Southern Cross information
for 23 INF DIV

For date 710903


23 INF DIV was a US Army unit
Primary service involved, US Army
Quang Tin Province, I Corps, South Vietnam
Location, Chu Lai
Description: The following is an edited version of an article titled "The General Answers You" by SP4 William Hutchison EDITORS NOTE: Our Southern Cross reporter recently interviewed Major General Frederick J. Kroesen and asked him some questions the average soldier is concerned about. The following are the question and responses from the general. More questions and answers will be continued next week. REPORTER: Rumors are circulating regarding the Americal Division standing down in the near future. Has the division been given any time-frame for standdown? GENERAL: As of this date, I hasten to say this is the 14th Day of August, there has been no public announcement of any standdown scheduled for the division or any element of it. It would be naive to think that, with a continuing reduction required in the U.S. Army forces here in Vietnam, that the Americal Division would not be affected in some way by the required reduction to meet the president's goal of 100,000 by the first of December. However, there is no way for me to determine or indicate which of the major units that are still in Vietnam would be affected by this requirement for continuing reduction. REPORTER: How long will it take to complete the inactivation of the division, once we are given word? GENERAL: Any speculation to the time required for inactivating the division must consider a number of factors, such as the ability of the depots to accept equipment for turn-in, the availability of aircraft or ships for personnel movement and the ability of the government of Vietnam to take over control of the installations that we now have. All these things can be done over a period of time or be done in an expedited fashion. All of them have a normal processing time which I think will allow for an orderly, well coordinated turn-in and turn-over of the division's assets. Perhaps the most important factor will be the security of the division and its remaining personnel as the phase-down occurs. This of course, is affected by the capability of the enemy, the ARVN and other friendly forces in the area, so I would have to estimate that a period of 90 to 120 days would be adequate to accomplish the inactivation of the division, given the enemy situation we have in the area now, given the normal processing time we would like to have to turn in the equipment and ship out personnel. REPORTER: What effect will the division's going home have on the personnel presently assigned? GENERAL: I would presume that any change in the Division's status is going to have very little affect on personnel who are now assigned. Except for those people whose DEROS is almost upon them. I think the rest of us will be transferred to other units or other assignments and we will still complete our year in Vietnam. We have a number of veterans of other units who were transferred into the division from the 1st Brigade, 5th Mech., and the 173d Airborne Brigade, when their units went home, and I think all of us in the division can look forward to the same kind of thing. When we inactivated or reduced to zero strength in the 4/21st and 5/46th Inf. those personnel were merely reassigned to other units. I would anticipate that this is what is going to happen to those of us in the division if we are to be inactivated. REPORTER: A medic assigned to the 1/52nd Inf. asked a question concerning individual standdown of the units within the division. He wanted to know why the division makes no definite statement on a unit's standdown until the last possible moment, therefore allowing rumors to circulate. GENERAL: Withholding announcement about standdown dates is almost entirely a matter of security. That is, it is concerned with the safety of the troops involved. Any unit is more vulnerable to enemy action when it is moving and when movement is coupled with the turn-in of weapons and equipment, vulnerability many fold. If we inform everybody ahead of time, we also inform the enemy, and we are going to invite his attack when we are at our weakest moment. Now, in addition to the security problem, there is also the psychological letdown that we have to guard against when we make an announcement. If, for example, we say that the 1/52nd Inf. is going home next week and leave LZ Stinson, it is rather doubtful that people would be concerned about the bunkers that need to be maintained and upgraded. Most of us would be more apt to take a chance on the old sandbags for another week, and that is a chance that might cost somebody his life. Furthermore, any decrease in our operations which interdict enemy infiltration routes would allow him to concentrate his forces or build up his supplies, increasing his capabilities to launch attacks against our units and installations. So I hope that every man in the division will realize that if I do not announce a standdown schedule, it is only because the safety and the security of the division is my first responsibility. This is not only my responsibility, but it is General Abrams', General McCaffrey's, and General Dolvin's responsibility as well-to insure that the security of the forces are the paramount consideration. REPORTER: Much has been said about the Americal Division in the press-most of it not so good. How would you evaluate the job which we have done here in Vietnam? GENERAL: I have said many times since coming here, and I honestly believe, that the Americal Division can be measured against any other division that has ever been in Vietnam. Use any measurement criteria that you desire, use any statistics, use any standards and you will find that this division will never suffer by comparison. The division knows how to do everything it is called upon to do and it does it well. It does it professionally and it does it thoroughly. Unfortunately, when we make mistakes we are very spectacular about them. The reputation of the whole division has suffered because of the actions of a very few. We cannot escape a collective responsibility for those mistakes, but we can take a justifiable pride in what the division has done here. The Americal Division was born in a very difficult time in 1967 when the U.S. Marines needed help; when Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces were almost lost. The second and third NVA Divisions and local VC controlled almost the whole area. There is no more difficult task than organizing a division in combat-developing the procedures, techniques, and teamwork and fighting the enemy at the same time; but this was done and it was done well. If you don't believe it, ask the NCOs and the officers who are here on their second and maybe third tours, and you will find that although they have a tremendous loyalty for the units they fought with first, they will also admit to a great respect for the Americal Division and the way we do things. I think this division has every right to be completely proud of the record it had established here, and I will stack the division up against any in the United States Army today. REPORTER: How effective are the troops who are presently serving under the "Southern Cross"? GENERAL: I think our troops are as effective as any I have served with before and any that would hope to serve with in the future. I think our troops come into this war better trained than any it has been my experience to serve with in previous wars. I have always admired the American infantryman, but I think I admire the American infantryman in this war more than I did in the previous wars. Because he had come to us better trained and for some reason, regardless of the feelings that we seem to have in the United STates against this war, we still seem to have a well-motivated soldier who comes over here to do the job his country sent him to do; and I have great faith in the way they are doing it and the way I believe they will continue to do it. REPORTER: We all recognize that the division is plagued by several problems, one of them is drugs. How serious a problem do drugs present? GENERAL: I think that drugs are an extremely serious problem. They are the most serious problem in the world for those who are addicted to drugs, addicted to heroin in particular. They seem to remain unaware or uncaring and refuse to believe that they are destroying themselves. Drugs are almost as serious for the habitual users who refuse to believe that they will become addicted. I have a great deal of compassion and sympathy for those people but I continue to hold each of them individually responsible for the condition in which he finds himself. My primary concern as the commander of the division, is the mans ability or inability to perform his mission, to accept a responsibility for his duty, and failure to do this, thereby places another man's life in danger. For this there can be no excuse and nor forgivenesss for the drug user. REPORTER: Do you see any differences between the use of marijuana and heroin as far as their legality is concerned? GENERAL: I consider the use of marijuana and the use of alcohol in the same vein. When they incapacitate a man or make him unable to perform his mission, they are no different than heroin, and if they endanger other peoples' lives because they incapacitate an individual, I feel that individual should be dealt with very harshly. REPORTER: Another problem is the lack of personnel, especially in the line units. What is being done to bring the Division back up to strength? GENERAL: The shortage of personnel we have been experiencing for the last couple of months was caused by some major personnel management mistakes that had been by a heavy normal DEROS of personnel during the summer months, and then by some personnel policies which were adopted when the division was overstrength and we transferred individuals from their combat assignment into non-combat rear area assignments. I believe that in the past month, we have corrected some of these mistakes, we've changed some of the policies and we hope to overcome this shortage. I expect now that the problem is known we will be receiving additional personnel replacements through the USARV replacement channels and that our personnel strength will improve markedly by the end of August. REPORTER: Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird made a statement to the press on August 4, in which he said the Army's combat role in Vietnam was virtually ended. In coming soldiers holding combat MOSs would like to know what his statement means in terms of what they will be doing in the field? GENERAL: This is a very important question because I feel that is essential that every soldier in this division understand what his role and his mission is during the coming months. Mr. Laird's statement is a true reflection of the fact that the mission of driving the NVA forces out of Vietnam has been taken over by the ARVNS. U.S. forces are no longer engaging in the large scale nick-named operations which were once targeted against the enemy and which required long periods of combat against the enemy's main forces. Unfortunately, this change does not mean that U.S. soldiers no longer have to fight. We must continue to protect ourselves and we still have the mission of assisting to protect and provide security to the Vietnamese population, in our area of operation. We just cannot do this by sitting in a defensive position on a firebase and hoping the enemy will not attack. Six years of experience in Vietnam has taught us that we must stay on patrol to keep the enemy from concentrating his forces, building up his supplies and preparing detailed plans for attacking our positions. If we do not prevent these things, it is almost certainty that these attacks will take place, and they will be very costly to us. So, for the combat forces of the division, the future is one of patrolling the mountain area looking for caches, working with the RF and PF to provide them with the best training we can give them, and staying alert for the enemy who is still out there and still has the mission of our destruction. Many people choose to interpret this as offensive operations and they are determined to say that we are conducting offensive operations when secretary Laird said we will not. I maintain that if the policeman on the beat in the small town in the United States or the policeman in a patrol car is on offensive operations, then I would have to admit that we are on offensive operations. But in fact I don't believe that. I believe the policeman on the beat, rather than being out seeking a criminal to destroy, is out on his beat as a preventative measure, attempting to insure that a criminal entering his beat does not have an opportunity to commit a crime. I liken our current operations and missions to the operations of the police force in your home town.

The source for this information was 7109_435_scr supplied by Les Hines 03/17/2000


Additional information is available on CD-ROM.

Please send additions or corrections to: Gary Roush Email address: webmaster@vhpa.org


Return to panel index

Return to Helicopter Pilot KIA index

Return to VHPA Home Page

Copyright © 1998 - 2023 Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association

Last updated 12/12/2000

Date posted on this site: 05/13/2023