

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 4

SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Kontum airfield (57th AHC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) General:

a. The sustained attack by NVA/VC forces in the Kontum area began 30 January at 0212 hours and was reduced to minor sniper fire and occasional mortar/rocket rounds by 0800 hours on 5 February 1968. This was a coordinated attack against the City of Kontum as well as all U.S. and ARVN military installations in the area. The magnitude of the attack requires consideration of entire Kontum action rather than the 57th Assault Helicopter Company area alone.

b. Indications are that the overall plan called for taking advantage of the isolated location of US and ARVN compounds. The plan was time phased to eliminate specific compounds on given dates. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company was the first to come under heavy ground attack. This attack, from 30 0230 thru 31 0900 January 1968, was by an estimated force of 200 and included sapper, security and indirect fire elements.


c. The major attack on this compound was basically a repeat of the 10 January action. NVA intelligence had not been updated since that time and apparently they were not aware of improvements to the existing defensive posture. The enemy was either over confident in their ability to eliminate this unit or were inflexible to initiate alternate plans once the attack had failed. The action on subsequent days was oriented mainly against MACV, Special Forces, 43rd Signal and 24th STZ compounds.

2. (C) Sequence of Events

a. 30 January 1968

(1) At 300212 hours a coordinated rocket, mortar and ground attack was launched against the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound. During the battle that followed NVA forces reached a point within 50 meters of our defensive wire. Gunships engaged the enemy outside the entire eastern perimeter at a range of 20-30 meters utilizing miniguns and M-5 systems. This action, combined with ground defensive fire, broke the attack but fighting continued until 0900 hours 30 January.

(2) Defensive fires of this unit combined with those of A Troop, 2/1 Cav inflicted heavy casualties upon the attacking forces and sealed off escape routes for NVA elements.



CONFIDENTIAL

(3) The action during the early morning hours of 30 January resulted in one aircraft receiving minor damage on the ground while six additional aircraft, including four gunships, received varying degree of damage from intense enemy fire while performing aerial flight.

(4) From first light until 0900 hours gunships of 52d Battalion engaged isolated units to the east and northeast of this compound. Action was later continued with TAC Air. A firm body count for all 52d Combat Aviation Battalion gunships was not obtained but 57th gns accounted for 35 NVA bodies during this phase of the action.

(5) A sweep of the area was initiated at 0900 hours to conduct a body count along the perimeter. This action was terminated by intense sniper fire prior to completion. Body count had reached 59 at this time.

(6) Sniper fire continued throughout the day along the east, west and north perimeter.

(7) 122mm rocket and mortar attack was initiated at 1845 hours. Sporadic fire and small scale probes continued until 2400 hours.

b. 31 January 1968

(1) Between the hours of 0230 and 0330 a series of reports from 24th STZ indicated a severe situation in their compounds.


(a) NVA/VC forces, estimated at 150 strength, were overrunning their perimeter and final bunkers were occupied.

(b) The 105mm battery was reported to be infiltrated and possibly in enemy hands.

(c) This unit was notified that M4CV and B-24 compounds were being overrun. (Gunships dispatched and engaged the NVA forces along the wire defenses at which time enemy forces withdrew).

(d) Zone notified this unit of a confirmed NVA forces of 300 - 500 men located 2000 meters to the east of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound.

(e) At this time the Senior Advisor, 24th STZ declared a tactical emergency in an effort to obtain additional gunship and TAC request we relay the situation and declaration to II Corps headquarters through 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.



CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Enemy forces infiltrated ARVN forces defending the south side of Kentun Airfield and were within hand grenade range of our southern perimeter. Gunships were employed and a low pass with searchlight indicated seven bodies along the fence.

(3) Steady but light contact was maintained on the east and west perimeter between the hours of 1900 and 2400.

c. 1 February 1968

(1) Gunships of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were employed from 0230 thru 0800 against targets within the built-up area of Kentun and to the north. Targets included buildings, churches, stretches of housing and government complexes. In each case fire was requested and targets identified by ground commander and/or advisors.

(2) Sniper activity continued on east and west perimeter of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company throughout the period.

(3) A rocket and mortar attack was launched by the enemy at 1745 hours. Counter fire in close proximity to our perimeter, when mixed with enemy fire, made it extremely difficult to differentiate between friendly and enemy rounds.

(4) Light probes against the western perimeter were encountered from 1910 hours until the end of this period.

d. 2 February 1968


(1) At 0220 hours a mortar, rocket and ground attack was launched against the MACV, signal and special forces complex. Gunships were dispatched in support of local defense.

(2) Six teams of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion gunships were on-station supporting local forces against heavy enemy fire in and around the city. Methods of control included:

(a) Targets and clearance to fire were obtained from ground commanders.

(b) Those targets familiar to personnel operating Galdiator TOC, for which definite target identification control measures could be established, were controlled by this unit. Targets that were unfamiliar to TOC personnel were passed to the requesting agency for identification and control.

(c) Gunships not assigned to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were operating in area without contact and minor control problems were encountered.



CONFIDENTIAL

(d) All 52d Combat Aviation Battalion aircraft were given a cease fire and returned to 57th Assault Helicopter Company revetment area until positive fire control was established.

(e) See lessons learned.

(3) Cantonment area received (2) 122mm rockets at 1900 hours setting fire to a 5,000 gallon tanker.

(4) Isolated sniper fire during the remainder of the period. Total cumulative KIA and KBA count was 203.

e. 3 February 1968. Enemy activity decreased considerably however, rocket attacks on this compound occurred at 1040 and 1200 hours.

f. 4 February 1968. Relatively inactive with the exception of (2) 122mm rockets in the compound at 1600 hours. The City of Kenton was reported secure except for sniper fire. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company continued on 100% alert and provided continuous illumination during the hours of darkness.

g. 5 February 1968. An estimated enemy battalion moved within 3 kilometers of MACV compound during the early hours and were engaged by artillery and gunships. Activity was on a small scale and this unit received six unidentified rounds that failed to explode and penetrated to a depth of six feet (assumed to be 105mm illumination). Flare coverage was reduced to a standby status and unit went on 50% alert.

3. (C) Significant Factors

a. The NVI intelligence on local defense appeared to be the same as 10 January attack. This possibly is due to control of civilian traffic around the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound. In addition, local hire personnel are used outside the compound only.


b. The security force of 35 provided to this unit after the 10 January attack was instrumental in improving defensive facilities during the 20 day period between attacks. Major accomplishments included:

(1) Defensive wire was improved and expanded out to encompass a larger area. This work is still in progress.

(2) Temporary perimeter lighting had been installed.

(3) Bunkers had been improved and repositioned.

(4) A larger force was employed on the perimeter.



CONFIDENTIAL

c. The NVN/VC body count reached a total of 253 by LHA and KBA. This figure is by no means all inclusive for 52d Combat Aviation Battalion action in the Kontum area. In addition, secondary explosions were obtained during gunship employment against four mortar and rocket positions.

d. A search of the battle area in the vicinity of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company perimeter revealed numerous satchel charges, bangalore torpedos (home made and manufactured), wire cutters and 60mm mortars thus, verifying the intent to destroy this complex to include aircraft.

e. The sequence of events indicates the enemy respected the potential of helicopters being employed against their force and therefore intended to eliminate that threat on the first day of the attack.

f. Continuous illumination of the battle area around Kontum was a major factor in the successful defense by all US and ARVN forces during the hours of darkness.

g. Night employment of gunships in a final protective fire role was a significant factor in preventing enemy penetration of compounds on at least two occasions.


h. This unit suffered no loss or damage to major items of equipment other than aircraft. All aircraft damaged appear to be repairable.

i. The parking area for O-1 and O-2 aircraft (south side of field) was destroyed. An emergency work order is being submitted to prepare temporary parking facilities.

4. (C) Lessons Learned

a. The armed helicopter is an accurate and effective weapons platform that can be integrated into final projective fires. Employment at night, as well as in built-up areas, requires close coordination, target identification and positive location of friendly troops by the commander being supported. These systems are area type weapons and ground commanders must accept a degree of risk that some rounds will inadvertently land within their positions when employed close-up or on point targets.

b. The enemy force, when employing infiltration and sapper tactics, is inflexible to changes in defenses that disrupt his rehearsed plan. Continued improvement to wire locations, bunker locations, and overall security serves to deny him the intelligence, detailed planning and rehearsal so often employed in successful infiltrations.



CONFIDENTIAL

c. The lack of combat forces in the immediate vicinity of Kontum and the constant state of approach from the north thru the southeast continues to be a major problem in providing adequate security for this compound. Any force of any size has a high probability of reaching this unit's perimeter prior to detection.

d. The physical location of BS and ARVN compounds are such that any mutual support is denied. This situation favors the enemy in that he can attack and eliminate compounds one by one with minimum interference. The major exceptions are supporting artillery and gunships.

e. The organic fire power of an assault helicopter company and its detachments is capable of defending against a substantial attacking force. However, manning the perimeter on 50% alert during the hours of darkness degrades immensely from the aircraft maintenance effort and results in a slow recovery to full operational capacity.

f. It is essential that one agency have knowledge of all gunships operating in the area. At one time two gun teams (other than 52d (AB) were operating independently in and around Kontum City. Friendly forces were being fired upon and 57th Assault Helicopter Company TOC had no means of contacting these elements to effect a cease fire.

5. (C) Planned action and recommendations

a. Planned actions

(1) Work will continue to replace defensive wire destroyed, expand the outer perimeter wire and install anti-personnel mines along the north and east side.

(2) Civilian access to the compound is limited to permanent hire and KP personnel who have received a local clearance. Civilian traffic through the area will continue to be denied.

(3) Continued improvement on defensive bunkers.

(4) Temporary perimeter lighting will be improved. The major limiting factor is a readily available power source. This unit has operated on TO&E generators since arrival in-country. The demand for power has reached a stage where lights to the billeting area is occasionally denied to provide perimeter lights.

(5) Defensive plans will continue to be reviewed and updated as required.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MND 927622
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Recommendations

- (1) A US combat unit be stationed in the Kontum area to provide early detection and warning of any forces approaching along the major avenues of approach.
- (2) Designation of one agency to control all gunships operating within the immediate tactical area.
- (3) Immediate replacement of key personnel losses during the month of January.
- (4) Authorization be given to retain the security augmentation from other battalions until planned improvements to local defenses are completed. (Estimated 2-3 Week period)
- (5) USAFV approval and engineer tasking for the 57th Assault Helicopter Company base development plan be expedited so that construction of permanent defenses can be accomplished with minimum time delay.

6. (G) Listing of damage and casualties

a. During the action of 30 January thru 5 February, 26 personnel were wounded.

b. Of the above total the following individuals have been evacuated and may be a permanent loss of this unit:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SULLIVAN, KENNETH J.	MAJ	04030953	57th AHC
LESLIE, JEAN F. SR.	CW2	W3154207	57th AHC
SOPUCH, HERBERT N.	SF4 E4	US52688284	57th AHC
BLANKENSHIP, HARVIN	SF4 E4	US52679955	57th AHC
LITTLE, WILLIAM H.	SF4 E4	US56697966	57th AHC
WASHINGTON, THOMAS	PFC E3	US63001896	57th AHC
HILLS, WILLIAM F.	PFC E3	RA.18825173	57th AHC
FANNING, WILLIAM M.	FVT E2	RA.18825433	57th AHC
NASH, JOHN C.	SSG E6	RA.18532673	615th Trans
SHIRRETT, JAMES C. JR.	SF4 E4	RA.18951430	615th Trans
ELIAS, JOHN JR.	PFC E3	RA.18715159	615th Trans

c. The following list shows the maintenance personnel shortages within the 615th Trans Det and Service Platoon at this time. Shortages which are directly affecting maintenance productivity are designated by an asterisk.

615th Det

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Job Title</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>
(1)	*1	Aircraft Maintenance Technician	WO	062B

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MND 9276 22
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)	*1	Detachment First Sergeant (Note 1)	E-8	67N40
(3)	*1	Assistant Shop Foreman	E-4	67N40
(4)	*2	Senior Engine Repairman	E-5	68E20
(5)	*2	Senior Airframe Repairman (Note 2)	E-5	68G20
(6)	*2	Airframe Repairman	E-4	68G20
(7)	1	Aircraft Electrical Repairman	E-4	68E20
(8)	*1	Aircraft Supply Specialist	E-5	76B20
(9)	1	Aircraft Supply Specialist	E-3	76B20
(10)	*1	Aircraft Tech Inspector (Note 3)	E-6	67N20
(11)	*1	Aircraft Armament Repairman	E-4	45J20

b. Service Platoon Maintenance Shortages

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Job Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>
(1)	1	Maintenance Supervisor	E-6	67N40
(2)	5	Senior Helicopter Repairman	E-5	67N20

Note 1. Although the Det First Sergeant does not directly affect the maintenance output, his absence requires most of the time of the Shop Foreman acting as First Sergeant.

Note 2. Includes one man who is DEROS in 10 days.

Note 3. Includes one man who is on emergency leave and is not expected to return.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MND 9276 22
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 11

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Frey Attacks on Kontum Airfield (57th AHC) (Kontum, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) C11004 Mar 68
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Strength of units (2 above): 218 personnel.
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: Unk.
5. (C) Location: Unk
6. (C) Casualties: Friendly, none, VC, unknown.
7. (C) N/A
8. (C) N/A
9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by the VC: 122mm rockets, 82mm mortars.
10. (C) Gunships and other reinforcements used: Gunships, Spooky, Artillery.
11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

60mm mortar - 5	unk
81mm - 0	0
4.2" mortar - 0	23
Artillery - Unk	0
Gunships - 28 rkts 10,000 7.62mm	0
Other - Spooky expended twice	0


12. (C) VC did not use satchel charges.
13. (C) Distance at which attack was initiated was 6000 meters.
14. (C) Duration of attack: 40 minutes.
15. (C) Engagement broken off due to gunships, artillery and Spooky. VC withdrew.

INCL 11

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 9276 22
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

CONFIDENTIAL

- 16. (C) All personnel manned their positions and the alert crews manned their ships and took off.
- 17. (C) 1st Avn Co unit officer present was 1st Lt. George E. Burnison.
- 18. (C) Unit with primary responsibility for protection of installation was the 57th ALC.



CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 11

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield
(57th AHC) (Kontum, RVN) 1 February through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 17 March 1968
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company.
3. (C) Strength of units (2 above): 12 officers, 44 WO's, 209 EM.
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: Unk.
5. (C) Location AR864935.
6. (C) Casualties: Friendly, 1 WIA. Enemy, Unk.
7. (C) N/A
8. (C) N/A
9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by VC: 122mm rockets.
10. (C) Gunships and artillery were used.
11. (C) Estimate of number of rounds fired: Friendly, unk.
Enemy, 14 rkts.
12. (C) N/A
13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated: 8500 meters.
14. (C) Duration of attack was 30 minutes.
15. (C) Engagement broken off by VC because of gunships, artillery,
and Spooky.
16. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior was good. Personnel
manned defensive positions and alert crews manned their ships and
took off.
17. (C) 1st Avn Bde unit officer present was LTC Charles E.
Stanley.
18. (C) Unit having primary responsibility for defense of
installation was 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MVD 9276 2.2
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 1

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Kontou Airfield
(57th AHC) (Kontou, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

- 1. (C) 20 Mar 68 2340 hours and 21 Mar 68 0300 hrs.
- 2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
- 3. (C) Strength of units (2 above): Officers: 12 WO's: 44
M: 184
- 4. (C) Estimated number of Viet Cong: Unk
- 5. (C) Location: Vicinity of AR862934
- 6. (C) Casualties: Friendly: 1 WIA. Enemy: Unk.
- 7. (C) N/A
- 8. (C) Mh-1C (66-15079) Light Damage
- 9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by VC: 122mm rockets.
- 10. (C) Gunships, Spooky, and artillery were used as reinforcements.
- 11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

UNK

8 rkts 122mm

- 12. (C) N/A
- 13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated: 8500 meters
- 14. (C) Duration of attack, first phase 6 min, second phase 6 min.
- 15. (C) N/A
- 16. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior was good. Personnel manned defensive positions and alert crews manned their aircraft and took-off.

17. (C) 1st Avn Bde unit officer present was LTC George E. Darnison.

18. (C) Unit with primary responsibility of defending installation was 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

INCL 1

GROUP - 4
Downgraded at 1 year interval
Declassified after 1 year

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MND 927622
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 1/

SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield
 (57th AHC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) DTG: 21 March 1968 1235
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Strength of Units (2 above) Officers: 12 WO's: 44
 EN: 184.
4. (C) Estimated number of Viet Cong: UNK
5. (C) Location (6 digit coordinates): LR841962
6. (C) Casualties:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>
KIA	0	UNK
WIA	0	UNK
MIA	0	UNK

7. (C) Description of friendly losses of personnel by type N/A
 i.e. (CE, gunner, etc.).
8. (C) Description of equipment losses, friendly or VC:
 (Aircraft, Weapons by type, etc.).
9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by the VC: 122mm rockets.
10. (C) Gunships and other reinforcements used: Gunships, Artillery.
11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>
60mm Mortar	UNK	0
81mm Mortar	UNK	0
4.2" Mortar	UNK	0
Artillery	UNK	3
Gunships	NONE	N/A
Other	----	N/A

INCL 1/

GROUP 1
 Downgraded from CONFIDENTIAL
 Declassified on 05-08-2011

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 927622
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

12. (C) Did the VC use satchel - NO.
13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated - 8700 meters.
14. (C) What was the duration of the attack - 06 minutes.
15. (C) Why was the engagement broken off - VC stopped shooting and withdrew.
16. (C) Generally, what was the friendly reaction and behavior - Personnel manned defensive positions, gunships took off.
17. (C) Name of senior 1st Aviation Brigade unit officer present George E. Burnison, LTC Inf. Commanding.
18. (C) Unit having primary responsibility for defense of installation. 57th Assault Helicopter Company APO 96499.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 9276 2.2By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL


INCL 11

SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield
(57th AHC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) DTG 241803 March 68
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Location: AR 788898
4. (C) Type of Attack:
 - (a) ground, mortar, rocket: Rocket
 - (b) size of attacking force: Unknown
 - (c) number of rounds by type: (7) seven 122mm Rocket Rounds.
 - (d) any additional pertinent information describing the attack: Rocket came from AR 841961 & AR 849966
5. (C) Description of Aircraft Damage and Loss: None
6. (C) Description of Facilities Damage and Loss: None
7. (C) Description of Communications Damage and Loss: None
8. (C) Description of Casualties to Include Personnel by type (eg, CE, etc): None
9. (C) Distance at which the action was initiated: 8700 Meters and 9900 Meters.
10. (C) Duration of attack: 06 Minutes.
11. (C) Description of Sapper Attack N/A.
12. (C) Gunships and other Reinforcements used: Gunships & Artillery.
13. (C) Reasons why engagement was broken off: Gunships & Artillery was Deployed and Enemy discontinued fire.
14. (C) Discuss the Friendly Reaction and Behavior: Personnel manned their positions & Gun Crews took off.

INCL 11

DECLASSIFIED
Downgraded at 5 year intervals
Declassify



CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 1

SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Kontum airfield (57th ABC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) DTG 5 April 68 2210
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Location (digit coordinates): AR788892
4. (C) Type of Attack:
 - (a) ground, mortar, rocket: Rocket
 - (b) size of attacking force: Unknown
 - (c) number of rounds by type: (22) 122mm Rocket Rounds
 - (d) any additional pertinent information describing the attack: Rockets were fired at or near the following locations: AR 848936 AR 848958 AR 858933
5. (C) Description of Aircraft Damage and Loss: (5) UH-1C Light Damage, (5) UH-1H Light Damage
6. (C) Description of Facilities Damage and Loss: G.I. Medium Tent
7. (C) Description of communications Damage and Loss: Damage to Communications wire-loss of Communications to outside lines.
8. (C) Description of Casualties to Include Personnel by type (CG, CH, etc): 8 WIA
9. (C) Distance at which the action was initiated: Approximately 8000 meters.
10. (C) Duration of the Attack: 15 Minutes
11. (C) Description of Sapper Attack: N/A
12. (C) Gunships and other Reinforcements used: Artillery and Helicopter Gunships.
13. (C) Reasons why engagement was broken off: Enemy ceased fire due to arrival of gunships.

INCL 1

GROUP 1
Downgraded from

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 927622
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

CONFIDENTIAL

14. (C) Discuss the Friendly Reaction and Behavior: 50% Alert at 2000 hours. Remainder of personnel immediately secured defensive positions, Gunships were unable to get airborne due to the close proximity and intensity of the rocket fire.

15. (C) Name of Senior 1st Brigade Unit Officer and his Primary Duty: Charles E. Stanley LTC TC Airfield Commander.

16. (C) Unit having Primary Responsibility for Defense of the Installation: 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MVD 9276 2.2
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 5

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell (155th AHC) (Ban No Thuot, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on 1 February 1968.

a. At 0210 approximately 20 rounds fell within the limits of the compound of Camp Coryell, many of which fell in the cantonment area.

b. Directions for the defense of Camp Coryell were given by Major Billy R. Goodall, commanding officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company, from the combat operations center.

c. Flare and Gun standby ships were instructed to search the area and give support to those units in the area that needed it.

d. Instructions given for the defense of the compound included:

(1) Direction for mortar concentrations of high explosive and illumination rounds.

(2) Directions given for protective fire to those in defensive positions with small arms and machine-guns.

e. Mortar rounds which fell in the cantonment area caused six casualties, two of which were serious enough in nature to require med-evac to Nha Trang.

f. Light damage was incurred by the officers latrine, 165th Maintenance Office, and the 568th Medical Detachment cantonment area.

2. (C) Damage Report: Aircraft:

A/C#

DAMAGE

66-16387

Heavy: Turn-in

66-16389

Moderate

66-16372

Moderate

66-16377

Moderate

66-16439

Light Damage

INCL 5

GROUP - 4
 Downgraded at 3 year intervals
 Declassified after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MVD 9276 22
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 5

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell (155th AHC) (Ban Me Thuot, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative description of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on 2 February 1968.

a. At 0310 hours approximately 25 mortar rounds fell within the limits of the Camp Coryell compound, most of which fell in the aircraft parking area.

b. At the time of the attack the compound was already on alert and most of the personnel on the compound were in bunkers. There were no casualties.

c. Directions for the defense of the compound were given from the command operations center by Major Billy R. Goodall, Commanding Officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company.

d. The gun and flare ships were used for illumination and defense of the Camp Coryell compound.

e. Damage:

<u>I./CH</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
66-16379	Heavy
66-17137	Heavy: Turn-in
66-16216	Moderate
66-16377	Moderate
66-16438	Moderate
66-16046	Heavy

f. Due to the number of rounds that have fallen on this compound during these attacks the exact location of each round's impact area has been impossible to plot.

GROUP 1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MVD 927622
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCL 5

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell (155th AHC) (Ban Loc Thuet, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative description of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on the morning of 4 February 1968.
2. (C) At 0150 hours approximately 20 rounds fell within the limits of the Camp Coryell compound.
3. (C) Personnel on the compound were on alert and in the bunkers, so no casualties were incurred.
4. (C) Instructions for the defense of the compound and utilization of the flare and gun standby ships were given from the Command Operations Center by Major Billy R. Goodall, Commanding Officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company.
5. (C) Damage

A/C#

66-16441

66-16438

DAMAGE

Moderate

Light

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MND 9276 22
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 5

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell (155th LHC) (Ban Le Thuot, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative description of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on the evening of 5 February 1968.
2. (C) At 2240 hours approximately 30 mortar rounds fell within the limits of the Camp Coryell compound, falling in the aircraft parking area and the cantonment area.
3. (C) Eight casualties were incurred during this attack by persons trying to make their way to their positions.
4. (C) Instructions for defense of the compound by small arms, machine-guns, mortars with illumination and high explosive rounds, and utilization of flare and gun standby ships were given from the command operations center by Major Billy R. Goodall, commanding officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company.
5. (C) Damage Information

L/C#

DAMAGE

66-16215	Heavy: Turn-in
66-16380	Heavy: Turn-in
66-16438	Heavy: Sheet-metal, 2 T/R blades, 2 N/R blades
66-16387	Extensive sheet-metal
66-16216	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, 3 N/R blades
66-16381	Moderate
66-16389	Light: Sheet-metal
66-16090	Light: Sheet-metal; fuel cells, 2 N/R blades
66-16377	Light: Sheet-metal; needs tail-boom
66-16379	Light: Sheet-metal

INCL 1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 9276 22
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

CONFIDENTIAL

66-16441

Light: Sheet-metal,
T/R Blades

66-16372

Light: Two Sync Elevators

66-16440

Light: Sheet-metal

66-16668 (Dust-Off)

Light: Sheet-metal

66-16441 I/C# Damaged:

None

66-16580

Light: M/R blade
Sheet-metal

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MND 9276 22
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCL 4

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of enemy attacks on Camp Coryell (155th AHC) (Ban Bo Thuet, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 0115 23 Feb 68
2. (C) 155th Assault Helicopter Company & attached units.
3. (C) Strength of above units placed at 518 personnel.
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: 50.
5. (C) Location: AQ805042.
6. (C) Casualties: Friendly; none, VC; unknown.
7. (C) Damage:

<u>A/C/Off</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
UH-1C	155th	Light
UH-1C	155th	Light
UH-1C	155th	Light
UH-1C	170th	Light
UH-1C	170th	Light
UH-1H	170th	Moderate
UH-1H	170th	Light
UH-1C	355th	Light

8. (C) Weapons used by VC were believed to be 3 tubes, 82mm mortar.

9. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

VC

(158) 81 mm mortar

(53) 82mm mortar

10. (C) Distance at which action was initiated is 2000 meters.

11. (C) Duration of the attack was five minutes

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 9276 22
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

12. (C) Engagement was broken due to counter-mortar fire. Install
ation defense was adequate. VC stopped shooting and withdrew.
13. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior was excellent. One-hundred
percent alert. Responded with counter-mortar fire. Requested
artillery support from 23d AVN Division. All bunkers manned and
ready.
14. (C) Senior 1st Avn Bde unit officer present was MAJ. Mullen,
CO, 185th Recon. Aplt. Co.
15. (C) Unit with primary responsibility of defending install-
ation was 155th Assault Helicopter Company

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MVD 9276 22
 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO: 5

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Carroll (155th AIC) (Ban Lo Thuet, DM) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 0350 4 Mar 68
2. (C) 185th Recn, Airplane Co. 155th Assault Helicopter Company and attached units.
3. (C) Strength of units (two above): Approx. 700 personnel
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: Approximately 200 personnel
5. (C) Location: (6 digit coordinates) AQ805042
6. (C) Casualties:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>	
MIA	4	6	
WIA	27	25 (Estimated)	
MIA	0	0 (Unk)	

7. (C) Description of friendly losses by type:
 - a. 1 CO (185th AIC)
 - b. 1 Korean (PA&E)
 - c. 2 personnel (Det. # 10, 5th Wx Sqdn, USAF)

8. (C) Description of equipment losses, friendly or VC:


- a. Friendly Equipment losses (Captured):

1/4T jeeps (9)	5T trk (6)	Orderly Room (1)
1/4T trks (12)	Forklifts (2)	Pers. prop. \$1200.00
2-1/2T trks (7)	Billets (5)	

- b. Enemy Equipment losses (Captured):

Mk-47 Auto. rifles (6)	Directional Mine (CHICOF) (1)
Bangalore torp. (Banloc & Comp. B)(12)	Satchel charges (3)
Grenades, hand (CHICOF) (2)	Var. items indiv. equip & web gear

INCL 7



CONFIDENTIAL

9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by VC:

4 tubes, 82mm mortar

1 Bangalore Torpedo

3 B-40 Rockets

10. (C) Gunships and other reinforcements used:

1 UH-1H Helicopter

2 UH-1C Gunships

Counter-mortar fire

1 AC-47 (SPOOKY)

11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

(286) 81mm mortar

(2) Gunships

ENEMY

(86) 81mm mortar

(3) B-40 rockets

(1) Bangalore Torp.

12. (C) VC attempted to employ satchel charges. They were of hand-made type holding Composition B. Number of satchel charges VC had on hand is unknown.

13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated: 10 meters; B-40 Rockets, 1000 meters, mortars.

14. (C) The attack on Camp Coryell lasted 50 minutes.

15. (C) Engagement was broken by enemy forces due to counter-mortar fire and other protective fires. The installation was adequately defended. VC suffered heavy casualties along NW perimeter as a result of protective fire.

16. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior to attack was good. 100% alert status; all defensive positions manned NLT 0355. Good fire discipline. Reaction force committed 0410. FTL called 0415.

17. (C) Senior 1st Avn Bde unit officer was MAJ. J. Mullen, CO, 185th B.C.


18. (C) Unit with primary responsibility of defending installation

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MVD 9276 22
By MSD NARA Date 7/9/86

CONFIDENTIAL

was 155th Assault Helicopter Company.

19. (C) Three separate mortar barrages were launched. The first attack occurred at 0350 when approximately 46 rounds were fired. The second and third barrages were at 0415 and 0440 respectively. Approximately 24 and 16 rounds were fired respectively. During this period of time the perimeter was breached by the use of a Bangalore torpedo in the vicinity of the PA&E motor park. A portion of the ammo dump was destroyed by some means; either mortar rounds or satchel charges. An estimated company size hostile force was repulsed along the NW perimeter. This force fired three E-40 rockets into the perimeter and had attempted to replace Bangalore torpedoes, mines, grenades, and satchel charges along the perimeter.



CONFIDENTIAL

REF 5

SUBJECT: After Action Reports on Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell (155th AHC) (Ban Ho Thuet, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative recapitulation of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, (AQ805042), on 13 March 1968. Report submitted IAW 1st Avn Bde Reg 335-1.

a. At 2220 hours, 13 March 1968, the Camp Coryell complex was attacked by a hostile force utilizing an unknown number of 82mm mortar tubes. An estimated 81 rounds were fired in four separate barrages at 2220 hours, 2240 hours, 2315 hours, and 2325 hours.

b. The compound had been on 50% alert. Upon attack, the signal for 100% alert was given and all defensive positions were manned at 100% posture at 2230 hours. Counter mortar fire was immediately delivered on suspected enemy locations, along with illumination rounds delivered on preplanned concentrations. A total of 317 rounds were expended as follows: He; 229 rounds, WP; 57 rounds, ILLUM; 31 rounds. Result unknown.

c. Continual coordination was effected throughout the night with 23d ARVN Division MACV Advisory Team.

d. Two UH-1C gunships and one UH-1H flareship were airborne at 2250 hours. They continued to search suspected hostile locations throughout the night with negative results.

e. A state of 100% alert was maintained until 0700 hours.

2. (C) There were 20 WIA and one KIA on the compound. Three personnel were medically evacuated during the night utilizing Dustoff and organic aircraft. Casualties are listed below:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WIA/KIA</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
GOODALL, Billy R.	MAJ	WIA	155th AHC
BAKER, Charles H.	SSG	WIA	155th AHC
BRENNELAN, James L.	1LT	WIA	155th AHC
BIRDSEAW, Robert J.	SSG	WIA	155th AHC
JANNIGAN, Jack G.	SSC	WIA	155th AHC
LAKE, George R.	1FC	WIA	155th AHC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 927622By MSD NARA Date 7/9/76

CONFIDENTIAL

BOSS, Gary A.	WO1	WIA	155th AHC
BREWER, Leander C.	SP4	WIA	155th AHC
BRYDEN, Charlie K.	PFC	WIA	155th AHC
BURSTON, Albert	SSG	KIA	155th AHC
BURMAN, Marvin D.	WO1	WIA	155th AHC
WILLIAM S, Lawrence M.	PFC	WIA	155th AHC
BURMEER, Jan P.	SP4	WIA	208th Sig
ELLIOT, Patrick P.	SP4	WIA	52d Sec. Det.
BUBE, Larry W.	SF4	WIA	52d Pathfinder Det.
BURICE, Thomas W.	CPT.	WIA	185th Recon. Apln. Co.
4th Inf Div Transient Personnel			
ADKINS	WO1	WIA	
DINELE	SF4	WIA	
DRUDGE	PFC	WIA	
ROALOFF	WO1	WIA	
WERNER	SP4	WIA	

3. (C) There was negative aircraft damage, as most of the rounds fell in the cantonment area.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 9276 22By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell
(155th AHC) (Ban Me Thuot, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) From 262305 to 262310 April 1968.

2. (C) 155th Assault Helicopter Company, 185th Recon. Airplane Company, 165th Transportation Detachment, 70th Engineer Battalion.

3. (C) AQ805045

4. (C) A mortar attack occurred at Camp Coryell compound in which 25 rounds fell within the confines of the compound. Twenty-three rounds fell on the NE corner of the compound, occupied by the 70th Engr. Bn. Twenty-two rounds fell in the center of the compound in the 165th Trans. Det. aircraft maintenance area, and mortar pool area, and in the corral next to the maintenance area. The rounds were fired from the north side of the perimeter, from approximately 500 meters out.

5. (C) Damage Information

UH-1H 67-17235 Moderate damage

UH-1H 67-17152 Moderate Damage

UH-1H 67-17259 Moderate damage

UH-1H 67-17090 Moderate damage

UH-1H 67-17149 Light damage


UH-1D 64-13653 Moderate damage

UH-1C 66-15049 Moderate damage

6. (C) Negative communications damage

7. (C) Personnel wounded:

DAILY, Bruce	SFA	70th Engrs.
RAINER, Raymond L.	IFC	70th Engrs.
WATSON, Charles R.	SFA	70th Engrs.
CAIERON, Ronald J.	FFC	418th Med.
VOIGSCHILD, Jack	SFA	568th Med.
WARD, Robert	CFT	568th Med.



CONFIDENTIAL

MEZ, Eugenic	PFC	165th Trans.
MEN, Clifford H.	SP4	165th Trans.
MES, Harold F.	SP4	165th Trans.
MOMON, S. L.	SP4	165th Trans.
COLSON, David E.	SP4	155th AHC
MURRAY, Osborne	SP4	155th AHC
DUBOSE, Alton E.	PFC	155th AHC
HOLMES, Charlie	SP4	155th AHC
SEVLA, John R.	WO1	155th AHC
KOSOSKI, Jerry W.	SP4	155th AHC

8. (C) Enemy positions estimated to be 500 meters from the north fence of the compound when attack started.
9. (C) The attack lasted five minutes.
10. (C) Two UH-1C gunships, one UH-1H flareship, counter mortar radar, artillery, mortars.
11. (C) Normal perimeter defense plus counter mortar concentrations.
12. (C) LTC W. E. Toothill
13. (C) 155th AHC, 165th Trans. Det., 165th R/C.

CONFIDENTIAL

DMZ

TNCL G

I CTZ

SPAATZ

*KONTUM

I CTZ
XXX
II CTZ

PLEIKU - 52D CBT AVN BN (-)

KONTUM - 57TH ASLT HEL CO

SULTAN

BAN ME THOUT - 155TH ASLT HEL CO

*PLEIKU

MIDDLETON

WAINRIGHT

* BAN ME THOUT

II CTZ

III CTZ

II CTZ

XXX

III CTZ

IV CTZ

III CTZ

XXX

IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl _____