188THAHC

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (14 May 68) 3d Ind (U) CPT Arnold/dla/LBN 4485 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 308th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 Ayril 1968, RCS CS FOE-65 (RL) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 8 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

- l. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 308th Combat Aviation Battalion.
- 2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER!

10 Incl

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: HQ lst Avn Bde HQ 308th Cbt Avn Bn

MFR: ORLL was not staffed due to lack of significant unresolved problem areas.

ACTION OFFICER: CPT Arnold/4485

188# AHC

This documents our Move from Dan Treng to LZ Sally in March 1968.

FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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RETURN TO AVHGC-DST

HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION:
APO San Francisco 96363

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Albert Table of the control of Long A. Long Table

1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

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a. (U) The mission of the 308th Combat Aviation Bettalion is to provide command, control, staff planning, administrative support and pathfinder support for three to seven transport aircraft and/or holicopter companies.

- b. (C) Organization Changes: The 303th Combat Aviation Battalion became operational on 10 Feb 1960 at Bien Hoa, RVN and consisted of the following units located as shown from 10 Feb to 3 ar 1963: (See Inclosure 1)

  (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Bien Hoa, EVN

  (2) 17th Assault Helicopter Company, Long Binh, RVN

  (a) 613th TC Det, Long Binh, RVN
- (b) 722nd Signal Dot, Long Binh, RVN

  - (c) 93rd Wod Det, Long Binh, RVM (3) 117th Assault Helicopter Company, Bion Hoa, RVM
  - (a) 140th TC Det, Bien Hoa. WI THE PROPERTY AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PERSON OF THE PERSON
    - (b) 256th Signal Det, Bien Hoa, RVN
    - (4) 135th Assault Helicepter Company, Black Horse, RVH
  - (a) 614th TC Dot, Black Horse, RW.
    - (b) 68th Signal Det, Black Horse, RVN
    - (c) 87th QM Det, Hear Tan, RVN
      - (5) 195th Assault Helicopter Company, Long Binh, RVN

(b) 366th Signal Det, Long Binh, RVN

(a) 609th TC Det, Long Binh, RVN GROUP 4 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR: 5200.10

AVGILC SUBJECT

Operational Report of 308th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1960, RCS, CS FOR-65 (NL)

	<u> AUTH</u>	AVIATOR HANNING LEVIL	<u>ASG</u>
1 Feb 68	23	17 10 - 18 - 19 - 17	8
10 Feb 68	304	249	242
9 Mar 68	204	169	163
30 Apr 68	204	169	173

(2) Enlisted: The following table depicts the enlisted strength of this battalion during the past quarter:

-		<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG</u>	
1:	Feb 68	90	49	
10	Feb 68	1019	952	(Lpprox)*
9	liar 68	781	692	
30	Apr 68	781.	852	

\*Morning Reports Not Available

(3) Shortages: A shortage exists in the following DSG:

1:0SC	<u> AUTH</u>		<u>asg</u>		<u> SSHORT</u>
05020	c		3		62%
LIELY	7		(i) (i)		1.00%
44E20	3		2		33%
45J20	1.0		6		.40% 50%
68020	6		<b>3</b>		
68620	1.7	and the state of t	14	en e	18%
71720	<b>Δ</b>		0	40	100%
vii - 3.36	- P	Andrew Commencer	- 11		35%
76N20 76N40	17 9		6		.33%

<sup>(4)</sup> The following shows military and civilian strength as of 30 April 1960

<sup>(</sup>a) Military Strength

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SUBORDINATE UNIT	OFFI AUTH	CIM PDY	WC AUTH	FDY	III. AUTH	PDY
ннс	20	17	3	3	90	122
17th AHC	15	17	52	47.	152	154
613th TC	10		1	1	70	75
722nd Sig Det	0	0	1	1	8	10
188th AHC	15	10	52	42	152	146
603rd TC	1	1	0	0	70	65
154th Med Det	\.1	1.	o .	o	ß	7
4th Sig Det	0	0	1	3.	S	3.3.
200th ASHC	13	S	25	17	143	1.43
611th TC	1	1	1	O	80	75

#### (b) Civilian Strongth

SUBORDINATE	TOCH RIF	DAC AUTH PDY	V:: AUTH O/F			CONTRACTOR YNA_TECTRON	
17th AHC	0	C O	0 0	0	0	2	
188th AHC	0	0 0	0 0	0	0	<b>2</b>	
200th ASHC	1	0 0	0 0	0	0 `	2	
HHC	0	0 0	0 0		0	0	
TOTAL	1	0 0	0 0	0	0	6	

#### e. (C) Casualties

(1) Casualties sustained by the units of the 308th Combat Aviation Battalic during the period 1 February 1966 - 30 April 1966 are as follows:

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>ຄາ</u>	.nr	Total
				$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_{i}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{I}_{i}} \mathcal{I}_{i,j}(j)$
Died not as a result of Hostile Actio	on 2	1.	0	. 3
Killed in Hostile Action	2	0	1	3
CONCI	DENTIAL		*	

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Injured in Non-Hostile Action	<b>5</b>	4	3	12
Wounded in Hostile Action	11	5	ទ	24

- (2) Personnel being carried in missing status now number 6. All 6 individuals are missing from a UH-lH aircraft lost on 21 April 1960.
- f. (U) Re-enlistment: Re-enlistment statistics for the quarterly report period are:

<u>lst TEW</u>	CARETERI ST AUG	FR/NG
1 0%	2 06	 0 00
	2 - 0%	C C.

TOTAL: 29 - 0%

g. (U) Awards and Decorations: During this period 53 recommendations for awards were submitted and 92 awards were received. The following is a breakdown of the recommendations submitted and awards received:

AWARD	SUH ITIMD	RTOUTVED
HOH	<b>0</b>	0
DSC	0	0
DSI	ol.	<b>c</b>
SS	1	2
LOI:	0	0
DFC	6	5
SI.:	0	4 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
BS	2	0
Azgr yn	4	2
ΛΉ	<b>31</b>	73
VCI:	3	6
PH		0 (Submitted to 12th Gp, 300th Bn
		reorganized since
		sion)

h. (U) Education: The battalion education section provided all personnel available with information for study programs. While this unit was in the

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Bien Hoa - Long Binh area. Since the battalion's relocation to Camp Eagle, Hue-Phu Bai, RVN, there has been a decline of education accomplishments due to the non-availability of an Army Education Center in the immediate area.

- i. (U) Rest and Recuperation
- (1) The R & R utilization rate for this quarter is 94.5%

February: 00% (No R & R quotas, unit operational 10 Feb 68)

March: 94%

April: 95%

- (2) The battalion's utilization rate remains high and approximately 15-20 more quotas a month could be filled during next quartor.
- (3) All requests for R&R are being satisfactorily filled. There are increased requests for R&R quotas to Australia and Hawaii.
- j. (U) SPECIAL SERVICES: The battalion special services program has been limited because of the relocation of the battalion to Camp Eagle, Hue-Phu Bai, RVN.
  - k. (U) CIVIC AVTION:
- (1) During the reporting period all units were engaged in Civic Action activities.
- (2) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, collected approximately 200 pounds of assorted canned foods for distribution in the TET Relief Program. The food stuffs were given to the 2d Civil Affairs Company for distribution in the III Corps area.
- (3) Approximately 650 Piasters were collected during the TET aggression Relief Program.
- (4) A Civic Action project in the Hue area will be initiated in the near future.
  - 1. (U) CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
- (1) During the period 1 March 1968 to 26 March 1968, this command was authorized 45 Local National Direct Hire (LNDH) allocations. Because the battalion has been relocated to the I Corp, all allocations acquired while operating in the III Corp have been declared invalid. Currently, the employment of direct hire local nationals remains unauthorized for two reasons:
- (a) Hq, 101st Airborne Division will not authorize the hiring of Vietnamese Nationals within the Camp Eagle Complex and Hue-Phu Bai areas.

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Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS, CS FOR-65 (R1)

- (b) The lack of an adequate civilian personnel agency located in the Hue-Phu Bai area.
  - (2) The Daily Hire Civilian Personnel Program. (AIK Imprest Fund).
- (a) This program was increased greated due to the need for sandbags in the Hue-Phu Bai area. While this command remained in the Bien Hoa area, 1 February 1963 15 March 1968, a sum total of 86,000 VNO was expended. Since 15 March 1968, units of this battalion have expended a total of 513,800 VNO. Total quarterly Imprest Fund Expenditures stand at 604,800 VNO.
- (b) Funds were drawn from 16th Cbt Avn Gp and the 101st Abn Div. All unit requirements utilizing Daily Hire Fersonnel to fill candings for aircraft revelments, troop bunkers and billet areas have been not.
  - m. (U) Sundry Funds, Clubs and Lesses:

There has been no significant accomplishment or problem areas in this field due to the fact that only one unit within this battalion, the 188th Assault Helicopter Company, has a sundry fund.

#### n. (U) Information:

- (1) The command information program has been enhanced with production of a weekly bulletin. The weekly bulletin highlights the past weekly significant events within the battalion. In addition, battalion policy letters have been used extensively since arrival at the new location to establish battalion procedures for the new environment.
- (2) The PIO program has been revitalized recently. Each unit is responsible for calling in a daily summary of significant events. These reports include names, hometowns and quotes from individuals involved in the day's activities. When all summaries are received, they are reviewed and immediately sent by teletype to higher headquarters. By using this method, activities are able to reach news media quickly. In addition, hometown news releases have increased because all incoming personnel to the battalion fill out a release during processing. The PIO section also works closely with the awards and decorations section to insure news releases are submitted when awards are presented.

#### o. (C) Combat Operations:

(1) The battalion began combat operations on 10 February 1968, with the 17th, 117th 135th and 195th Assault Helicopter Companies in general support of III ARVN Corps, the Royal Australian Task Force, and U.S. Infantry Divisions operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The companies were committed daily to tasks varying from combat support missions to reinforced battalion size combat assault operations. During this period, daily requirements for aircraft were 10 lift, one command and control, and 4 armed helicopters each for two assault companies; 15 logistical support aircraft for an unarmed helicopter company; and 8 lift and 10 armed helicopters for a special-mission company. By tailoring the distribution of its aircraft, the battalion tested the feasibility of special proper companies. The concept was the creation

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of an aviation unit which could react to varying situations and support missions which required additional armed responsiveness while maintaining an airmobile assault and logistical support capability. To accomplish this, 8 armed helicopters were transferred from the 17th AHC to the 195th AHC in return for 8 unarmed helicopters. The result was one company designed for logistical and administrative missions utilizing 20 unarmed aircraft and one heavy gun company with 16 armed and 14 unarmed aircraft. This arrangement left two normal companies to fulfill requirements for standard airmobile operations. This arrangement worked well for logistical cormitments and in the conduct of long range reconnaissance patricls and night defense of isolated locations. Disadvantages became apparent also. The loss of unit integrity effectively reduced the number of combat assault companies from 4 to 2. Flexibility was lost due to incorrect composition for some types of missions. The homogeneous assignment of aircraft resulted in less than the predicted increase in aircraft availability. The anticipated maintenance advantages were realized only to the extent of one armed and one unarmed helicopter above the number maintained as mission ready under normal assignment. The morale and team proficiency were affected, requiring additional coordination in size hile operations calling for all of the battalion's resources. At present the companies of the battalien are equipped and operated under standard airmobile concepts with satisfactory results for both the supported and supporting units.

- (2) Upon reorganization and relocation to the I Corps in mid March, the battalion was attached to the 16th Combat Aviation Group and placed under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division. Retaining the 17th AHC, the battalion received the 188th AHC and the 200th ASHC, giving the battalion a composition of two assault companies (UH-1 aircraft) and one Assault Support Company (CH-47). Aircraft requirements in support of the 101st Abn Div have been 6 cargo helicopters, 20 lift, 2 command and control, and S armed helicopters daily. Support rendered the division included company size asseults, combat resupply, cornand and control, pacification and psy-ops, chemical dispersion, long range patrolling, security reaction force, armed convoy escort, reconnaissance, and close air support, in addition to aircraft recovery and parts transport for the division organic aviation. During the period 19-21 April 1960, the battalion was the principal Array aviation support to the division in operational DELUMRE, which established a new fire support base to provide artillery fire on infiltration routes within the A Shau Valley. Aviation support included company size airmobile assaults, lifting a total of 1100 troops during the initial phase of the operation. The battalion also provided general support for the division with a minimum of one assault helicopter company and 6 CH-47 helicopters per day throughout the operation.
- (3) Cargo helicopters played a prime role in the logistical support of the division. Maintenance and cost considerations in CH-47 operations makes maximum efficiency desirable. Every effort was made to insure usoful rotor time. Proper planning and coordination was instituted to reduce dead time caused by improper scheduling, and improper load preparation. The best logistical support was rendered when priorities were established by the division G3 which insured that cargo was transported in the order of importance.

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Initial planning and subsequent changes to tactical requirements required constant monitoring for best results to be obtained. The use of a liaison officer between the division and the CH-47 company with knowledge of both supported unit requirements and cargo helicopter operations proved invaluable. This individual, provided by the 200th ASHC and located with the Division Army Aviation Element, acts as advisor to the supported unit and coordinates aircraft requirements.

(4) Statistical data for the reporting period is shown on Inclosure 3 for activities in both the III and I Corps areas. It should be noted that the battalion was not operational for the first nine days of the reporting period, and in addition seven days were devoted to relocation. A fully operational posture was reassumed on 1 April 1968. The data represents an effective mission support period of eight weeks. (See inclosure 3.)

#### p. (U) Training:

- (1) The battalion closed in the Camp Eagle area 20 March and since has been criented toward operations, physical security, administration and training. Personnel are receiving formal maintenance training at the ANTAF school at Vung Tau, and escape and evasion training in the Phillippines. Battalion personnel filled quotas for N-16 armorer training at Da Mang Support Command and four personnel have been trained as unit armorers. Assault holicopter personnel have attended classes presented by the METT team on the new 2.75 Rocket.
- (2) M-16 rifle training program is being implemented at company level, so that personnel can verify the zero on their M-16 rifles twice monthly and receive classroom instruction on sight adjustment, loading and unloading, stoppages, immediate action, care and cleaning of the rifle, megazine and sofety.
- (3) Battalian personnel received a three hour class on the operation of NY-26 signal equipment.

#### q. (Č) Physical Security

- (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 17th Assault Helacopter Company are collocated at Camp Engle and have security responsibility for a portion of the Camp Eagle outer perimeter defense plan. HHC occupies two fighting bunkers at night manned by three personnel per bunker. The 17th AHC occupies four fighting bunkers manned by three personnel per bunker and one tower manned by two personnel.
- (2) The 188th AHC located at Landing Zone Sally terms nine Mighting bunkers each night with three men per bunker.
- (3) The 200th ASHC located at Hue-Phu Bai Airtheid provides a 16 mail augmentation to MAG-36 each night for perimeter defense. The 20011 ASHC also maintains an eighteen ran reaction force to reinforce the parimeter defense when necessary.

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#### r. (C) Intelligence:

- (1) During the first portion of the reporting period the S-2 section was chiefly involved with the establishment of SOP's, procurement of documents, publication forms, maps; and the conduct of liaison visits to other S-2 sections and intelligence agencies.
- (2) After the battalion completed the in-country combat move to Camp Eagle, the S-2 section became involved with the analysis of aircraft hits as sustained by the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion.

#### s. (C) Supply

- (1) Upon becoming operational, critical logistical problems of assigned subordinate units became the prime concern of the S-4 section. One unit deployed from CONUS without a 2½ ton wrecker, M60. This shortage did not only affect moter pool operations, but also, affected their maintenance capability to lift aircraft and aircraft engines when necessary.
- (2) Shortage of the two authorized UH-ID helicopters negated the command and control capability of this headquarters during battalion air assaults. Subordinate units were tasked to provide command and control aircraft until this unit received one UH-ID helicopter.

#### t. (C) Maintenance (aircraft)

- (1) Units encountered dusty terrain conditions upon the initial deployment into their respective areas of operation. The initial shortage of soil stabilization (peneprime) was eventually overcome; however, for one month engine and related rotating controls and control surfaces received abrasive waster. A highly effective FOD program was developed and it being menitored to bessen damage. Peneprime is continuing to be placed on helipads and revoluent, areas as it comes available.
- (2) Light discipline has an effect on the amount of night maintenance that can be accomplished in the 188th Assault Helicopter Company Area. The major maintenance effort was accomplished during daylight hours; however, aircraft availability has been marginally acceptable. As the local enemy situation improves, night maintenance will be increased.
- and repair parts support for units of this battalion was located one and one half flying hours distance. To overcome the number of flying hours that build have been expended on maintenance and parts runs, a consolidated run was scheduled to service all three units three times a week attilizing a SU-AF of the 200th ASHO. This method of resupply was effective. At the end of this reporting period, another direct support company, we a closer location, has received the support mission for the battalion of the red of this reduction is distance should substantially improve the support.

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(4) Aircraft availability for the reporting period was:

CH-47A - 50%

UH-10 - 76%

UH-1H - 79%

- (5) Aircraft status as of 30 April 1968 is stated in Inclosure 4.
- u. (C) Signal: During this reporting period the signal section received approximately 75% of all major communication equipment. However, the section does not possess secure communication due to the lack of secure equipment. Supply action has been initiated to secure KW-7 and KY-8 communication equipment; however, these items are critical command shortages and supply action may be delayed for several more months. Also, the section does not possess repair capabilities due to the lack of test equipment and tools. The personnel status of the section is above strength, however, several positions are being held by OJT personnel due to the lack of school trained personnel.

#### v. (U) Aviation Safety:

During the reporting period the battalion experienced 2 major aircraft accidents; I incident, I missing aircraft, 3 precautionary landings and 2 forced landings. The two aircraft involved in the forced landings were landed without damage to the aircraft or injury to the crew of passengers.

#### w. (C) Medical:

- (1) The Battalien Medical Section became operational on 10 Tarch 1966, four days prior to initiating a combat move from Bien Hoa to vicinity of Hue-Phu Bai. Upon arrival at Camp Eagle, the medical section was given the responsibility of providing aviation medical support to HHC, 17th Assault Helicopter Company and the 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company. The 200th ASHC is located approximately five riles away at Hue-Phu Bai and to render effective medical care it was necessary to supplement the company with three medical aidmen. The aidmen can conduct sick call, render aid to the battlefield casualties and accidental injury victims.
- (2) The battalion medical section is presently constructing an aviation field dispensary to provide direct medical support to HHC and 17th AHC which are collocated.
- (3) The problems of medical supplies, air evacuation, communications. emergency care and flight physicals have been solved by this section by establishing close coordination and cooperation with other medical sacratures in the vicinity. Medical supply requisitions are filled by the lolst Airborn. Division medical supply office. Air evacuation is coordinated with the 1/10 AHC and communications are handled by the battalion signal section.

Operational Report of 308th Combat Aviation Battalion for AVGNI-C Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS, CS FOR-65 (R1) SUBJECT:

- Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations. and Recommendations.
  - a. Personnel. None
  - B. (C) Operations
  - (1) Armed Escort for Cargo Helicopters
- (a) OBSERVATION. When CH-47 helicopters are operating in areas of intensified anti-aircraft activity, the presence of a helicopter fire team has both a deterring and penalizing effect on enemy anti-aircraft gunners.
- (b) EVALUATION. The size and utility of the CH-47 make it a lucrative and vulnerable target for the energy. Evasive action is limited because of externally carried loads. The related weapons systems provide inadequate self protection. These factors combine to encourage and aid the enemy sunner to direct fire by all types of weapons against this aircraft. Experience has shown a reluctance by the enemy to take, under fire, a cargo helicopter if it is escorted by an armed helicopter fire tear.
- (c) RECOLLENDATION. That armed helicopter escent be provided for cargo helicopter operations into areas of known enemy activity.
  - (2) Aircraft Vulnerability
- (a) OBSERVATION. Most incidents of aircraft being hit by ground fire occurred at intermediate altitudes.
- (b) EVALUATION. Statistics gathered by the battalien within the 101st Airborne Division AO show that the predominance of anti-aircraft hits are sustained between 50 feet and 1500 feet mean rea level. Helicopters flying within 1500 feet of the ground are within offective range of small arms sniper fire. The risk increases with a decrease in altitude until the aircraft is so near the ground that reaction time is denied the enemy. point has proven to be below 50 feet.
- (c) RECOLLENDATION. Aircraft should not operate between 50 feet and 1500 feet unless transitioning for landing or climbing to cruise altitude. If weather conditions preclude flight above 1500 feet, nap-of-the-earth techniques should be utilized to reduce hit probability.
  - c. Training. None
  - d. Intelligence. None
  - e. (U) Logistics
  - (1) Unit Deployment:
  - The procedure during a battalion-size rave is for battalion headquarters to supervise and assist in all aspects of the move.

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Operational Report of 308th Combat Aviation Battalion for SUBJECT: Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS, CS FOR-65 (R1)

- EVALUATION: When this battalion was reorganized and relocated by simultaneous movement, two companies had to be assisted by their former battalion headquarters. This decentralization of direct supervision resulted in some non-combat essential items of equipment being shipped by aircraft.
- (c) RECOMMENDATION: That sufficient time separation between deploying units be programmed to allow the owning headquarters to coordinate the entire movement.
  - f. Organization. None
  - Other. None

5 Incl 8.8

LTC, Inf

Commanding

## Confidential

AVGN-CO (14 May 68) 1st Ind SUEJECT: Operational Report of 308th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS, CS FOR (R1) (U)

- DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96337 2 9 MAY 1968
- TO: Department of the Army, AC of S for Force Development, DA (ACSFOR, DA), Washington, D. C. 20310
- 1. (U) Concur with content of basic report except as noted below. Certain points have been amplified for clarity.
- 2. (U) The Joseph CAB became operat 1. CTZ. On 10 March, the unit was moved to ICTZ and attached to the 16th Combat Aviation Group with operational control to the 101st Abn Div.
- 3. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.
- manned Page 9, paragraph 8, Item: Physical Security: Aviation units are vide for experimental skilled personnel. Their organization does not provide the security of the security soldiers. While aviation units can and do when the security, the requirement to provide personnel for external in internal security, the requirement to provide perform their primary mission of security decreases their capability to perform their primary mission of security decreases their capability to units should be augmented with security decreases their capability in units should be augmented with security decreases their capability in units should be augmented with security and the security mission be assigned to Infantry, Military Police of the security mission be assigned to Infantry, Military Police of the security mission be assigned to Infantry, Military Police of the security mission be assigned to Infantry, Military Police of the security mission of the security mission be assigned to Infantry, Military Police of the security mission of the security mission be assigned to Infantry, Military Police of the security mission of the security mission the security mission be assigned to Infantry, Military Police of the security mission that the security mission that
  - b. Page 11, paragraph u, Item: Signal.
- (1) Reference item on KW7 and KW8 secure communications equipment. This headquarters instructed the 308th CAB to submit a letter to USARV requesting that the equipment be issued on an emergency basis.
- (2) Reference item on lack of test equipment and tools. Items that could be made available from existing Group resources were loaned to the 308th CAB until requisitions could be filled. Follow-up on all requisitions is being accomplished.
- (3) Reference item on lack of school trained personnel. PIR roster as of 1 May 68 reflected shortages of (2) two 35M30 repairmen, (2) two 05020 radio operators, and (1) one 35L20 repairmen. During the month of May all of the watancies were filled with school trained personnel.
- c. Page 11, paragraph w, Item: Medical. The 200th ASHC is currently receiving medical care from the 134th Medical Detachment at Phu Bai. Company aidmen with the 200th ASHC do routine screening of sick call and render minor first aid treatment.

GROUP 4 DOWNGRADED
AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
LICLASSIFIED AFT R 12
LYBARS DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVON-CO

29 MM. 1968 Operational Report of 308th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period SUBJECT: Rading 30 April 1968, RCS, CS FOR (R1) (U)

- (U) Section 2 Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations. Concur.
- 5. (C) Incl #1, Item: Organization Chart: APO number for the 200th ASHC and 611th TC DET are not shown. Should be APO 96308.
- 6. (U) Incl #5. After action report.
- a. Page 4, paragraph 11d, Item: Aerial Port. This is an absolute must when moving any unit under combat conditions and expecting it to be operational shortly after arrival in its new area. If the movement of priority cargo is not monitored closely, many convenience items will arrive prior to combat essential items.
- b. Page 4, paragraph 11g, Item: Transportation. As written, this recommendation would not employ existing transportation capabilities to the best advantage. However, this headquarters agrees that transportation must be arranged far enough in advance and requirements placed on supporting units to alleviate large backlogs of cargo at aerial or water ports.

5 Incl no

DANIEL G. GUST Colonel, INF Commanding

AVBA-C (14 May 68) '2d Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report of 308th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS GSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

JUN 27 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375 Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Porce Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

- 1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.
- 2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:
- a. Paragraph 1q, page 9 and Paragraph 3a, 1st Indorsement. 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters has recognised the problem and concurs with the comment in 1st Indorsement. While USARY Security Forces TDA P5 WIZJAA-00 does provide some personnel to assist aviation units in physical security, it is not adequate. This is evidenced by the latest USARPAG manpower survey which recognises a requirement for 725 BH to provide physical security for 1st Aviation Brigade sviation units. The Brigade currently has only 3A7 of these personnel authorised and it is projected that this authorisetion will remain constant.
- b. Paragraph 2e (1), page 12. Although in this case coordination of the entire movement by the gaining battalion may have been more advantageous, future moves must be analyzed to determine if the recommendation will apply.


FOR THE COMMANDER!

J. D SEGAL

V.T., AGC


ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

5 Incl



CALL CENT IN

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#### STATISTICAL SUPPARY CHART

		III CORPS 10 Feb-12 Mar	I CORPS 1 Apr-30Apr	TOTAL
(1)	Battalion Combat Assaults	1.	0	1
(2)	Company Combat Assaults	47	33	80
(3)	Flying Hours	9,231	5,964	15,195
(4)	Passengers	41,760	31,675	73,435
(5)	Cargo (tons)	991	6,89 <del>6</del>	7,868
(6)	Sorties	26,212	20,052	47,064
(7)	Aircraft Damaged (hostile)	40	50	90
(8)	Damaged (operational)	2	1	3
(9)	Aircraft destroyed due to host	ile act 4	1.	5
(10)	Aircraft missing due to hosti	le act. O	1	1
(11)	U.S. KHA	2	1.	3
(12)	U.S. WHA	ò	7	16
(13)	U.S. missing due to hostile a	ction C	6	6
(14)	AC KBV (BC)	37	134	171
(15)	Structures Destroyed	90	24	114
(16)	Sampans Destroyed	5	0	5
(17)	Aircraft Recovered (CH-47)	N/A	10	10
(18)	Modical Evacuations	195	1/12	337

(308th Combat Aviation Battalien Camp Eagle, RVN, APO 96383)

### ATROPAFT STATUS AS OF 30 APRIL 1968

SUBORDINATE UNIT	UH- AUTH	-1¢ 0/H	UH- <u>AUTH</u>		UH-I		CH- AUTH	-47 O/H	OH- AUTH		
17th AHC	8	8			23	18					
188th AHC	8	8			23	20				•	
200th ASHC							16	17	2	0	
HHC, 308th CA	В		2	1				g (. d. /d. ; ab y = 4b			
TOTAL:	16	16	2	1.	46	38	16	17	2	O	

(308th Cembat Aviation Battalion, Camp Eagle, RVN, APO 96383)

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HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96383

AVGM-CC

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report (U)

THRU:

Commanding Officer
16th Combat Aviation Group
ATTN: AVGM-SC
APO 96337

TO:

Commanding General 1st Aviation Brigade ATTN: AVBA-C APO 96384

- 1. (U) Type Operation: Unit Move
- 2. (U) Date: 0730 hours 9 March through 1800 hours 12 April 1968.
- 3. (C) Location: From III Corps Tactical Zone to I Corps Tactical Zone.
- 4. (C) Reporting Units: 308th Combat Aviation Battalion; 17th Assault Helicopter Company with Detachments; 188th Assault Helicopter Company with Detachments; and 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company with a Detachment.
  - 5. (C) Unit Supported: 101st Airborne Division.
- 6. (U) Intelligence: General buildup of Viet Cong NVA forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone.
- 7. (C) Mission: To move the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion to include assigned units by Airlift and Sealift from the III Corps Tactical Zone to the I Corps Tactical Zone.
- 8. (C) Concept of Operation: The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion, to include assigned units, moved from the III Corps Tactical Zone to the I Corps Tactical Zone in four phases: 1) Airlift of advance parties on 9 March 1968: 2) Airlift of Combat essential equipment commencing on 14 March 1968, ending on 21 March 1968: 3) Sealift of oversize and Non-Combat Essential equipment commencing 16 March 1968, ending 12 April 1968: 4) The ferrying of organic aircraft commencing on 14 March 1968, ending on 25 March 1968.

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200-10

Incl "5.

(C) Execution: The Battalion Commander 308th Combat Aviation Battalion received a warning order from S-3, 12th Combat Aviation Group at 1300 hours 7 March 1968. The warning order directed that the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion with assigned units would move by Sealift to I Corps Tactical Zone commencing 15 March 1968. (See Incl 1, Task Organization). The Battalion was to remain assigned to the 12th Combat Aviation Group, attached to 16th Combat Aviation Group and OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. This arrangement still exists. On 8 March 1968 representatives from the units involved were briefed on the move, liaison, and advance party requirements. A minimum of a four day stand down prior to proposed movement date was requested. On 9 March at 0730 hours the liaison parties departed for 16th Group Headquarters located at Danang, South Vietnam. The party was briefed by LTC Steen, then the 16th Combat Aviation Group S-3. LTC Steen assumed command of the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion on 10 March 1968. Major Jones, the ADAU, 101st Airborne Division escorted the liaison party to Camp Fagle (YD 811155) and to LZ Sally (YD 642274). It was determined then that the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 308th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 17th Assault Helicopter Company would be located at Camp Eagle and the 188th Assault Helicopter Company would be located at LZ Sally. A tentative location for the 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company would be at Red Beach at Danang. This location was changed later when space at Hue-Phu Bai Airfield became available. Also, on 9 March 1968, the advance parties for all units departed Bien Hoa by C-130 at 1330 hours, ultimately arriving at 16th Group Headquarters at 1800 hours. A meeting took place between the liaison group and the advance party concerning location of units, space available, support required (Transportation, Engineer, Quartermaster, etc) and approximate arrival date of the units. Upon return of the liaison party at Bien Hoa the evening of 9 March it was learned that the proposed novement dates had been changed again. This time, commencing on 19 March, all units were to move by sealift. At 1300 hours, 11 March 1968, a meeting was held with transportation personnel to coordinate the move by sealift commencing 19 March 1968. At 1730 hours, 11 March 1968, another message from S-3, 12th Combat Aviation Group was received negating all previous instructions. It had been decided to airlift all combat essential equipment and sealift all non-essential equipment commencing 14 March 1968. The latest change was the criteria upon which the move was initiated. The new plans were:

# a. AIRLIFT: 14 March 1

188th. (Incl 7)

15 March HHC (Incl 5)

16 March 17th (Incl 6)

19 March 200th (Incl 8)

b. SEALIFT: All units were to load at New Port on 20-21 March 1968 (For exact dates and times see Incl 9). An immediate stand down was requested for the companies involved by the S-3, 308th Combat Aviation Battalion. This request was denied by the S-3, 12th Combat Aviation Group. The 17th Assault Helicopter Company completed its last III Corps mission at 131700 March 1968.

AVGM\_CC

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

The 188th Assault Helicopter Company completed its last III Corps mission at 131200 March 1968. The 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company completed its last III Corps mission at 121800 March 1968. The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion with its assigned units ultimately arrived in the new location and proceeded to establish the facilities necessary for operations. The first assigned mission was flown for the 101st Airborne Division by the 188th Assault Helicopter Company 18 March 1968. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 308th Combat Aviation Battalion, became operational on 31 March 1968. The 17th Assault Helicopter Company became fully operational on 12 April 1968, the 188th Assault Helicopter Company on 4 April 1968, and the 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company on 10 April 1968. One CH-47 has not arrived due to extensive maintenance.

#### 10. PROBLEM AREAS (U)

- a. Notification date (warning order) did not provide sufficient lead time to properly pack equipment. Packing materials were not used nor were they available on such a short notice.
- b. Constant changes in movement dates and modes of travel made preliminary planning extremely difficult.
- c. Unit personnel were not well versed in preparation of transportation movement control documents.
- d. Facilities at the 8th Aerial Port, Bien Hoa, were not adequate for off-loading of the stake and platform trucks. As a result, some of these vehicles were delayed for as long as twenty-four hours at the aerial port waiting to be unloaded.
- e. Due to the lengthy delays between C-130 sorties, personnel and equipment were waiting long periods at 8th Acrial Port, Messing and sanitation facilities at 8th Acrial Port for transit personnel are minimal
- f. Priority movement of selected items were not controlled by Air Force loading teams. (Fork-lift drivers arbitrarily loaded C-130's)
- g. The existing weather at Hue-Phu Bai forced several C-130 sorties to off-load at non-destination airfields. The known shortages of equipment are attributed to this action. This also created a temporary set back in movement.
- h. Sufficient transportation was not available at Hue-Phu Bai to move the air lifted equipment to the various base camps. Sufficient off-loading equipment (Fork lift, MHE, ect) was not available at field site locations.
- i. The companies were directed to close aircraft too soon after the closing of the main bodies. As a result, revetments were not available and the aircrafts were needlessly exposed for an unacceptable period of time.

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AVGM\_CC SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

- j. The engineer support required to establish a forward heliport in a combat area is extensive. The engineer support rendered the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion helicopter was not enough to provide minimum protection against enemy attacks. The heliport area was not developed to receive aircraft and to afford the protection required in a forward area. As a minimum, there should be facilities for POL, ammo and ammo storage and revetments for the using unit. The heliport area could have been improved by the use of MSA1 matting, T-17 membrane and peneprime.
- k. Inadequate thought and preparation was given to the shipment of the aircraft maintenance facility. The only guidance was that all equipment that was not air transportable by C-130 would go by sea. This left the tool crib van, wrecker and folk lift to go to sea. These items are of vital importance to the Transportation Maintenance Detachment and without them the third echelon(direct support) maintenance capabilities of the units was degraded. Provisions should be made for the airlift of these items or else leave the aircraft in a "stand down" condition until these items arrive at the new location.

#### 11. RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

- a. That higher headquarters give adequate consideration to a unit's readiness capability and reaction time prior to directing a unit move.
- b. That firm dates for unit movement be given which allow unit personnel sufficient reaction time to brief their sections and pass out instructions.
- c. That unit movement personnel and aerial port personnel coordinate the amount of cargo to be moved, identify modes of transportation to move cargo and determine turn around time of vehicles hauling cargo to port. Personnel and vehicles should not be delayed at the aerial port for a long waiting period.
- d. That aerial personnel and unit personnel should coordinate closely to insure that priotity packed cargo is shipped first.
- e. The unit movement personnel and aerial personnel should formulate alternate plans for control and accountability of cargo if off loaded at a non-destination airport.
- f. That a sponsor unit be appointed to assist the moving unit with transportation requirements, mess facilities and administrative support. (a minimum of one host unit per company)
- g. That required vehicle transportation be located and secured well in advance of unit moves to alleviate back logs of cargo at the aerial port of destination.
- h. That an engineer unit be given the revetment construction project prior to unit move. This would preclude unnecessary aircraft exposure.

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

- i. That sufficient material handling equipment at the ultimate site be available for off loading CONEX containers from truck beds. Lack of sufficient equipment created a delay in turn around time at Eagle and Sally off loading sites.
- j. That a convenient maintenance facility (DS-GS) be established prior to moving a aviation unit into a remote location.

CHARLES S. STEEN JR.

LTC, Inf Commanding

10 Incl

1 Task Organization

2 Advance Party

3 S-1

4 S-4

5 HHC

6 17th

7 188th

8 200th

9 Significant Events Summary

10 Statistics

# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

#### TASK ORGANIZATION

#### 100001 FEBRUARY 1968 TO 090001 MARCH 1968.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 308th Combat Avi tion Battalion

17th Assault Helicopter Company 613th TC DET (KD)

722nd SC DET (RL)

117th Assault Helicopter Company

140nd TC DET (KD) 256nd CS DET (RL)

135th Assault Helicopter Company

614th TC DET (KD) 68th SC DET (RL)

195th Assault Helicopter Company

609th TC DET (OA)

366th SC DET (RL)

93rd MED DET (OA)

090001 MARCH 1968 TO PRESENT

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 308th Combat Aviation Battalion

17th Assault Helicopter Company

613th TC DET (KD)

722nd SC DET (RL)

188th Assault Helicopter Company

603rd TC DET (KD)

4th SC DET (RL)

154th MED DET (AO)

200th Assault Support Helicopter Company 611 TC DET (AB)

Incl 1

#### CUNTIDERHAL

# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

AVGM-CC

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

#### ADVANCE PARTY

MAJ Henderson, the senior member of the advance party, departed 16th Combat Aviation Group 9 March 68 and coordinated with LTC Steen, the new 308th Battalion Commanding Officer. On 10 March, the advance party proceeded to Gia Le Naval Construction Battalion Camp and located the assigned base area. CPT Clsen and two NCO's were assigned to plan base development for the 17th AHC. Sgt Riggins was assigned to plan and layout the Battalion Headquarters site. Coordination was effected with CPT Dickey, FSE, 1st Bde, 101st Div for Class I, II, IV, and V supplies. CPT Richmond, G-4, 101st Division was contacted for transportation requirements to move unit cargo, conex and palletized loads to Eagle site for 308th CAB and to LZ Sally for 188th AHC. Initially, sufficient transportation, 5 ton S & P tractor-trailers, were available for movement of cargo from Hue-Phu Bai; however, the vehicles were controlled by the local Fleet Logistical Command (FLC) on daily dispatch by that support organization and later mission requirements of higher priority curtailed availability. Two days effective use of the 10 plus S & P's was completed. The third and fourth days only 21 and 5 ton 6x6 trucks were available through the Division G-4, and the movement of cargo slowed considerably. Unit vehicles, 21 ton capacity, were utilized to the fullest for continuous movement. Support from FLC was marginal due to commitments in the local area. The fifth day of the cargo movement from Phu Bai, assistance was gained from the 220th RAC and the 131th SAC with 5 ton tractors and trailers. This assisted in completing the 188th AHC Movement to LZ Sally and the 17th AHC and the 308th HHC to Eagle site. However, through extensive use of unit vehicles, 200th ASHC moved its cargo rapidly by unit transportation to its site at Phu-Bai Airfield. The main problem encountered was the lack of on site unloading capability. One forklift at Eagle for use by the 17th AHC and 308th HHC, and one at LZ Sally for the 188th AHC presented a major unloading problem that caused delay in turn around time for the trucks raking the cargo runs. Quite often this resulted in only two trips per day. By the close of the sixth day, the majority of cargo for all units was on site or enroute.

Incl 2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96383

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

S-1 SECTION

The S-1 Section of the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was notified on 9 March 68 that the battalion would be transferred to the I Corps area. Upon receipt of this information, the S-1 Section took action to organize materials, office equipment, files, and personnel for the deployment. Records and files pertaining to the 117th, 195th, and 135th Assault Helicopter Companies were transferred to their new battalions. All S-1 files, records, publications, furniture, etc., were organized into essential and non-essential items. All essential items that were necessary for the operation of the S-1 section at Cong Ly Street were organized, but not packed in order to keep the section operational until movement was accomplished. All non-essential items were packed by the S-1 personnel in two of the three CONEX containers allocated to the section. The third CONEX container was packed just prior to departure with essential items for the operation of the S-1 section. The 1/2 ton truck assigned to the S-1 section was also prepared for movement. All equipment organic to the S-1 section was accompanied by at least one member of the section. Specialists Lord, Aiken and Hansen accompanied the CONEX containers to Hue-Phu Bai where the containers were unloaded and their custody given to other members of this organization. The S-1 vehicle, driven by 1LT Smith, had as passengers MAJ Roberts, 2LT Boulay, and SP5 Bazan. Movement from Cong Ly Street began at approximately 2300 hours 14 March 1968 with movement of the CONEX containers. The S-1 vehicle left Cong Ly Street at approximately 0200 hours 15 March 1968. When the S-1 vehicle arrived at the 8th Acrial Port the S-1 CONEX containers had already boarded the C-130 for movement. There was approximately a 24 hour delay before the remainder of the S-1 personnel departed Bien Hoa Airbase. The S-1 1/2 ton truck, separated from its trailer, departed at approximately 2200 hours with MAJ Roberts, 1LT Smith and SP5 Bazan. 2LT Boulay followed with the trailer. All personnel had arrived Hue by early morning 16 March 1968. Personnel proceeded to Camp Eagle approximately 0700 hours 17 March 1963. Upon arrival, all sections worked together to erect tents, install latrines and showers and dig fex holes. The S-1 section equipment was unpacked on 20 March and the section was partially operational the fellowing day.

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HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

S-4 SECTION

Upon notification of the movement order, the S-4 Section made necessary coordination to obtain the required number of CCNEX containers for shipment of supplies and materials. A total of 53 CONEX containers were obtained and distributed to staff sections and other elements of Headquarters and Headquarters Company. Each section was responsible for maintaining an informal inventory list of items placed in their CONEX containers.

The CONEX containers were marked with the Unit Identification Gode and owning section. The next step was to segregate the essential items from the normal operating items to insure early arrival at the destination of the essential items.

The next action was to prepare Transportation Movement Control Documents and coordinate with the 8th Acrial Port Squadron at Bien Hoa. The 8th Acrial Port Squadron representative determined all section equipment was air transportable.

The movement of CONEX centainers, personnel, and vehicles to the 8th Aerial Port at Bien Hoa began approximately 2000 hours, 14 March 1968. Five tractor trucks with stake and platform trailers began shuttling CONEX containers to the 8th Aerial Port on 15 March 1968. WO Skelton, from the S-4 Section, was located at the 8th Aerial Port to assist in loading and to insure all items of the shipment were loaded and transported to their destination.

The first C-130 scrtie departed at 0230 hours on 15 March 1968. A total of three sorties departed Bien Hoa on 15 March 1968.

In addition to CONEX centainers, some vehicles and personnel were moved on each sortie when space was available as determined by the load master of each C-130. The essential items were shipped on these first sorties.

No other sorties were begun until approximately 2000 hours on 15 March 1968. A total of eleven (11) sorties were completed by 0400 hours on 16 March 1968. Once again, operations were at a standstill until approximately 1930 hours on 16 March. At this time the six remaining sorties were dispatched. The 20th and final scrtie departed Bien Hoa at 0200 hours, 17 March 1968. At this time all CONEX containers, pallet leads, organic vehicles, and personnel had departed with the exception of 1 3/4 ton and trailer which remained with the rear party.

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Incl 4

# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

#### HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

The unit began to pack and crate immediately after receiving a verbal movement order.

The major problem encountered was a lack of time in which to pack and move property. The unit packed in three days. In addition the initial plans were based on sea move. On 11 March 1968 the unit was informed it would move by air. A readjustment in planning was made and unit's first C-130 sorties departed 15 March 1968.

In addition to the lack of adequate time, the unit encountered a problem in obtaining proper banding and crating material. The unit was able to borrow limited amounts of padding and wrapping paper from various units in Bien Hoa area, however, this did not meet the needs of the unit.

The following C-130 sorties were flown:

- a. 15 March 1968 3
- b. 16 March 1968 11
- c. 17 March 1968 6

Incl 5

# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

AVGM-CC

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

17th Assault Helicopter Company

The 17th AHC was alerted to move on 7 March 1968 with no firm dates established nor definite guidance furnished on specific locations. On 9 March a liaison party from the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion, including the commanding officer of the 17th Assault Helicopter Company, departed from Bien Hoa for Hue Phu Bai. On the same date an advanced party from this unit, consisting of representatives from the unit and detachments and a ½ ton vehicle with radio, departed for Da Nang.

On 12 March 1968 the unit was informed that the first C-130 sorties would depart on 16 March and a sea shipment would depart on 20 March. At this time preparations to pack for the ultimate move and to segregate the sea and air shipments were initiated. On 14 March the unit was released from flying operational missions and relieved of the commitment for perimeter security. On 17 March the first C-130 sorties departed, and on 19 March the last C-130 sorties were completed. The first flight of UH-1's departed on 18 March and arrived at Camp Eagle on 19 March. The second and final flight of UH-1's departed on 19 March and arrived at Camp Eagle on 20 March.

# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

AVGM-CC

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

#### 188TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY

On 7 March 1968 the 188th Assault Helicopter Company was notified of a movement of the complete company with all TO&E equipment.

The advanced party, consisting of the Supply Officer, Service Plateon Leader, and a representative of the Operations section, left Dau Tieng on 9 March 1968 for the new location, Landing Zone Sally. The necessary equipment for the advance party, which included tents, poles, a jeep, trailer, rations, and other necessary items, was shipped forward by CH-47 on 10 March 1968.

ll March 1968 marked the start of packing. All sections of the company began to load their organic equipment into conex containers. The three flight plateons were in the best position to be leaded first while areas such as the mess hall and the 603rd Maintonance Detachment had to maintain operation in order to insure feeding of the troops and maintenance on the aircraft.

The next two days, 12 and 13 March 1968 were devoted to packing and loading. The mess hall coased operation after the evening moal and likewise night maintenance was terminated. By dark on the night of 13 March approximately 40% of the company was entirely packed. This 40% was composed mainly of the equipment in the flight platoons, operations, orderly room, and officer, NCO Clubs' stock.

The first sortie of the combined air and sea move appeared in the form of a C-130 at the Dau Tieng Airstrip on 14 March 1963 at 1000 hours. With the aid of an Air Force loading team, conex's and pallets were shuttled from the company area to the loading ramp. It was at this point that the first major drawback was encountered, a lack of forklifts Much time was spent coordinating the use of the three forklifts available to us. An additional setback was the fact that the Air Force would not work after dark. This situation was magnified when the forklift, organic to the company, was deadlined.

The first flight of helicopters left Dau Tiong at 1300 hours on 14 March. It included five UH-1H and two UH-1C helicopters plus crow equipment and rations for five days. It should be noted that the the gunships were disarmed so that they carried only about 25% of their ordinance. The 25% was retained to provide a temporary cover for downed aircraft from the flight.

AVGM-CC

: 15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

On 15 March, more C-130's arrived and subsequently, the day was spent loading these aircraft. An individual from the company went along on each C-130 to secure the carge in the event that the aircraft was diverted and unloaded at an enroute destination.

A new method was devised for shuttling loaded conex containers and pallets to the airfield. It was found that three pallets or conex containers could be placed on one five ton tracter-trailer. By using five of these vehicles a steady loading of C-130's was assured.

Also on this day, the second flight of five slicks and two guns left Dau Tieng. The Company Commander left with the second flight as more than 50% of the equipment was loaded on the Air Force transports.

The majority of the company was packed and ready to be loaded on 15 March. Tents were removed and general police of the area began. The Maintenance Detachment was still palletizing its equipment but by nightfall most of this had been accomplished. In addition, the sea move was prepared in order to meet the convoy date of 16 March. Items included in the sea move were signal vans, and various other items not transportable by air.

At 0700 hours on 16 March, the sea move convey left Dau Tieng for the terminal at New Port. After the convey left Dau Tieng the only personnel remaining were those ferrying the remainder of the flyable aircraft and the rear party. On this day 80% of the equipment had been leaded, the company area was in a high state of police and everything was running smoothly.

In excess of 90% of the equipment was moved when the Executive Officer left with the seven flyable slicks and three gunships at 1300 hours on 17 March 1968. With the departure of the third flight, approximately 12 personnel remained behind to crew the aircraft that were still down.

After an intermediate stop at Dong Ba Thin the third flight landed at Landing Zone Sally at 1200 hours, 18 March 1968.

At the destination, conveys began moving equipment from Huo-Phu Bai to LZ Sally. The first convoy began on 14 March and moved all the air shipments to LZ Sally by 20 March. The convey from the sea move arrived at LZ Sally on 29 March 1968.

Incl 7 (Con't)



# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

AVGM-CC

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

200TH ASSAULT SUPPORT HELICOPTER COMPANY

The 200th ASHC began movement to Camp Eagle at 0600 hours 19 March 1968 by air and by sea. The air novement party moved from Bear Cat to Bien Hoa by unit vehicular transportation on 19 March 1968 for further air movement by C-130 to Hue Phu Bai. Unit organic vehicles moved by road convoy and closed at the aerial port at 1735 hours 19 Mar 68. A total of 28 C-130 sorties were required to move 500,000 lbs of unit cargo. There were two C-130 sorties on 19 March and 26 C-130 sorties on 20 March 1968. The first sortie departed POE at 2335, 19 Mar 68 and the last sortie departed POE at 2315, 20 Mar 68.

The scalift party departed Bear Cat on 20 Mar 68 and arrived POE on 21 Mar 68. Total weight to be scalifted was estimated at 400 short tons. The rear maintenance detachment arrived at Phu Bai by CH-47 on 20 Mar 68.

Due to the relative few problems encountered by movement personnel of the 200th ASHC during the unit move, no recommendations are submitted.

LAMENDENTIAL

# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

AVGM-CC

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

#### SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

DATE	TIME	ACTION
7 Mar	1300	Warning Order
8 Mar	1830	Briefing for new unit commanders
9 Mar	0730	Liaison party departed
	1130	Advance party departed
	1915	12th Group UNCLS message AVGC-CA, 10 Mar 68 received reorganized units in 308th Combat Aviation Battalion
	,	Meeting between liaison party and advance party
	2100	Liaison party returned.
10 Mar		LTC Steen assumed command of the 308th CAB
•		Advance party arrived at new field location.
ll Mar	1300	Transportation meeting.
	1730	New message received stating new dates and airlift/sealift combination.
12 Mar	1800	200th completed its last III Corps mission.
13 Mar	1200	188th completed its last III Corps mission.
	<b>170</b> 0	17th completed its last III Corps mission.
14 Mar	1000	1st C-130 arrived Dau Tieng.
	1300	1st Flight of 188th AHC's organic aircraft took-off.
	<b>20</b> 00	HHC moved conex containers to Eth Aorial Port.
15 Mar	0230	First C-130 sortie for HHC departed Bien Hea.



AVGM\_CC SUBJECT: After Action Report

DATE	TIME .	ACTION
15 Mar	1300	2nd flight of 188th AHC's organic aircraft departed. All flyable 188th A/C closed LZ Sally. 3 non-flyable at Dau Tieng.
16 Mar	<b>07</b> 00	Convoy containing 188th AHC's sealift equipment departed Dau Tieng
	0830	308th Bn Hq, convoy arrived at new base camp location
		188th had first assigned mission from 101st Airborne Division.
17 Mar	0200	Last C-130 sortie arrived at Hue-Phu Bai for HHC.
	2330	First C-130 sortie for 17th AHC departed Bien Hoa.
18 Mar	1200	Last of flyable A/C of 188th arrive LZ Sally.  14 A/C of 17th AHC departed Long Bien for Camp Eagle 7 RON at Phu Hiep, 7 Ron at Dong Ba Thien.  188th AHC vehicle convoy from Dau Tieng arrived at New Port Dock.  Aviation Brigade flight section transferred UH-1D 66-16194 to Hqs, 308th Bn.
19 Mar	0400	Last C-130 sortie for 17th arrived Hue-Phu Bai
	0700	BOC became operational.
	0945	9 A/C 17th AHC departed plantation airstrip for Camp Eagle
	1400 .	4 CH-47 A/C of 200th ASHC arrived at Phu Bai.
	<b>233</b> 5	First C-130 sorties for 200th departed Bien Hoa.
		14 A/C of 17th AHC arrived at Camp Eagle.
20 Mar	<b>07</b> 00	Vehicle convoy from 200th departed Bear Cat for New Port Dock.
	1400	Hqs, 308th Bn A/C #194 closed Camp Eagle. All A/C 17th AHC closed at Camp Eagle.
	1800	Aircraft sorties (C-130) for 308th Bn to include companies were completed.

CAMPERMAL

15 April 1968

AVGM-CC

SUBJECT: After Action Report

ACTION DATE TIME 21 Mar Sealift cargo departed Newport Dock for Hue Port. 188th received mortar attack at LZ Sally - 2 A/C light damage. 28 Mar IST for 200th ASHC arrived at Hue Port 188th received 64 S/T of sealift cargo shipped. All 29 Mar critical maintenance equipment received. 30 Mar 17th AHC received 200 S/T of scalift cargo. All critical maintenance equipment received. 200th ASHC received 150 S/T of sealift cargo. All 31 Mar critical maintenance equipment not received. HHC, 308th CAB fully operational. 31 Mar 1 Apr 200th received 100 S/T of sealift cargo. 17th AHC received sealift cargo except barrier unterial. 3 Apr All sealift carge for 200th closed at Hue Port. Unit will move cargo from dock by vehicle convoy. All sealift cargo for 188th AHC off-loaded at Huo and Tam My Ports. Final LST for 188th AHC arrived Hue Port. 4 Apr 188th AMC fully operational. 8 Apr Final LST for HHC and 17th AHC closed at Hue and Tam My Ports. 17th AHC fully operational. 12 Apr 200th ASHC fully operational. 1300 All 308th Combat Aviation Battalion units completely closed and fully operational.

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 308TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco 96383

AVGM-CC

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

#### ATRLIFT AND SEALIFT TONNAGE

1. HHC, 308th Combat Aviation Batta	lion.
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#### a. General

C-130 scrties: 20

- (2) First sortie 0400, 15 Mar 68
- (3) Last sortic arrived 0400 17 Mar 68
- (4) Unit Aircraft closed 20 Mar 68

#### b. Airlift Tonnage

(1) Conex containers: 53	178.94 S/T
(2) 25 vehicles and 25 trailers	41.2 S/T
(3) Palletized Cargo	1.0 S/T
c. Sealift Tonnage (LST)	5.0 S/T
(1) LST departed Newport 21 Mar 68	
(2) Last LST arrived Hue Port 8 Apr 68	
d. Organic Aircraft 1(UH-1D)	
TO&E Tonnage lifted	.5 S/T

#### 2. 17th AHC

#### a. General

- (1) C-130 sorties: 40
- (2) First scrtie 2330, 17 Mar 68
- (3) Last sortie arrived 0400, 19 Mar 63
- (4) Unit aircraft closed 20 Mar 68

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	VGM_( UBJE(		15 April 1968		
	b.	. Airlift Tonnage			
		(1) Conex containers: 92	209.8 S/T		
		(2) 36 vehicles and 31 trailers	240,245/T		
		(3) Palletized cargo	12.5 S/T		
	c.	Sealift Tonnage (LST)	200.0 S/T		
		(1) LST departed Newport 21 Mar 68			
		(2) Last LST arrived Hue Port 8 Apr	r 68		
	d.	Organic Aircraft 28 (20 UH-1H, 8 UH	H-1C)		
		(1) TO&E Tonnage lifted	14.0 S/T		
3.	18	Sth AHC			
	a.	General			
		(1) C-130 sorties: 63			
		(2) First scrtic 1130, 14 Mar 68			
		(3) Last sortie arrived 2400, 16 Ma	ır 68		
		(4) Unit Aircraft closed 30 Mar 68			
	ъ.	Airlift Tonnage			
		(1) Conex containers: 64	195.0 S/T		
		(2) 25 vehicles and 25 trailers	138.4 S/T		
		(3) Palletized cargo	72.9 S/T		
	c.	Sealift Tonnage (LST)	70.0 S/T		
		(1) LST departed Newport 21 Mar 68			
		(2) Last LST arrived Hue 4 Apr 68			
	d.	Organic Aircraft: 28 (20 UH-1H, 8 UH	H-3.C)		
		(1) TO&E tonnage lifted	14.0 S/T		
4.	200	th ASHC			
	a.	General			
		(1) C-130 serties: 28	W W T T B B		
Inc	1 10	(Gon't) CONFIDEN	VIIAL		

				<b>DCHI</b>			
NVCM			fter Action Report			15 April 1968	
•		(2)	First scrtie 2335, 19 h	iar 68			
		(3)	Last sortie arrived 231	15, 20 Ma	r 68		
		(4)	Unit aircraft closed 30	Mar 63			
7	b.	Airlift Tonnage					
		(1)	Conex containers: 99			112.5 S/T	
		(2)	24 vehicles and 19 trai	lers.		100.0 S/T	
		(3)	Palletized Cargo			37.5 S/T	
C	·.	Seal	ift Tonnage (LST)			350.0 S/T	
		(1)	LST departed Newport 21	Mar 63			
		(2)	Last LST arrived Hue 28	Mar 68			
cl		Organ	nic Aircraft 16 (CH-47	V)			
		(1)	TO&E Tonnage lifted			64.0 S/T	
5. R	ECΛ	PITUI	LATION				
3	08t	h Cor	mbat Aviation totals:				
		C-130	) sorties	14.		151	
		Conex	containers	om <sup>a</sup> l ARCHI	VOTA	: 3 <b>0</b> 6	
	•	TONNIGE: SEVIEURACE.		guor (L.)	graph with		
			Conex Containers	696.24	S/T		
			V.hiclosk	519,84	S/T		
			Palletized Cargo ·*	123.9	S/T		
			Sealift	625,0	S/T		
			TOE: A/C	92.5	S/T		
		Total	Short Tons Shipped*			2057.48	

\*Excluding weights of all individuals and actual weights of all organic aircraft