unit history information
for IIFFV
73 SAC
1 ASTAP
For date 680131
IIFFV was a US Army unit
73 SAC was a US Army unit
1 ASTAP was a US Army unit
Primary service involved, US Army
Bien Hoa Province, III Corps, South Vietnam
Location, Long Binh
Description: The strength subsection of the command section included the following four column table: Date, Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted Men; 30 Apr 67, 359,36, 3503; 31 July 67, 332, 37, 3248; 31 Oct 67, 323, 34, 2807; 31 Jan 68, 334, 26, 2915.
The G2 Air subsection of the Intelligence and counterintelligence section included the following: During this period, the OV-1C (Red Haze) assets of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) were increased by one new aircraft for a total of four. All aircraft are now equipped with the AN/UAS-4A Infrared Sensor system. This system is more sensitive than the previously used item and it is expected that imagery quality will improve; however, during the dry season, the presence of natural and man-made fires throughout the III CTZ caused increasing difficulty in the discrimination of Red Haze emissions. This situation is expected to continue through the remainder of the dry season.
Special maximum surveillance efforts were conducted during the truce periods which occurred during this quarter. The Christmas truce extended from 241800 to 251800 Dec 67 and the New Year truce from 311800 Dec 67 to 020600 Jan 68. The TET truce began at 291800 Jan 68 and was canceled by the GVN at 300930 Jan 68 due to the unprincipled violations on the part of the VC. Cancellation of the TET truce did not cancel the concentrated SLAR/RED HAZE coverage of selected areas. This coverage extended into the new reporting period due to the enemy offensive. During the earlier truce periods, a successful effort was made to provide 24 hour coverage along the Cambodian border and the coast line of III CTZ. During these periods, a coordinated effort was effected using the assets of the 1st Inf Div Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon (ASTAP), the 73d SAC, Army and Air Force O-1 aircraft, and the assets provided by the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) of the 7th USAF. The reconnaissance effort thus effected provided excellent information on VC/NVA routes of movement into the III CTZ. One of the most active areas revealed was in the vicinity of WT9540 during the New Year truce period. This area was characterized by a buildup on the evenings preceding the truce, exceptionally heavy activity on the first night of the truce, a general tapering off of activity after the truce, and a complete absence of activity two days following the truce. The volume of surveillance effected during these special periods can be maintained only for limited periods of time due to maintenance requirements necessary to insure proper functioning of aircraft and sensor systems. The assets enumerated above provided aerial coverage of suspected enemy activity in the following manner during the truce periods: 1.) VR reconnaissance aircraft of the 73d SAC covered the III CTZ border with Cambodia and the coastline for a minimum of twelve flying hours daily. 2.) During the hours of darkness, each portion of the III CTZ was covered with SLAR once each hour. These missions were conducted by the 1st ASTAP and the 73d SAC. 3.) Red Haze missions were conducted by all elements. The 1st ASTAP and the 73d SAC concentrated primarily on the border area while the 460th TRW principally covered the main VC/NVA base areas.
There were continuing indications that the VC were experiencing serious difficulties as a result of Allied operations. Replacement from local resources of combat losses and ralliers appeared to be a particularly acute problem. (In this connection, it is believed that the infiltration of NVA replacements was increased to a great degree.) Coercive measures against the local populace, the drafting of boys 15 years of age, heavier taxation were some of the measures being resorted to by the VC. Even these measures did not enable the VC to replace their personnel losses from locally available resources. The only recourse was the utilization of NVA invaders. The 7th NVA Div and the 88th NVA Regt are probably almost wholly composed of NV personnel. Of the five VC regts in III CTZ, it was estimated that the one having the smallest proportion of NVA personnel had 35% and the regt having the most had 75% such personnel. Even at the VC LF battalion level, NVA personnel are present in strength. Indications were that the D440 LF Bn of VC Ba Bien province has 75-80% NVA personnel.
Documents and PW sources of information continued to indicate a food shortage among VC forces. There is little doubt that Allied operations forced changes in supply routes and made all routes more hazardous during the reporting period. Nevertheless, the enemy proved his resourcefulness once again by almost totally re-arming his forces with a new family of weapons (AK assault rifles, rocket launchers, 122mm rockets). Comment: Appearance of these weapons in large numbers will substantially increase the VC firepower and, consequently, alter the situation whereby the Allied forces had enjoyed overwhelming fire superiority in any situation. This may alter the course of small unit engagements.
Targeting System: The G2 Targets Division developed an improved targeting system which provided timely targets based on all source intelligence indicators. The division provided targets for artillery, combat sky spots and B52 assets. The system included a current area analysis of the III CTZ based on terrain analysis and a continual study of enemy tactics and habits. Superimposed upon that analysis was a daily plot of intelligence indicators of enemy activity. The indicators included intelligence reports, contacts, sightings, attacks by fire and ground attacks, booby traps, 'people sniffer' returns and caches. Approximately 300 such indicators occurred in III CTZ each day and were meticulously plotted and graphically retained for one week. Enemy installations were then targets within the concentrated area of activity, collated with the area analysis and targeted for the most appropriate available asset. Finally, the system provided a rapid means of evaluating Agent Reports of enemy concentrations, VR sightings and photography readouts.
The source for this information was II Field Force Vietnam quarterly ORLL period ending 31 Jan 1968 from Walker Jones
Additional information is available on CD-ROM.
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Date posted on this site:
05/13/2023