," (according to Hackworth's account - p.
474), and in one very important way it most assuredly was.
What we have only recently come to know is that the North Vietnamese
had successfully put a spy in the very heart of US/SVN intelligence.
(See, The Perfect Spy by Boreman, 2007) So not only did the the NVA
know our plans on a virtual day-to-day basis from as early as 1960-61
but they trained their commanders to know details like how to
instantly spot and have snipers waiting to kill American Commanding
Officers, (the COs). During this first great battle of the war, the
VC/NV snipers killed virtually all the 101st COs within the first few
minutes when the VC/NVA began firing during the SECOND WAVE. knocked
out virtually all the COs radio communications and so badly pinned
down the LONE SURVIVING 101st CO that for virtually the first four or
five hours of battle the 101st troopers fought for their lives led
only by the NCOs.
From: Wesley Davis The source for this information was MAD MINUTES by Clodfelter P:45
Additional information is available on CD-ROM.
Please send additions or corrections to: Gary Roush Email address: webmaster@vhpa.org
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Date posted on this site:
05/13/2023
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